

# **FINAL DRAFT v.1**

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## **GREEN COAST 'for nature and people after the tsunami'**

### **END TERM EVALUATION -- May 2008 --**

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*Date: 1 May 2008*

## **Executive Summary**

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# 1 Background and Introduction

## 1.1 *The 2004 Tsunami*

On December 26, 2004 a seabed earthquake, measuring 9 on the Richter scale, near the Sumatran island of Nias, generated a huge tsunami wave that spread in all directions, discharging its energy on thousands of kilometres of coast around the Indian Ocean (see map 1 in annex A). Waves up to 30 m (100 ft) high were reported to have stripped beaches with tourist resorts, local houses, roads, railways, and other human infrastructures and settlements up to several hundred meters or even several kilometres inland. According to available information, human and economic losses were most severe along shorelines lacking natural vegetation and with constructions close to the sea (coastal forests can act as a wave breaker). In total about 227,000 people lost their lives and 1.7 million people were displaced<sup>1</sup>. The disruption of society was tremendous.

Most small coastal communities depend heavily on their coastal natural resources (e.g. fisheries, small-scale eco-tourism). Many coastal communities also used semi-natural resources like home gardens, bamboo and coconut groves. The Tsunami had a devastating impact on these and other important economic activities such as aquaculture (i.e. shrimp ponds) and tourism. Poor fishing communities have been most severely hit by the Tsunami in many locations. Beside loss of tourism enterprises (Sri Lanka, Thailand) and shrimp ponds (Indonesia and Malaysia), a large part of the fishing fleet has been lost. Coral reefs have been damaged in various locations, diminishing the tourism potential in those areas. Finally, damage to coral reefs, mangroves, sea grass beds, peat lands and estuaries will reduce their ability to provide nursery habitat for local fisheries, and the region's marine food chain will suffer for years. Restoring the coastal ecosystems therefore assists in restoring the livelihoods of coastal communities and the local economy.

## 1.2 *The Green Coast project*

Green Coast is an initiative of four organizations: Wetlands International (WI), Both ENDS (BE), Wereld Natuur Fonds (WWF NL) and IUCN NL. The project was developed in response to the 2004 Asian tsunami. With financial support of 4.3 million Euros from Oxfam NOVIB (through funds from SHO, Dutch public charity), Green Coast is implemented in the period June 2005 – March 2008 with the overall objective to recover coastal ecosystems in support to local livelihoods of tsunami affected people. In the aftermath of this disaster many disaster relief activities were initiated (food, shelter), followed by rehabilitation work.

After intensive consultation with their networks in the region, they identified three focal areas for support, with a main emphasis on rehabilitation projects in the field:

- a) Assessments of ecological damage and opportunities for rehabilitation, including local people's views, rights, capacity and needs (budget 450,000 Euros);
- b) Policy support to guide reconstruction policies and implementing agencies towards sustainable recovery of coastal systems and associated livelihoods (500,000 Euros); and
- c) Communications and Small Grants facility for ecosystem restoration activities through field-level community based projects (budget 2.6 million Euros).

The three components are inextricably linked and overlap in the timing of implementation.

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<sup>1</sup> Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (2006): Synthesis report.

Green Coast focuses on three tsunami-affected countries: India, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. In addition there was some support for policy work and model examples in Thailand and Malaysia (see map 2 in annex A). The partnership of the four organisations is based on a common vision and complementarities in terms of expertise, skills and regional networks of the four organizations and their partners.

Although an emergency response project, Green Coast is designed as a long-term endeavour to build resilient communities and ecosystems in vulnerable coastal regions in Asia.

***Box 1: The Vision of the Green Coast Project***

The vision of the project builds on the general principle that human well-being is vitally dependent upon the conservation and sustainable use of ecosystems. In the context of Tsunami responses, the rehabilitation and sustainable management of (natural) coastal ecosystems will offer opportunities to recover local livelihoods and will also provide a more secure future. The importance of coastal ecosystems for local communities has been briefly described in the foregoing section, and stresses the need for integration of environmental and socio-economic concerns in the rehabilitation efforts. Another key principle of the project is that local communities need to participate in all stages of coastal rehabilitation, from assessments, through planning to implementation. The project is designed to ensure the linkages between these various phases in coastal rehabilitation.

*Source: Project proposal, April 2005*

**1.3 Approach and methodology end-term evaluation**

The work of the end-evaluation will build on the extensive mid-term review that focused on Indonesia, India and Sri Lanka. The other two (model) countries were not included. This mid-term review was conducted in November 2006. Most small-grants projects were finalised at the formal end-date of March 2007 but others were granted extensions. The response to the observations of the mid-term review is also part of this end evaluation. This evaluation will however not repeat all conclusions. Thus the mid-term evaluation report should also be read to get a complete overview.

Title	Green Coast project
Organisations	BE - BothENDS IUCN - International Union for the Conservation of Nature WI - Wetland International WWF - World Wide Fund for Nature
Countries	India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Thailand
Budget	4,309,325 Euros
Expenditures <sup>2</sup>	4,046,483 Euros
Donor	OXFAM Novib
Type of research	End evaluation
Evaluation period project	September 2005 - March 2008 (extension as of March 2007)
Date of evaluation	April 2008
Terms of Reference	Annex B
Date evaluation report	1 May 2008
Authors	Mr. P. de Koning, Mekon Ecology Ms. S. Sachithanandam, Viluthu

<sup>2</sup> Expenditures until March 31<sup>st</sup> (excl. costs of final evaluation, reporting, audit, GC brochure & LL materials)

The Terms of Reference (ToR) for the end evaluation is presented in annex B. Key questions of the evaluation<sup>3</sup> were:

- 1) What outcomes<sup>4</sup> (intended and unintended) have been achieved by GC Phase 1?
- 2) Have these outcomes been achieved in a cost-efficient and cost-effective way? and are they sustainable?
- 3) What contributions have been made to women's empowerment and furthering gender equality?
- 4) Have changes in policies and practices occurred to which Green Coast activities have contributed?
- 5) What lessons can be learned about the effectiveness of Green Coast as an approach (intervention strategy) to achieve outcomes?
- 6) Furthermore, the evaluation should make recommendations on how the Green Coast approach best be replicated and scaled up, in order to ensure sustainability of results. The evaluators should also look into possibilities to what extent Oxfam NOVIB and the Green Coast partners will integrate Green Coast approach in their regular work (what lessons can be learned from Green Coast and what can it 'teach' the involved partners?)

The evaluation has been result-oriented. The intention is that this report will be used by Green Coast partners in their dialogue with the humanitarian relief sector to promote the "ecosystem approach" in disaster relief work. The evaluation team consisted of Mr. Peter de Koning (Mekon Ecology), team leader from the Netherlands and Ms. Shanti Sachithanandam (Viluthu), from Sri Lanka. The evaluation was conducted in April 2008 and consisted of a mission to Sri Lanka, India, Thailand and Malaysia and a desk study of Indonesia. Green Coast staff as well as Small Grants recipients and community beneficiaries were visited and interviewed. We received support from the general project manager M-J. Vervest as well as by the specific country teams. Upon our request several projects were visited. The country teams were also allowed to make suggestions about projects they wanted to show us. In the selection of projects we used the following criteria (as much as possible): (1) Projects and areas not visited by the mid-term review; (2) A mixture of projects implemented by grassroot NGOs and CBOs; Projects that showed the diversity of the small grants projects (budget, focus); (4) Projects that involved or needed strong community participation.

The extensive output of documents, publications and especially Quarterly Technical Progress Reports (TPRs) were reviewed to assess the outputs and outcomes. Per country we looked at:

- 1) The quality and use of the Assessments;
- 2) Focus and performance of the Small-Grants facility;
- 3) Gender issues and women's empowerment;
- 4) Local partner organizations (NGOs, CBOs, groups);
- 5) Focus and relevance of policy work and communication;
- 6) Expenditures, efficiency and effectiveness

Our findings are presented in the following chapters.

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<sup>3</sup> Questions are formulated conform the Oxfam NOVIB 60124 guidelines "Central Research Questions to be integrated in Terms of Reference for Humanitarian Project Evaluations"

<sup>4</sup> See definition of 'outcome' in above mentioned guidelines



## **2 Indonesia Country Report (desk study)**

### ***2.1 Introduction***

On December 26<sup>th</sup> 2004, Indonesia and especially the shores of its most northern province Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and the island of Nias, was hit hard by the Tsunami. At the end of the day 176,000 people lost their lives, 550,000 people were homeless. On an enormous scale infrastructure and economic assets were destroyed, along a coastal zone of more than 800 kilometres. The disaster also severely affected the capacity of regional government, due to loss of life, offices, data and documentation. The central government was overwhelmed, struggling to coordinate the unprecedented size of the relief operations with national and international aid pouring in from all sides. The ongoing conflict between government troops and the rebel army of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) further added to the problem, with the Indonesian army trying to keep its control over the area by restricting movement of international relief operations.

The Green Coast project in Indonesia was implemented by Wetland International Indonesia Programme (WIIP) in a partnership with World-wide Fund for Nature Indonesia(WWF). Both partners had or established an office in Banda Aceh which made communication and coordination rather easy. Both organisations had ample experience in Indonesia with a variety of projects and were familiar with the concept of livelihood supporting activities. WIIP for example worked before the Tsunami in Banda Aceh with a women's group in a coastal community. The project coordinator and the small grants officer were directly involved in the assessment exercise.

The end-evaluation is a desk-study of the final outputs and outcomes of the GC-project in Indonesia. No projects were visited. Therefore, general performance has been assessed by the mid-term evaluation. A real end-evaluation will be conducted at the end of phase 2 in December 2008. This evaluation is an assessment based upon the available information.

### ***2.2 Review of progress and follow-up on the mid-term review***

The main findings of the mid-term review are presented below. Due to their good performance the Indonesian Green Coast team received a follow-up phase. This second phase started in April 2007 and will end in December 2008. This second phase is not part of this end-term evaluation. Therefore, most findings of the mid-term evaluation should be regarded as a kind of end-term findings.

- 1) The project managed to identify, analyze and address a broad scale of environmental issues that Tsunami-affected communities are facing in different coastal stretches and which are directly linked with their livelihood. Supporting community based initiatives to restore environmental damage, the project provides the needed flexibility to respond effectively to a variety of local rehabilitation needs.
- 2) Project-design is very ambitious linking three components, i.e. scientific assessment, policy development and small grant projects, all within in a limited timeframe, focussing on sustainable coastal rehabilitation. Although preliminary assessments done by WIIP explain the relatively early and smooth start of the projects in Indonesia, as compared to some of the other countries, the forced simultaneous start of the other components provided difficulties. External constraints like a 'competitive aid' environment, lack of local capacity and a political fluid situation, further undermined close cooperation from

the start. Yet, after one year, separate outputs from policy and small grants start to fall in place, reinforcing livelihood-based conservation approach.

- 3) While the project is coordinated by a National Coordination Team, the implementation was initially done by WIIP and WWF in a rather separate manner, each looking after their own components. In recent months however local project teams started more intense cooperation, trying to forge linkages and provide inputs for policy campaigns.
- 4) Green Coast is one of several projects active at cutting edge of livelihood and ecological restoration, but one of the few with a longer term perspective. Working in a variety of coastal areas, it identified different needs, priorities and activities. To prevent the project of becoming too diffuse, it is important to clearly define a common approach and methodology to ensure Green Coast plays a more prominent role in coastal policy development in Aceh.
- 5) Assessments: The scientific guidance of the Green Coast assessment study is limited due to simultaneous start of all components as well as delay in publication. This goes more for the policy component as the small grant facility could benefit from both preliminary assessments as well as zonal project assessment briefings. Overall the assessment provides crucial data, given lack of scientific analyses by other actors. The potential impact for assessment information to be policy-relevant was demonstrated by exposure of the negative impact of seawall construction near Banda Aceh.
- 6) Policy & Communications: Initial focus on analyses of past and present laws and regulations proves to be useful instrument in ongoing policy discussions with government and non-government organisations. However, role and input of local communities received less attention until recently. Community-based integrated coastal management approach needs to be further explored, backed up with scientific assessment. Several fact-sheets highlight communities' role in coastal rehabilitation. Yet, communication work needs to be better integrated, addressing misunderstandings and ensuring an efficient exchange and use of available data, knowledge and experience.
- 7) Small Grant Facility: Effective means to involve affected communities in ecosystem rehabilitation while supporting livelihood activities. Good output given difficult working environment, number of projects, large area and time constraint. WIIP initial strong focus on coastal rehabilitation needs to be adjusted as livelihood activities are progressing. With many local partners introducing community-based revolving funds, WIIP needs to provide them with an exit strategy to ensure sustainable use of these funds.
- 8) Gender: Importance of gender equality highlighted in proposal, yet not always implemented. Assessment is lacking gender-specific data, which should provide guidance for policy work and small grant facility. While women participate in projects, they do not always benefit on equal terms. Staff lacks experience for translating gender policy into practical activities, despite training and workshops. The staff's willingness to address this issue demonstrated by new training initiative in cooperation with local women's group.
- 9) Focus of final phase should be on integrated effort to develop a workable model for community-based integrated coastal management, a clear vision on coastal development supported by field inputs and lessons learned.
- 10) In future Green Coast should focus on and promote its overall strategic approach and methodology, by strengthening its community based coastal management model. Concentrate its efforts on one or two regional zones enable more efficient management.

## **2.3 *Outputs and outcomes of the Green Coast project Indonesia***

### **2.3.1 *The Assessments***

The assessments were conducted rather quickly after the Tsunami and approval of the Green Coast project. This resulted in the following outputs:

- 1) Note on 'Tsunami of Aceh and Sumatra' (chapter 1), note 'Wetlands prior to Tsunami' (chapter 2), note on the 'Estimated Damage to Coastal Ecosystems (chapter 3). The concise report is undated;
- 2) Aceh Assessment report (undated). The research was conducted between 30 August 2005 and 27 September 2005. The report consists of 189 pages!;
- 3) 'Post Tsunami Green Environmental Data Assessment' (October 2006).
- 4) Rapid Assessment Results East Coast Aceh (undated). The assessment was conducted between 29 January 2005 and 10 February 2005;
- 5) Rapid Assessment Results North Coast Aceh (undated). The assessment was conducted between 29 January 2005 and 10 February 2005;
- 6) Rapid Assessment Results West Coast Aceh (undated). The assessment was conducted between 29 January 2005 and 10 February 2005;
- 7) 'Comprehensive Assessment of Tsunami/Earthquake Affected areas in Aceh Province and Nias Islands' (undated)
- 8) Fact sheet of Assessment (undated). Overview of the work conducted;

The note (1) reports the damage caused by the Tsunami along the coast in terms of people (dead, hospitalised, lost, evacuated) and homes lost. Information on the coastal wetland ecosystem was scarce due to conflict situation, which hampered surveys before the Tsunami. There is however a stark contrast between the East and West coast of Aceh in geographical contours, height of waves and dominant coastal ecosystems (mangroves, beach forests, freshwater swamp forest, peat swamp forests, beaches, coral reefs, seagrass beds).

The Aceh Assessment report (2) as well as the 'Post-Tsunami Green Environmental Data Assessment' are both very comprehensive and provide detailed data on ecosystems, plant species, and uses in relation to ecosystems and livelihoods (even including the value of farm products in terms of commodity prices). Both reports seem to overlap but are not the same. In conclusion, the reports are good and comprehensive (with the exception of providing a gender distinction) but the reports are not easy accessible nor provide direct guidance to SG-projects.

The rapid assessments (3, 4, 5) are in general too much oriented towards wetland ecosystems and biodiversity species. Some general information is provided on the impact on the fishing industry and local farming. The rapid assessments describe some of the economic activities, notably fisheries, aquaculture (fish and shrimp farming), hatchery business, and rice farmers. However, we feel these assessments provide insufficient data on community livelihoods with gender distinctions (e.g. how men or women use certain ecosystems and which products they derive from it) to target certain areas and communities and to guide small-grants interventions or policy work. The 'comprehensive assessment' (6) is less comprehensive than the Aceh report (2). The recommendations in this report have sometimes no logical link with the previous assessment information (e.g. planting the biodiesel crop *Jatropha*?). In the analysis of soil conditions and suitability the assessment becomes clearer and provide more guidance.

### 2.3.2 *The Small Grants Facility*

Wetlands International Indonesia Programme (WIIP) through Green Coast project funded by OXFAM NOVIB has support up to 59 coastal ecosystem and livelihoods rehabilitation projects implemented by 51 local NGOs/CBOs partners. At the end of the GC-project a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation was conducted.

Ecosystem rehabilitation activities in Green Coast (GC) project were carried out by planting mangrove and beach trees, establishing protected area for coral reef and lagoon. There are at least 50 project sites throughout Aceh and Nias has been rehabilitated covering total 638 ha, of which consist of 206 ha of mangroves (1,004,000 seedlings), 394 ha of beach trees (187,600 seedlings), and 38 ha protected marine and coastal ecosystems.

Indonesia was not visited during the end-term evaluation. The main reasons were that the mid-term evaluation had already visited Indonesia just before the finalisation of the project. Their findings were positive and the Indonesian team was granted a second phase until December 2008. At the end of this year the second phase will be evaluated. Thus, the findings of the mid-term can be considered as being valid for the end-evaluation as well. Some factual information is added.

The SG-projects can be divided over three categories of projects (A: < 5,000 Euros, B: 5,000-15,000 Euros, C:>15,000 Euros) covering respectively 30%, 60% and less than 10% of the projects. Ecosystem rehabilitation activities mainly consist of replanting of mangrove varieties, coastal vegetation and attention to coral reefs. Some projects focus on given an economic and livelihood value to lagoons that have been formed on former rice paddies. The livelihood activities cover a wide range of economic activities ranging from fisheries, animal husbandry, cake production to selling clothes.

Some of the main observation(s) in the mid-term review are:

- The variety of project goals and activities covers the variety in ecosystems in Aceh and Nias. It provides a rich experience in good and bad practices and valuable lessons learned which can provide direction for future activities. Some projects are directly implemented by the local community, but most are initiated by local organisations with different backgrounds and with little experience in coastal rehabilitation. Overall, they manage to come up with good results, and the projects are well received by local communities, although it is too early to judge the long-term impact.
- From the management perspective the broad area covered and the high number of projects is cumbersome and requires more monitoring than was provided in the original budget. This has partly been overcome by adding extra staff, i.e. a technical program officer as well as four monitoring staff. Furthermore, the two experienced staff that has been put in charge of two small grant projects in the vicinity of Banda Aceh also regularly provides assistance in training and guidance of local NGOs and community groups.
- The small grant management is foremost focussed on the ecologic aspects, in many cases restricted to planting of mangrove around fishponds and re-greening of coastal areas. Staff is confronted with a lot of practical problems. Time can be a constraint. The standard one year project contracts often force people to start planting in dry season. The lack of a clear government policy regarding the Green Belt means communities can only work in restricted 'common-ground' areas or need explicit permission from the owners, which they are often reluctant to give especially regarding fishponds as silvo fisheries is a relatively new concept (not yet really enforced by local fisheries departments). Owners have far less problems to provide land to be planted with commercial trees like coconut, but this can cause resentment among the people who plant the trees but are not allowed to enjoy the fruits. These constraints highlight the bigger issues of land rights, the green belt safety zone, and sustainable development policies.

- So far, (November 2006), the impact of the economic activities, and the way the grant money is benefiting the local community, received little attention, as can be judged from monitoring activities and is acknowledged by the management. Stricter monitoring is needed to ensure that women and other vulnerable groups also enjoy the benefits, especially as these activities could provide a more long term perspective, which would enable and stimulate the community to proceed with the ecological conservation. Many counterparts introduce revolving funds as a more long term, sustainable economic strategy, i.e. by starting a credit rotation system, offering small capital to enterprising community members. While this offers women easier access, compared to money earmarked for capture fisheries and fishponds, it also can cause some inequalities.

Livelihood support activities include home gardens, organic agriculture, revolving funds, fisheries (boats, equipment) and processing and other equipment (e.g. sewing equipment). In general the database focused more on recording the data of ecological restoration than income improvement. But during the evaluation the Indonesian could rather easily provide additional information on livelihoods. In general:

***Ecological restoration:***

*(There are some deviations from the final TPR, the reason is unclear).*

- Mangrove planting targeted 638 ha and achieved 529 ha on which 811,263 seedlings were planted. The survival rate is 68%.
- Along the coastline coastal forests species were also planted (107,350 seedlings). The survival rate is 89%.
- In addition about 20 ha of coastal coral reefs are protected by communities.

***Livelihood rehabilitation:***

- 138 households were supported with home gardens
- 523 households received support related to fisheries and agriculture (1,856 farmers)
- Community infrastructure: 12
- 3,449 households received direct support but in total 43,637 households are listed as beneficiaries.

In general, it seems that most activities are either focusing on ecosystem restoration or livelihood rehabilitation. It is difficult to develop a clear and viable link between the two. A promising instrument to create is the BioRights approach used by Green Coast in Indonesia.

The BioRights approach is a micro-credit/loan provided to a local community as finance capital for small-scale economic activities to generate income. Instead of paying interest the local community helps in the active restoration of coastal ecosystems (nursery, planting caring). After 1 or 2 years, i.e. the contract period, and successful implementation the loan is turned into a grant and no payback is needed. The restored coastal ecosystem can in the future provide various ecosystem services like the provision of natural resources, habitat and breeding area for fish and wildlife, acting as a safety buffer (wind and wave breaks), etc. The results and experiences with this approach are so far positive. The approach seems acceptable and appropriate to the local Indonesian context. Currently, Malaysia and Thailand are looking at this approach to see whether they can adopt it to their context.

### 2.3.3 Local partner organisations (NGOs/CBOs)

[Shanti]

### 2.3.4 Gender issues and women's empowerment

[Shanti]

### 2.3.5 Policy Work and Communication

The following outputs for policy work and communications were produced under the Green Coast project and presented:

- 1) "Improvements of Wetlands" (undated). Labelled as chapter 4 this note probably belongs to the same document as the notes presented in 3.3.3;
- 2) WWF Indonesia Policy Report (TPR July-December 2005);
- 3) "Analysis on Marine and Fisheries Policies in frame of Green Coast Program" (undated);
- 4) "Fact sheet Policy Work Indonesia".

WWF-Indonesia actually produced a very important policy output before start of Green Coast i.e. the "Green Reconstruction Policy Guidelines for Aceh" (April 2005).. Another policy guidance document produced was the report 'Timber for Aceh' (March 2005). The reconstruction of Aceh needed huge quantities of timber. Rightfully, the report addresses the issue that this demand cannot be responsibly supplied from the already overstretched legitimate Indonesian sources, now unable even to meet demand for the domestic timber processing industry itself. The policy work initially focussed on analysing all related laws and regulations regarding coastal development, covering both national and regional laws as well as customary laws. The latter are implemented by Aceh's traditional leaders of fishermen communities called Panglima Laot or 'Commanders of the Sea'. Results have been published in a report in Indonesian and English language. More recently, discussions on formulating community-based coastal management model have started. The initiated 'road shows', i.e. district-based policy discussion events use both inputs to engage government and non-government representatives in discussion on future policies regarding rehabilitation and development of tsunami affected coastal zones.

The GC-partner WWF is member of the Steering Committee for Revision of Provincial Spatial Planning, Nanggore Aceh Darussalam.

Communication work focuses on production of series of fact sheets in English, highlighting several small grant projects, as well as one each on assessment and policy work. Communication organised a press conference to launch the assessment report and has organized a press tour to generate publicity for the Green Coast project related to the upcoming 2-year tsunami anniversary. Publications include *Guidelines on Green Reconstruction* and *Guidelines on Mangrove Planting* (of which an updated, Aceh specific version exists).

#### **Box 1: Rethinking development options.**

Indonesia gives two sad examples on how the Tsunami and earthquake affected the environment and linked livelihoods options for local people. The events led to shifts in geomorphologic shape, width, as well as water quality and basic substrates.

In some areas the coastal rice paddies, freshwater swamp or ponds, that used to be deep with freshwater, were lifted (thus became swallow) and/or were filled with saline mud and sea water. These areas can no longer be used as rice paddies but these newly created coastal brackish lagoons can be used for fisheries. This means some significant adaptation by people and communities.

The condition on Seumeulue Island, however, is the other way around. This island is suspected to

have lost around 25,000 hectares of its coastal wetland because the leverage of this island of about 1-1,5 meters, so that the coastlines are now reduced and many mangroves are dry and dead because its basic substrates do not touch water anymore and now they harden like being cemented. How this will affect the fisheries potential by the coastal communities is yet unknown.

*Source; various GC TPRs..*

Interviews during the mid-term review with various stakeholders confirmed Green Coast plays role in the policy discussion at the provincial level, pointing at its participation in the working group on Coastal Rehabilitation that was initiated by BRR<sup>5</sup> together with FAO and GTZ. Some local government departments are also involved in these initiatives. But while local government directly after the tsunami played a minor role, as it was severely affected and overwhelmed by the disaster, it is now gradually regaining grip on the situation, preparing for BRR's exit. Green Coast staff has to maintain relations with both, gradually shifting its focus from BRR to provincial government. Building up relations with the government is not always easy, due to the regular staff changes, especially of those leading the departments. The same goes for BRR. As already indicated by Green Coast, all the people I met where actually new on the job, thus making it difficult to judge the actual impact of Green Coast policy work.

In conclusion, we could say that:

- 1) The GC-partners succeeded in providing a significant input on Revision of Provincial Spatial Planning;
- 2) Key stakeholders on marine and fisheries issues in Aceh Province have become involved;
- 3) Green Coast strategies are adopted by other agencies (government and donors).

## **2.4 Budget, efficiency and effectiveness Indonesia**

### **2.4.1 Budget and expenditures**

Below the original budget and final expenditures as submitted by WIIP are presented.

**Table 1: Budget and expenditures Indonesia**

	<b>Budget component</b>	<b>Original budget (Euros)</b>	<b>Expenditures (Euros)</b>	<b>% Exp. of total Exp.</b>
<b>1</b>	<b><i>National project implementation</i></b>			
<b>1a</b>	Assessment	<b>120,000</b>	<b>119,413</b>	<b>10.3%</b>
<b>1b</b>	Policy Work, Communications	<b>95,900</b>	<b>97,311</b>	<b>8.4%</b>
<b>2</b>	<b><i>Project costs Small Grants</i></b>	<b>954,000</b>	<b>942,814</b>	<b>81.3%</b>
<b>2a</b>	Management costs WIIP	120,950	127,363	13.5%
<b>2b</b>	Local NGOs/CBOs <sup>6</sup>	249,928	200,337	21.2%
<b>2c</b>	Direct "Ecosystem& Livelihood" support	583,122	615,114	65.2%
				100%
	<b>Total country budget</b>	<b>1,169,900</b>	<b>1,159,538</b>	<b>100%</b>

Of the overall budget 81.3% was allocated to the Small Grants facility. Of this amount 13.5% was used for project management by WIIP (administration, monitoring, TA) and 86.4% was

<sup>5</sup> In response to the need for coordination of relief work the government initiated a new coordination body: the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency.

<sup>6</sup> Incl technical support to communities

used to support local level management and capacity building (2b, 21.2%) and for direct support (2c, 65.2%)

#### 2.4.2 Efficiency and effectiveness

The efficiency (see annex C for definition) are the means used to achieve outputs and outcomes. The efficiency of Green Coast Indonesia cannot be compared against a pre-determined standard. For building a house one could say that the costs per house has to be within a certain range. This is very difficult for a project consisting of components like assessments and policy work. Also for the small-grants projects this is difficult as they combine direct livelihood support as well ecological restoration work. There is also not one standard to assess whether the 'efficiency' is sufficient or not. Thus the assessment by the evaluation team is mainly qualitative in nature.

In general the budget has been spend mainly on direct support to 'ecosystem & livelihood' activities. The management costs are limited thus can be regarded as efficient. Detailed figures on the results achieved in comparison to the targeted result are presented in Annex C-2. Some of these results have been verified in the field. Most of the promised results have been achieved (general >80%). An exception is the establishment of community protected area in coral reefs (66.7%). For some basic figures no targets had been set.

**Table 2: Assessment of efficiency Indonesia**

	Budget component	Means (Euros)	Output, Outcomes	Assessment
<b>1</b>	<b><i>National project implementation</i></b>			
<b>1a</b>	Assessment	<b>119,413</b>	Good, relevant. Could be improved.	+
<b>1b</b>	Policy Work, Communications	<b>97,311</b>	Relevant process. Outcome is supported by Gov.	++
<b>2</b>	<b><i>Project costs Small Grants</i></b>	<b>942,814</b>	43,637 beneficiaries = 21.6 Euro/beneficiary 3,449 households direct support = yield farmers + 20-30% = catch fishers + 50-100% 529 ha planted = survival rate 68-89%	++
	<b>Total country budget</b>	<b>1,159,538</b>		

'-' = not good: outputs have not been used or are not relevant enough

'0' = reasonable, need to be improved: outputs have been used and are relevant

'+' = good: outputs are high and relevant, outcomes are promising

'++' = very good: outputs are high, outcomes are good and significant to target group

In general the budget has been spend mainly on direct support to 'ecosystem & livelihood' activities. The management costs are limited thus can be regarded as efficient.

The effectiveness (see annex C) can be defined as an assessment of the activities in reaching intended goals and outcomes. The country programs however never defined their own specific goals. We therefore consider it best to assess the effectiveness of the project components and activities on the level of the overall Green Coast project.

#### 2.5 Sustainability, integration and up-scaling



Indonesia has already been granted a second phase of the Green Coast to ensure sustainability of the investment and continue their work. The GC work has been integrated into the regular work of the GC-partners and they are working with the Government of Aceh on up-scaling.

## **3 India Country Report**

### ***3.1 Introduction***

The Tsunami hit the coastal areas of different states of India, namely Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, and the island of Andaman and Nicobar (which are Union Territories falling under the Central Government). About 1,076 km coastline was affected with a loss of 10,000 lives. The Tsunami also damaged 35% of the fishing equipment of fisheries communities. About 80% of the agricultural lands were negatively affected due to the deposition of sludge, saline sediment and debris. As a result water reservoirs and channels became silted up and groundwater and agricultural lands became saline. The tsunami also damaged large stretches of mangrove and coastal forests and displaced large amounts of coastal sand causing significant changes in geomorphology.

The Green Coast project in India was implemented by WWF India, Wetland International South-Asia (WISA) and a BothENDS representative. For the purpose of the project a project office was established in Chennai (Madras) in the state Tamil Nadu. Coordination and supervision were done by the Delhi offices of WWF and WISA. The division of tasks were;

- WWF India: policy work and communications
- WISA: assessment and small-grants facility
- BothENDS: scouting (of local organisations) and monitoring

The project office was closed at the end of March 2008. A mission to India was conducted between 11 April and 15 April 2008. The evaluation team first had a discussion with some remaining staff Mr. Dakshinamurthy (the Small-Grants Officer) and Mr. Murali (policy coordinator). Meetings were held with ten small-grants project recipients (PAVAI, NIZHAL, Ekoventure, REEF, TOTEM, VOCDRC, WEDFORUM, PEDDA, PHCC and PBRC). In addition, the two organisations that assisted in the policy work of the Green Coast, being CAG and FERAL, were also visited. At the end meetings were held with other GC-team members of WWF India and WISA. The BothENDS representative was not available for an interview. A meeting was also held with the DAHN Foundation whom implemented a non-related livelihoods project in the post-tsunami period to learn about their experiences.

### ***3.2 Review of follow-up on the mid-term review***

The mid-term review had several significant and serious observations concerning the performance of the GC-team and the partner organisations. Some needed follow-up. Others were reflection on the period before and needed no follow-up. The main findings of the mid-term review are:

- 1) The design of the project is unique in adopting the principle of conservation and sustainable use of coastal ecosystems for providing a rapid relief to the tsunami affected people. The approach of this project is a definite contrast from other aid projects that aimed at rapid spending for creating visible results.
- 2) The enormous constraints induced by the short working cycle did not allow the project to adopt the phased approach for implementation of its various components. This deviation from a phased approach to simultaneous working led to a significant constraint in the Project design that was initially conceived to integrate the learning from all its components for better results and quality outputs.

- 3) The project site was located remotely from the HQ of two agencies (WISA and WWF). The distance factor had serious implications of lack of coordination and communication among partner organisations (WISA - WWF and WISA- Both ENDS) and to some extent, between project team members representing different organisations, making the task of project coordination at Chennai difficult. This is leading all participating partners to work in isolation and resulting in production of disjointed outputs.
- 4) The language barrier for Delhi based team visiting the project site in Tamil Nadu created further difficulties in accomplishing the planned tasks. This was particularly true for tasks to be accomplished under the Communication Component by the Communication Officer who is based at WWF in Delhi but needs to work more closely with the team members based in Tamil Nadu.
- 5) Further, the limitations of working from distances and the ‘act fast’ mode adopted for generating quick outputs under the project has not only failed to produce quality outputs for assessment components but have also led to the progress of policy work in isolation from other project components. Consequently, some most relevant issues have been ignored in visualising the policy interventions.
- 6) The work on the Small Grants Facility has shown visible results even in a relatively short period of time and has contributed significantly to the popularity of the Green Coast Project at all levels in Tamil Nadu, including at the level of communities.
- 7) The links of Small Grants Projects with local livelihoods is strong as is evident from the involvement of large numbers of local communities in virtually all initiatives.
- 8) Sensitivity to gender is inherent and visible in most of the initiatives under Small Grants Projects.
- 9) Greater levels of communication and transparency among partners and better planning with respect to distribution of work at the project site is needed for delivering more integrated outputs.
- 10) To overcome the constraints of working on a project with many partners and its coordination from a distance, a strong local entity could be identified to host the project office and act as implementing agency for the Tamil Nadu based activities of the project.
- 11) Small Grants played a critical role in relief work for ecosystem and people and this continued role will be necessary to scale up the successful Small Grants Project in order to create for tangible results.

*Response in general:*

During the interviews staff mentioned that they consider some observations in the mid-term incorrect or exaggerated. As not all staff were present any more this could not be verified. However, the distance factor between Delhi and Chennai was correctly seen as a constraint in several issues like communications, coordination and responsibilities. After the mid-term more responsibility was delegated to the project office in Chennai. The Small-Grants Officer considered this an improvement. The Chennai-based project coordinator left the project and was not replaced. The reason provided was that the recruitment took a long time and the intended candidate did in the end not accept the offer. After that there was insufficient time till the end of the project to find a sufficient candidate. This resulted in the situation that all project team members fell under the responsibility of their own organisations. It seems this created more rest in the organisations. All other observations can no longer be validated as the project has closed and many participants can no longer be interviewed. The interviews conducted suggest that there at least no (longer a) problematic discussion of conflict between WWF India and WISA.


In response to the observation of the mid-term a local Communications Officer (employed by WWF) was appointed. She speaks Tamil although her writing skills are limited. Therefore she

used a translator if and when needed to correct her Tamil. This does not have to affect her effectiveness as she can talk directly to people in communities. It seems that the other observations have not been followed-up (if it was possible).

### 3.3 Outputs and outcomes of the Green Coast project India

#### 3.3.1 The Assessments

Before the Green Coast project (GC) started an assessment was already conducted by WWF India (thus could not follow the ToR provided for assessments). Later, after the project started this information together with several other reports were used to draft several assessments. The Assessment of environmental and socioeconomic impacts of tsunami was carried out by a network of 6 experts and 11 NGOs. The assessments were based on the collation of existing information, primary surveys, rapid rural appraisals and focal group discussions in 33 villages within the 5 priority stretches of the tsunami affected were carried out. Later in the project the focus further on less stretches using sound criteria (TPR 4 QT, July 2006). The focus was on the coastal stretch of Tamil Nadu.



*Figure: map of the priority areas of SGF in Southern India*

This resulted in the following outputs:

- 1) "Assessment of Impact of Tsunami in Indian Coast on Agriculture". The assessment started in December 2005 and was completed in February 2006;
- 2) "Assessment of Impact of Tsunami on Geomorphology and Water Quality". The assessment was conducted in December 2005 and January 2006;
- 3) "Ecological Impact to the Mangroves and Shelterbelts of coastal Tamil Nadu as a result of Tsunami" (undated).

The assessment "Conservation of Coral Reefs in Gulf of Mannar" was conducted before the Green Coast project but has been presented on the website. The assessment was conducted between 4-10 January 2005.

The assessments are very general in the information they provide and predetermined in their focus (i.e. subject). The last one has no direct relevance to the Small Grants project or the policy work conducted under GC. The first three assessments conducted on behalf of GC do provide useful information. It is however rather difficult to extract information from the documents. The quality could also be improved (e.g. fonts vary within a document; a table of contents is missing). The target audience for the assessments is unclear. The first small-grants projects were signed in January 2006 before finalisation of the assessments. There is also no indication that the assessments were used in subsequent rounds of project appraisals. Therefore the use of these assessments is questionable and this has been acknowledged during interviews. A letter was sent by Wetlands International HQ in January 2006 – prior to finalisation of the assessments -, which pointed out important aspects lacking in the assessments being conducted (in line with our observations) and urging the India team to focus on the use of assessment for decision-making of SG-projects and policy interventions. It also points to record reasons if decided otherwise. We can only concur with this letter and observe that the assessment have not been used as such.

This, however, this not necessarily mean that the work conducted under the SGF and regarding policies was not good (on the contrary). But all 3 components are stand-alone activities. Actually the best assessments – although too limited in scope - are presented in the Technical Progress Reports (TPRs). The TPR provides a concise description of: the significance of an area in terms of affected people; the environmental and socio-economic impacts; and the related policy issues.

### *3.3.2 The Small-Grants Facility*

A total of 60 small-grants project were supported. The Small-Grants Officer did a great job with recording the project data of each project and documentation was properly filed. Out of 60 projects one project (CROP) was stopped before the end-date because the planted seedlings all died as a result of grazing by cattle. The project forgot to put up fencing. There was no confidence that the recipient could improve its lack of performance. The reports and presentations tend to forget this project and often mention a total of 59 projects.

The small-grants projects delivered late in the project factual and grass-root information for the policy work. This is mostly due to the simultaneous implementation of both components (as already mentioned in the mid-term). The reason given is the time- pressure for the project implementation under its post-disaster relief conditions.

Based upon consultation and contacts with local identification of options for ecological restoration and livelihood reconstruction three rounds for proposals were conducted. Between September 2005 and March 2006, 188 proposals were received. Many however did not fulfil the requirements. In January and March 2006, 13 SG-contracts were signed. In round 2, 14 SG-contracts were signed in May 2006 and in round 3, 28 SG- contracts were signed in July 2006 (one proponent received 2 small grants). In the last round, the 27 small grants projects targeted 32 tsunami affected villages of Tamil Nadu (25), Andhra Pradesh (1) and Kerala (1). In total 164 Tsunami affected villages were involved in Tamil Nadu, Pondicherry, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala and GC benefited 24,157 households. Because of the large number of projects these are grouped together below to identify the most important outcomes. Some of the SG-projects are used to highlight certain aspects of the interventions.

#### ***Ecological restoration***

Some projects focused on coastal restoration by replanting mangrove forests, replanting of native species belonging to the Tropical Dry Evergreen Forest (TDEF) ecosystem and other plantations (mixed trees, e.g. coconut, casuarine). The project database lists that in total 52.5

hectares of mangrove forests were re-planted in 10 projects and 7 hectares of TDEF (plus a coastal stretch of 8 km) in 3 projects. In addition seedlings were provided in 30 projects to households and communities to plant in a variety of community plantations and homesteads. The number of hectares is unknown.

The success rate of the projects varies as could be seen during the visit when various project sites were visited. Some examples:

- *REEF*: The project of 250,000 IRs (3,959 Euros) is implemented by the 6yr old organisation REEF (Rural Ecology and Environment Federation). It is a very small organisation run by two mangrove biology Phd-students. The project intended to replant 3 ha of mangroves in Ariyankuppam estuary near the village of Thangaithaittu with the purpose to increase the prawn fisheries and improve the estuary. They established a nursery and planting is done at 3 sites. The actual planting is done by 100-200 families. One site was visited and one could see the survival rate is high (given the difficult circumstance i.e. solid waste coming from Pondicherry). The planting is done with expertise, an overall strategic vision and the project seems well implemented.
- *PHCC*: The project is implemented by the organisation PHCC (Palni Hills Conservation Council). The project also included the establishment of a nursery (not only for mangrove species), bee keeping and environmental education. The project has been implemented by a forester with no experience with mangroves. The site for planting is at the moment barren and is situated between the sea and a fisheries community. The intention is that by planting mangroves a buffer zone is created and the barren area becomes a mangrove ecosystem again. Before the Tsunami there were many shrimp ponds, some vegetation but no mangroves left. In the first year a large area was planted with mangrove seedlings. Now only very few seedlings remain (<1%). The high mortality rate is related to the lack of tidal water (because the channel was closed with sediment) and a dry summer. Nearby old shrimp farms are situated. It is unclear if and how they polluted the water and sediment during their existence. The project has not been implemented well. Project staff lacks basic knowledge about mangrove species, salt tolerance levels, local mud conditions etc. The seedlings were grown in a nursery with completely different conditions in comparison to the planting site. Because of the lack of knowledge and experience, they should have started with some small plots of planting to test local conditions (as there are no mangroves in the vicinity). Some basic measurements on soil and water conditions would have helped as well.

Other Coastal Forests:

- *PBRC*: Over the last 15 years PBRC (Pitchandikulam Bio Resource Centre) – together with 17 active women's group – has been working on environmental awareness programs and eco restoration exercises from planting trees, studying the wetland and mangrove ecosystem, propagating indigenous species in nurseries, innovative organic agricultural practices and micro credit financing. Under the GC, nurseries were set up the villages Pattipalam and Nadukkupam surrounding the Kaliveli wetland (budget 844,000 IRs or 13,367 Euros). The seasonal agricultural lands in the wetland are now lost as a result of the deposition of saline sediment by the Tsunami. The project supports in Nadukkupam a Women's Self Help Group (SHG) of 18 women. The SHG got permission from a land-owner to use his 4 acres for various activities. With the help of the GC-project they started a nursery to grow seedlings of the Tropical Dry Evergreen Forest (TDEF). The seedlings are sold to PBRC and the Forestry Department. The SHG took a loan from the bank and has now also started other activities on their plot like fruit trees and producing fodder for the cows (which they bought with the loan. The project can be considered a success.

In general most projects are quite successful in the replanting of mangroves or TDEF. Many projects had problems with grazing by cattle and the seedlings had to be protected by fencing

and guarded. Because the plants and trees are yet not mature enough continuation will be problem. Most proponents continue their support of the activity also after the ending of the SG-project but they would also like to receive additional support for this.

Restoring an ecosystem is a long-term process and cannot be measured within the timeframe of the GC-project of 1.5 years. at least 3-5 years are necessary to make sure the seedlings are mature enough to survive seasonal variations (by reaching the groundwater table) and not palatable anymore for cattle. In future similar projects some funds should be allowed for some aftercare. In Sri Lanka, innovative micro revolving funds are trying to close this gap (see SGF in that chapter).

Except for the PBRC project the proponents seem to focus on specific areas and did not think about the 'bigger picture' of the ecosystem to be restored. I.e. whether the planting is sufficient or many more hectares should be planted and if so, how this up-scaling will be achieved. For a proponent focusing on one community this is understandable. Thus, ideally the GC project team would have done this. A proper Assessment would have been important to enable a strategic selection of restoration projects or facilitation of such projects.

***Box 2: PBRC and the women's group of Nadukkupam.***

The Kaliveli wetland is situated inland but is connected to the sea. When the Tsunami hit the coast it pushed inland via the river. The wave brought a large amount of water, debris and saline sediment to the wetland area. The communities around the wetland used to fish in the wetland and used the floodplains for seasonal agriculture. Now these seasonal lands are too saline and nothing grows. The villages are hit by shortage of food crops and unemployment.

About 4 years ago, PBRC started working around the wetland to restore the Tropical Dry Evergreen Forest (TDEF) and they now target 15 villages of Sevidan Kuppam through forming women's Self Help Groups. The project coordinator PBRC explained why they initiated this project. The vision of PBRC is to restore the coastal ecosystem by replanting the Tropical Dry Evergreen Forest species along the coastline and around Kaliveli wetland. The support of the communities is crucial in this endeavour and they are integrated in their project by using women's groups. Since then these groups has been meeting regularly to share the trials and tribulations of their personal lives as well as to learn about their ecosystems and how it links to livelihoods.

Under the GC-projects the women of Pattipalam and Nadukkupam were provided with an alternative livelihood opportunity. The women received assistance in cash and kind to establish a nursery for TDEF. Adjoining land was obtained on lease (they themselves actively approached the landowner to get the lease), and a fence and plumbing infrastructure established with a cash investment of IRS 7,000. The initial income of group by sale of the TDEF seedlings was IRS 35,000. This quickly developed into an economically viable venture. They now also cultivate organically grown vegetables and derive a substantial income from it. The women applied to a commercial bank for further assistance to expand their nursery business. After inspecting the venture and meeting with the members of the group, the Bank has extended credit worth IRS 375,000 to the group. Meanwhile, the declining quality of water prevented them from investing the whole fund in the nursery venture. After investing about IRS 30,000 on the nursery, they divided the rest of the funds to buy milking cows for their group. They planted also fodder on their land. Now they repay the Bank from the income obtained by selling milk.

This experience has changed these women's lives. They were now very vocal and dedicated. They spoke of the pressure they had to face in their families during the early stages of forming and consolidating their group. Now, looking at their development and earning capacities the very same families have had to change their previous attitudes. "As I did not have money before, I had to consult with my husband and ask his advise whenever I wanted to do something" the leader of the group said. "But now as soon as I decide something I don't have to ask anyone. I go off and do it. Like, meeting with the bank manager.." She laughed, "I am now the financier even to my husband.."

The group has plans to expand their enterprise by establishing an outlet for their produce alongside the main road a couple of kilometres away. A big problem is that the amount of good water is limited. The

Tsunami negatively affected the water quality. To expand further they need to build a pipeline from another source to their nursery. They are pondering how to solve this. It is impressive to see how they actively address the issues they are confronted with.

**Why do we like this project?**

- The focus is on a region where PBRC has experience and an interest in continuing involvement after the GC-project.
- Clear long-term perspective on restoring the wetland's ecosystem.
- The project is related to the long-term vision of the organisation.
- The GC project helps a community group. Their activities in turn supports PBRC's work.
- The initiative has the potential to become self-sustainable whereby part of the nursery raises seedlings for the ecological restoration (seedlings are sold) and the other for the women's own enterprises (fodder, vegetables, fruit trees).
- The women are empowered, look strong and actively taking their fate in their own hands.

*Source: Field visit and interview with the women's group and PBRC.*

***Livelihood restoration***

Another important element of the small grants projects was the restoration of livelihoods after the Tsunami. Most donor organisations focused on fisheries and handed out boats and equipment. There is ample evidence of negative effects of this relief effort. Because of this focus the GC-project concentrated more on farmers and their communities. Many farmers were also negatively affected by the Tsunami as saline sediments were deposited on their rice paddies, and rivers and ponds filled up with debris and saline sediment. GC supported a variety of projects related to restoring homegardens, introducing sustainable rice agriculture (SRI), various household enterprises (like making compost through vermiculture) and reconstruction of some community infrastructure (drinking water, solid waste management). Green Coast supported about 7,021 households in creating homegardens, restored the productivity of 521 hectares of agricultural land and supported 151 new eco-enterprises by groups and households.

The support reached about 8,513 households. Of the direct beneficiaries 90% were women and 10% men. The indirect beneficiaries have not been quantified yet. But for example the SRI project has a great spin-off. Many rice farmers now come to the farmers group to be trained and copy the technique.

Some example projects were visited during the mission:

*Restoring agricultural lands that were affected by debris and saline sediment:*

- **EKOVENTUE:** The organisation introduced the relatively new technique Sustainable Rice Agriculture to affected farmers. The budget was 850,000 IRs (13,462 Euros). One old farmer dared to try it out and planted half of his land conform the SRI-technique (He stated "after the Tsunami I had nothing else to loose"). The group of farmers doubted whether the low density of rice planting could actually yield more. This is contrary to their experience. However, the yield was higher than normal with less expenses for inputs (like seedlings and chemical fertiliser) thus resulting in a much higher income. This is convinced the other farmers. Through Farmer Field Schools interested farmers were trained and 176 farmers used the technique on 188 acres of paddy. They are now so convinced that they will plant and use SRI for all their paddies in the next season. The manuals produced by EkoVenture for farmers are instructive and simple to understand. The success convinced 794 other farmers to do the same. In addition, high yield seeds for flowers were handed out and organic farming techniques were presented as well as the merits of alternate cropping to restore the soil. To increase organic fertiliser input 14 vermicomposting units were supported. Twelve women's Self Help Group profited of this sub-project. The GC-project supported directly 190 households and restored 188 acres (for app. 71.8 Euros per household and per acre).



- WEDForum noted that all post-Tsunami relief focused on fisheries. But who helped the affected coastal agriculture? They reached out to a group of farmers in the remote and Tsunami affected village of Vedaranyam. The farmers were initiated in restoring soil quality, recovering nearly 125 acres of paddy lands. They were trained in alternative organic cultivation methods. 60 tanks (waterholes) were also desilted. As a result the poor farmer households were able to triple their incomes.

*Home gardens in order for households to produce vegetables and fruit around their house:*

- *PEDA*: The organisation People Education for Development Association implemented a GC-project in Tranquebar Taluk in Nagai district. They helped to establish 150 home gardens (called kitchen gardens in the project) near households and 25 vermicomposting units to support the gardens. This will help them to restore their subsistence and reduce the purchase of vegetables from the market (savings about 100-200 IRs per month). More than 800 families were supported to establish horticulture around their house (fruit trees like mango and guava plants. About 650 families are doing well. The project also supported the excavation of a 3 km irrigation canal (silted up by the Tsunami). About 1,000 small farmers use this canal for irrigation. For this work 750 landless labourers were employed. The budget for all this work was 829,189 IRs (about 13,133 Euros), helping 2,725 families. This means not even 5 Euro per household! We consider this a good integrated project that helps to restore a local economy after a disaster.
- *SWARNA (not visited)*: The organisation Swarna Social Welfare centre received a budget for their project of 214, 610 IRs (3,399 Euros). The Tsunami killed many coastal trees in the village of Kunnankal in Colachel. The TPR reports that they helped 1,710 women/households in planting coconut trees near their home and raised awareness /trained these households in kitchen gardening. In general, the awareness on coastal conservation has been raised as well (although not described how and in what exactly). We observed that many communities and household regard coconut trees as important and valuable trees and ask for them. In that sense, we consider this an appropriate project addressing the expressed need of the affected people (for about 2 Euro per household....).

Most projects can be considered a success and the results are convincing. Even when taking into account some of the notable failures they have big impacts for little money. Especially the introduction of SRI (after restoring the soil properties) gives a direct rise in household income and gives tangible convincing results. Most projects had a direct and meaningful contribution to the restoration of livelihoods of the participating households. One striking feature of these projects is their appropriateness to the local context. The appropriateness of these SGF becomes even more apparent when compared to what the conventional relief interventions did. Examples were seen or mentioned of inappropriate equipment and housing (not in line with local customs, very close to each other with limited space for kitchen gardens, too far from the coast etc.). An example seen was a housing project whereby the fishermen live part time in their temporary shelters near the coast to go out fishing and part time in their new fancy houses further inland. It is probably just a matter of time before they sell them or rent them and make their temporary shelter again permanent.

#### ***Awareness raising and capacity building***

In most projects local people and groups were trained and provided with learning materials and found new skills. SRI is an obvious example. Less evident are the empowerment of women or capacity building of local NGOs/CBOs (see the paragraphs on these issues). The SGO did however also record the awareness raising and capacity building activities in the projects (in contrast to some other countries. Recorded are 590 events reaching 93,813 people:

- Training / awareness programs: 392
- Cultural programs / public meetings: 73

- Skill workshops: 19
- Exposure visits: 28
- Publication training materials: 29

***Lessons learned (from the TPR 4QT, July 2006:***

Some of the lessons learned are well described in the TPR by the Indian project team. We agree with these lessons but find it a pity that the team did not discuss these issues during project implementation and properly respond to it.

- 1) Local community institutions, like CBOs and community groups have been more effective on implementing integrated livelihood initiatives as compared to larger NGOs. This is primarily due to their higher acceptance and connectedness with the grass root communities.
- 2) Development of effective institutional mechanism is prerequisite for ensuring sustainable livelihood recovery. There needs to be a clear demarcation of roles and responsibilities of the participating individuals/ institutions/networks which set guidelines for sharing of usufruct. Emphasis must be laid on replicability and linkages with the larger developmental planning in the region.
- 3) Proper targeting and identification of project beneficiaries before initiation of the project is essential for effective implementation of the small grants initiatives. In the post tsunami scenario, there has been a rush of funds without adequate mechanism for monitoring and evaluation and transparency. This can be avoided with clear cut project design and elaborate consultation with the beneficiaries.
- 4) The project design should reflect the felt need of the target communities, rather than perceived notions of the implementing NGOs. Emphasis needs to be laid on participatory project design involving all stakeholders and partners.
- 5) Emphasis must be laid on capacity building of the communities through ownership and involvement in management of interventions. Role of the NGOs should be seen more as facilitating agencies, which project interventions leading to independent decision making for conservation and management of coastal ecosystems.

These are all valuable lessons and they show a clear understanding of what the GC-project intended to achieve and to some part has succeeded to do.

***3.3.3 Local partner organisations (NGOs/CBOs)***

The India program was not only large in the numbers of projects, but also diverse in the groups, organizations and the communities it supported. The Green Coast project partners included NGOs, CBOs, village based women's self help groups (SHGs), groups formed by experts and academics studying ecosystems, social activists groups and, cultural groups. This afforded an ideal opportunity for the fusion of ground experience and innovative approaches, while also increasing responsibilities in building capacities. Furthermore, the GC-team decided to ensure grassroots communities to access the small grants fund through a micro grant scheme. All this needed an inbuilt strategy to enable sharing of expertise offered by particular groups while compensating for their lack of experience in any area through training or appropriate collaboration.

In addition to collaborating with implementers of the small grants schemes, the Green Coast also linked with resource organisations, which worked on policy (CAG and FERAL). This meant that channels had to be established for information flow of the experiences of the implementation of the small grants schemes to the policy organizations, so that the concerns

and issues faced by the communities affected by the disaster could be reflected in the policy dialogues commenced with decision makers.

As it is, the project office was frugally constituted with one SGO (Dakshinamurthy) in charge of the small grants facility, with an assistant to oversee 59 projects. During the early stages the communication work was undertaken by an officer located in Delhi, which position was only after the mid-term evaluation transferred to Chennai office. The WI India was also unable to fill the position of Project Coordinator when it fell vacant in the middle of the Project. Since then, the SGO had to undertake part of the responsibilities of even coordinating Green Coast. This heaped enormous responsibilities on him.

The methodology of selection of small grants recipients, though appreciable in the context of its objectives in reaching out to small communities, was long winded for a rapid response project. Rather than advertise, applications were sought through existing networks. In many cases, the selected areas were personally visited by Dakshin who met with SHGs and other grassroots groups to explain the project and encourage them to apply. The result was not project applications but a flood of request letters from small groups having members ranging from 15-75. the SGO had to also then help each group to develop their list of needs into a coherent project proposal. With this familiarity of the project area and the community, he was able to defend the project to the National Reference Group (NRG). Once projects were approved by the NRG, along with his assistant, he had to embark on monitoring and report to WISA India office. The fruits of this labour were seen in many areas where it was reported that Green Coast was the only support received by those communities.

Considering the infrastructure support and resource constraints faced by the project office, Dakshinamurthy's performance has to be commended. In addition to identification of projects and communities, processing of proposals, monitoring the progress, in many cases he also organized exchange visits between beneficiaries of different areas and enabled experts to visit other projects in need of advise and direction. From the point of view of project management, detailed documentation was maintained on the activities supported, their budgets, progress and their monitoring reports. Both Ends, through their partner organization PHCC, supported Dakshinamurthy's work by looking for potential partner NGOs and also monitoring some projects.

Green Coast not only required clear outputs in terms of improvement in the situation of community livelihoods and the conservation of ecosystems, but also certain processes that ensured sustainability and gender justice. Suffice to say that this project management arrangement was totally inadequate to address the variety of issues, needs and problems thrown by each partner organization. There were a few organisations writing reports about activities they had never carried out, which had to be spotted in time and weeded out; groups that had embarked on specialised activities, such as mangrove planting, without prior experience or knowledge, and therefore in need of expert advise and guidance; experts' groups which had sufficient technical knowledge, but which needed collaboration with organisations experienced in community mobilization and gender-focused approach; groups of well intentioned social activists who have no prior experience in mobilizing and organizing community based activities; village based NGOs which lack the confidence to change some aspects of the project in order to utilize unforeseen opportunities that could have brought sustainability to their activities and effectiveness, needing support in terms of brainstorming of ideas and directions; or groups which during implementation had to face a situation where the community was divided over a serious internal conflict, in need of help with skills in conflict resolution. A two-three member team could not possibly look in to all this. Moreover, there were no channels to bring this wealth of experience gained at the community-level to the policy groups to inform their work.

**Box 3: Nizhal: a disheartening experience in community mobilization.**

Shobha is a journalist who has a passion for trees. Along with her friends she formed Nizhal (meaning shade in Tamil) to promote greening of the city and the suburbs planting trees within the premises of colleges and other public buildings. Nizhal came forward to do a bioshield development project in a coastal village south of Chennai under the Green Coast. Carrying out planting of bioshield as well as empowering women with the knowledge of the environment was Nizhal's stated objective.

Volunteers and well wishers of Nizhal landed in the village to spread the message of the value and beauty of trees only to be received with disdain by the men and women. The poor volunteers had to plant the trees themselves. They discovered in their subsequent visits that the saplings were being neglected, and had to pay the women to water them. They could not decipher the internal conflicts of the village either. Undaunted, they worked with local teachers in raising awareness about conserving turtles! Anyway, the introduction of home garden activity was a saving grace. The women of the village began to be involved at the latter stages of this nine-month long project. These tireless crusader were finally rewarded.

Making felt needs the starting point of any community interventions, involving in preparatory processes of identifying and building relationships with persons respected by that community, and forming the community as the subject of development process rather than the object, were the fundamental rules of development practice perhaps learnt rather late by Nizhal. It would also probably been better to question and discuss the approach before approval by GC.

*Source: Interview with Shobha during mission.*

There was an urgent need to address all needs related to capacity building through a comprehensive strategy. One method could have been supporting a few capable NGOs just to perform either capacity building function or a monitoring function for the partner groups implementing the small grants schemes, assigned to each cluster of the three core geographical areas identified for implementing Green Coast. The monitoring NGOs could have played the dual role of instituting and implementing monitoring systems in addition to documenting best practices and critical issues to be passed on to policy organizations. Such a strategy extends the possibility of building capacities of supporting NGOs, leading further towards sustainable solutions. The role of the project office in this context would have been to collate information, and coordinate communications and policy advocacy.

Under the GC, the local partner PHCC did the monitoring. The reports of monitoring visits were descriptive, more akin to the progress reports submitted by the implementing NGOs themselves. It listed the activities carried out, the problems and delays and where the project needed to be hurried. It seems the objectives of monitoring visits had not been thought through within the framework of the role of the project office, so that a template is prepared with all the necessary checklists. While the main responsibility to monitor progress of the project rests with the implementing organisations, identifying capacity needs, gaps in strategy, possibilities for inputs in policy and communications, and conflict assessment could have been the thrust of the monitoring carried out by the project office. This is the information that could propel a community-level project to the next levels of scaling up, networking with government and non-government organisations and policy formulation. There also seemed to be a conflict of interests in PHCC being both an implementing organisation as well as a monitoring agency.

Some good projects have been supported under GC India. Provided with appropriate support, they possessed the possibility of being exhibited as model projects to be replicated, emulated by the government or to be scaled up.

- *PAVAI*: the Pavai Center for Puppetry uses puppetry as a tool for environmental awareness. Its founder Dr. Banumathi was able to initiate an income generation venture

for women from a Tsunami affected community, in the production of puppets which were utilized by school teachers in raising awareness of children.

- *REEF*: a small group of researchers on mangroves, worked over 5 years to actively involve local children in the establishment of nurseries and the planting of mangroves around Pondicherry. They have successfully linked with the local schools and the parents of the children. The confidence and the community networks earned in this process have made them to venture in to exploring alternative forms of waste disposal and management for the city, which otherwise are dumped in and around the estuaries.
- *WEDForum*: a group of experts in agriculture, reached out to a group of farmers in the remote and Tsunami affected village of Vedaranyam. The farmers learned to restore soil quality and were trained in alternative organic cultivation methods. The farmers now know how to test new crops and assess soil quality.
- *EKOVENTURE*: The organisation EkoVenture introduced the SRI technique in paddy cultivation to the farmers, and also the techniques of organically cultivating vegetable seeds purchased from agricultural companies. The manuals produced by EkoVenture for farmers are instructive and simple. After the first very successful trials now every farmer in the group will plant and manage their paddies in the same way. They look confident and optimistic.
- *PBRC*: The self help women's group of Sevidan Kuppam in Pondicherry established a nursery to plant a TDEG forest area in the Kaluveli wetland. With the small assistance provided under Green Coast, they were subsequently able to convince and procure bank loans for other income generation ventures.
- *VOCRDC* is an organization functioning in Chidambaram. Under the Green Coast it supported 3 women's SHGs with about 35 members to plant 40,000 seedlings of mangroves on land allocated by the Department of Forestry. The department itself was planting mangroves in large tracts of land adjoining the VOCRDC land. A wide prevalence of unemployment in the area made this project all the more valuable because the women were remunerated IRS 70 per day for their labour in maintaining the nursery and planting the seedlings. Now that the project was completed, they were desperate in seeking further assistance, which, a village based NGO such as VOCRDC will not find easy to provide. Interestingly, the Forest department did request the NGO to supply seedlings. But since the original project proposed establishment of a nursery and planting they had insisted on their own piece of land and project different from the department. When suggested that this initial tie-up with the department may have possibly led to future collaboration and sale of seedlings (which would have sustained the project), the NGO leader looked uncertain and troubled. He was not sure whether such amendments were allowed (but also had not asked). VOCRDC has built good relationships with the local authority as well as government structures. With some insight in future sustainability and market sense they could have done much better.
- *TOTEM* is another group formed by some University staff working in the Pondicherry region implementing TDEF multi-species planting to restore a sacred grove. A murder committed years ago has however split the community in two. TOTEM now works with both sides and the villagers cooperate in the planting and maintenance of the grove. Although not part of the project it might be interesting to see whether working together on the sacred grove can heal the community, But for the moment, this organization has not thought about sustainability from the beginning and is in serious need of assistance to continue maintenance of the seedlings. It is unlikely that the community now could work together to maintain the sacred grove.

Good as they were, in many of them, the beneficiaries were still requesting for more assistance without which they would find it difficult to continue, raising questions on

sustainability. Sometimes it seems a mentality of donor dependency crept in after the huge tsunami hand-out<sup>7</sup>. This spoiled environment was confirmed by some local NGOs. Although there were some small women's groups that had taken off in a big way such as the Ooraha Mahalir Kulu after the Green Coast, still there remained a significant number of projects which needed continued assistance. Perhaps with monitoring, communications, facilitation of networking and timely action, some of these issues could have been sorted out during the GC project period. Now it seemed that there was an urgent need for a follow-up for some of them so as not to lose the work built up under the GC.

### 3.3.4 *Gender issues and women's empowerment*

Most of the government, international NGO and NGO assistance post tsunami went for the provision of fishing gear, housing and other infrastructure projects. This benefited primarily men because they were the fishermen as well as contractors and most of the skilled labour in masonry. Very little assistance went in to small-scale agriculture, and small-scale fish trading and other cottage industries which were mainly under women's purview. In this context, the Green Coast in India performed well in not only targeting mostly women's groups for assistance, but also identifying agriculture, household-based ventures and fish-trading activities as income generation ventures to be assisted.

The fact that Green Coast specifically targeted women's groups could be attested by the letters of request sent to the project after each visit by the Small Grants Officer to the field areas. Browsing through 26 such letters, it was found that only one was from a male Self Help Group. However, the mere participation of a women's group within a project cannot lead to improving gender relations. This had to be integrated with processes where women took control of the decision-making structures, gained access to technical skills, and embarked on high-income earning ventures. It had to also equip women with critical analytical skills to be able to at least raise questions about prevailing unequal practices amongst men and women.

This was probably the most challenging and highly ambitious task given the landscape of NGOs and their relationship with the communities in India. Most village based NGOs were led by males and they formed and worked with women's groups knowing their fundraising potentials. The women themselves did not trust that they were capable of learning scientific knowledge or technical skills. And, they opted for home based economic activities which was not entirely market oriented and were low-income earners. If they were, the men would have taken over anyway. In the informal sectors women were paid very low wages. For instance, in the agricultural sector while men were paid IRS 150 per day the women were paid IRS 50 or at best 60 per day. This is how the market had stabilized itself for the past so many centuries. If one were to counter all these factors, the brief for monitoring and capacity building had to be built in from the word 'go'.

As we saw, this was not the case, and the results were mixed. We saw some excellent examples such as PBRC, and also bad examples of the women's groups under for instance the PEDDA organisation where they appeared ignorant of underlying gender issues. They received training on seedling nursery maintenance but were not initiated in to business techniques of running it as a self-sustaining venture. The male farmers were trained in the SRI-technique. But they in turn hired female labourers for part of the work. Women working in the agriculture projects or the mangrove-planting program were paid the usual wages. The NGOs cannot possibly upset the labour market in the locality just for one short-term project. However, more than the implementation on the ground, of which one cannot have too many

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<sup>7</sup> The white face of the evaluation mission' team leader also did not help. During the post-Tsunami relief effort white persons came and just asked them what they needed and gave it to them. This resulted in for example 3 boats per household (to grandpa, dad, and son) where before there was only one boat. Or an enormous hand-out of sewing machines, which were later dumped on the market.

expectations, as this is a rapid response grant, the policy documents were the most disappointing.

In the executive summary of the assessment report (no date provided), a cursory reference is made as “declining productivity of fisheries and agriculture led to increased reliance on wage earning of female members of the households. Increased work loads and early marriages have also seriously impacted girl child’s education access and performance.” it is not clear as to how early marriages were related to the tsunami disaster. If girl child’s education was affected in any way, then we did not see any attempts within the Green Coast to address this issue.

The report also states “inadequate efforts to address the gender concerns also reduced the overall effectiveness of the reconstruction efforts. Women in fishing villages have a weaker representation in the local institutions (as caste panchayats), which played a major role in tsunami relief and rehabilitation programmes. Marginalization of women within these institutions therefore led to weak representation of their needs and aspirations in Tsunami relief and rehabilitation processes.” There seemed to be no evidence of discussions at the level of programme management and the partner organisations doing policy work, as to how these assessments were going to be factored in to the India programme. If this is seen as a problem surely then some capacity building and advocacy components had to be built in so as to promote women’s participation within decision-making structures of a village? It was as if the assessment thus had no relation to SGF and policy work.

Discussions with CAG and also FERAL indicated that gender components had not been taken into considerations in the documents prepared so far. In the policy brief used for the Road Show, the document deals at length with technical aspects of coastal conservation, but not on the social and political organization part of it, which is essential to put all these recommendations into practice. It mentions that women should have representation in the Panchayats and local monitoring committees (how?, through what provisions?), and the priority should be given for widows under rehabilitation projects (in what aspects?) are the only references made. Again, this document made no reference to the initial assessment report so as to build on those findings. One could argue that it is impossible to look into all the factors, environmental and social. However, facilitation of the formation of a network of women’s oriented organisations, which could monitor large-scale relief programs, and contribute to policy formulation, could be facilitate better gender-sensitive responses.

### *3.3.5 Policy Work and Communication*

Through partnerships with two prominent local NGOs - Citizen, consumer and civic Action Group (CAG) and Foundation for Ecological Research, Advocacy and Learning (FERAL) - current policies of government, donors and NGOs were analyzed.

The following outputs for policy work and communications were produced under the Green Coast project and presented:

- 1) "A critical Analysis of Policy Changes" (April 2006). By CAG on Tsunami rehabilitation and reconstruction in the state of Tamil Nadu;
- 2) "Policy Support for the Green Coast Project" (August 2006). By FERAL. The report had the objective to give recommendations on fisheries, reconstruction, shelterbelts and coastal zone regulations.

Road Shows were conducted in January 2007 to present and discuss the findings of the policy research. In total 243 local NGOs/CBOs came to the five road shows. As a part of its policy work the project has identified three main policy issues. Those are:

- Ensuring sustainable fisheries to support the livelihoods of the affected community.
- Ensuring that coastal defences, particularly shelterbelts, do not adversely impact coastal ecology and livelihoods.
- Ensuring that post-tsunami reconstruction and rehabilitation is environmentally sensitive in terms of structure and location.

The main findings of the policy research was (and discussed at the meetings) that:

- Increase in artisanal fishing capacities as a result of tsunami relief;
- Serious social and environmental implications of sea walls;
- Bio-shields (i.e. Casuarine tree monocultures) are ineffective against tsunami and may cause serious coastal habitat destruction;
- CRZ (coastal zone regulation) violations too many and too serious to enumerate;
- Reconstruction effort is non-participatory. Poor planning of waste water and sewage treatment is likely to cause large scale faecal contamination of ground water in the near future;
- High number of water sources inundated, need to be sampled for heavy metals.

We found this a great idea to involved local NGOs and communities in response to policies and discuss with them appropriate responses. However, the policy work seems in line with the policy experiences of the organisations and people. We could not distinguish whether an issue, point of view or priorities changed as a result of the experiences of the SGF. For example, what to do with degraded agricultural lands?, or the importance of home gardens, and the opportunities to integrate restoring coastal forest ecosystems with livelihoods by planting appropriate forest species mixed with commercial species. One example mentioned was that fisheries communities do not want trees between their houses and the sea because it blocks their view (so they can assess the weather and respond to good fishing conditions). But then what is an appropriate policy response to this if you want to guard their safety?

The GC-team was very much aware of the ongoing policy processes in the state and coastal interventions that were being implemented. Some of the most important interventions mentioned for which lobbying and advocacy was needed were:

- 1) Post Tsunami Sustainable Livelihoods Programme for the Coastal Communities of Tamil Nadu supported by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). (*US\$ 15 million, 8 years, being implemented by Department of Fisheries, Government of Tamil Nadu* ).
- 2) Emergency Tsunami Reconstruction Project / Environmental and Social Management Framework supported by World Bank, Government of Tamil Nadu and Government of Pondicherry. (*US\$ 682 million, being implemented by Government of Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry*).
- 3) UN Recovery Framework for a Post Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme supported by the United Nations through UNDP. (*US\$ 38.7 million, being implemented by a consortium of CAG, ATREE and NCF*).

The second project for example promotes the establishment of monoculture Casuarine tree along the coast to protect against new disasters. This monoculture is however not useful for the coastal stretches where they are planted (the east coast consists more of TDEF and sand dunes). Secondly, they are biodiversity dead zones. The main reason behind this planting seems one of convenience and commercial. The Forestry department has experience with planting of these low-maintenance trees and they can sell the timber trees to industry. Apparently nobody has yet approached the World bank and asked for a proper Environmental



Impact Assessment (in line with their own guidelines). The GC team has been in contact with the World Bank and alerted them on the negative aspects of the planting.

### 3.4 Other outcomes

Most outcomes were in line with the expectation beforehand. One example of an outcome that was not anticipated but a great positive result was part of the project implemented by PAVAI (also mentioned in 4.3.3). PAVAI helped a group of women affected by the Tsunami. The proposal focused on "income generation for the Tsunami affected women through art of puppet making and marketing". The budget of the project was 256,275 (4,087 Euros) and targeted 150 women and 180 children. Some trees have been planted to produce raw material. The puppets are linked to folk stories people tell each other. PAVAI also trains teacher in the art of puppetry to tell stories about coastal conservation and biodiversity. An expected side-effect was the empowerment of women by providing them market access and income.

What was not taking into account was the fact that the affected women found a way to deal with their individual traumas. The creative work helps, but also that they sit together and can talk to other women with similar experiences. They can do that in their own pace and on their own appropriate moment. The women now slowly recover from their traumas and as well as slowly learn to engage the market.

### 3.5 Budget, efficiency and expenditures India

#### 3.5.1 Budget and expenditures

Below the original budget and the expenditures are presented. Originally, a budget was allocated until March 2007. India was granted an extension until March 2008. This overall budget is presented in the table below The figures have been sub-divided differently from the formal financial report to show on what level money was spend and how much of the original budget went to direct support.

*Table 3: Budget and expenditures India*

	Budget component	Original budget (Euros)	Expenditures (Euros)	% Exp. of total Exp.
<b>1</b>	<b>National project implementation</b>			
<b>1a</b>	Assessment	<b>120,000</b>	<b>88,497</b>	<b>10.9%</b>
<b>1b</b>	Policy Work, Communications	<b>95,900</b>	<b>69,285</b>	<b>8.5%</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Project costs Small Grants</b>	<b>800,000</b>	<b>634,659</b>	<b>77.9%</b>
<b>2a</b>	Management costs WISA	<i>Unknown</i>	99,409	15.7%
<b>2b</b>	Local NGOs/CBOs	<i>Unknown</i>	Not recorded	
<b>2c</b>	Direct "Ecosystem& Livelihood" support	<i>Unknown</i>	535,250	84.3%
				100%
	<b>Sub total</b>		<b>792,441</b>	
<b>3</b>	<b>Other costs</b>		22,356	<b>2.7%</b>
	<b>Total country budget</b>	<b>1,015,900</b>	<b>814,797</b>	<b>100%</b>

Of the overall budget 77.9% was allocated to the Small Grants facility. Of this amount 15.7% was used for project management by WISA (administration, monitoring, TA) and 84.3% was used to support local level management and capacity building and for direct support.

### 3.5.2 Efficiency and effectiveness

The efficiency (see annex C for definition) are the means used to achieve outputs and outcomes. The efficiency of Green Coast India cannot be compared against a pre-determined standard. For building a house one could say that the costs per house has to be within a certain range. This is very difficult for a project consisting of components like assessments and policy work. Also for the small-grants projects this is difficult as they combine direct livelihood support as well ecological restoration work. There is also not one standard to assess whether the 'efficiency' is sufficient or not. Thus the assessment by the evaluation team is mainly qualitative in nature.

In general the budget has been spend mainly on direct support to 'ecosystem & livelihood' activities. The management costs are limited thus can be regarded as efficient. Detailed figures on the results achieved in comparison to the targeted result are presented in Annex C-3. Some of these results have been verified in the field. Most of the promised results have been achieved (general >90%). A notable exception is the number of vermicomposting units that have been installed (22%). It is unclear why the number is much lower than expected. With the awareness raising activities about 56% were children that have been approached through local school programs. In the table below a summary and general assessment is presented.

**Table 4: Assessment of efficiency India**

	<b>Budget component</b>	<b>Means (Euros)</b>	<b>Output, Outcomes</b>	<b>Assessment</b>
<b>1</b>	<b><i>National project implementation</i></b>			
<b>1a</b>	Assessment	<b>88,497</b>	Not good enough, not relevant enough. Not used for SGF.	-
<b>1b</b>	Policy Work, Communications	<b>69,285</b>	Relevant process. Road shows positive. No outcomes yet.	0
<b>2</b>	<b><i>Project costs Small Grants</i></b>	<b>657,015</b>	24,157 beneficiaries = 27.2 Euro/beneficiary 8,513 households direct support = yield farmers + 30% = households more food security = surplus gardens sold +10% 59.5 ha planted = survival rate 58-73%	++
	<b>Total country budget</b>	<b>1,159,538</b>		

'-' = not good: outputs have not been used or are not relevant enough

'0' = reasonable, need to be improved: outputs have been used and are relevant

'+' = good: outputs are high and relevant, outcomes are promising

'++' = very good: outputs are high, outcomes are good and significant to target group

In total 164 tsunami affected villages of Tamil Nadu, Pondicherry, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala have been reached and 24,157 households benefited. Overall, the small grants facility has functioned well. The efficiency of the use of means for the assessments are not considered positive as the they were not used for the SGF and are not relevant enough. The quality is also variable. The outcomes of the policy work are still limited but the GC-partners are linked to relevant processes. Given the context India it will be difficult to influence certain governmental decisions regarding the coastal zones on the short-term.

The effectiveness (see annex C) can be defined as an assessment of the activities in reaching intended goals and outcomes. The country programs however never defined their own specific goals. We therefore consider it best to assess the effectiveness of the project components and activities on the level of the overall Green Coast project.

### ***3.6 Sustainability, integration and up-scaling***

Most small-grants are finished and do not need further support. The supported households have picked up the rehabilitated livelihood activities and they will continue the activity. We assessed - together with the SGO - that about 10 projects (20%) still need some form of financial support to ensure continuation and/or sustainability. This support is especially related to ecological restoration activities e.g. the need to continue caring for planted seedlings, but also e.g. to establish market connections to ensure future income.

The problem however is that the local GC-partners have not defined the coastal stretch of Tamil Nadu as one of their priority areas. Under Mangroves for the Future they have indicated two other coastal regions of India as their priority regions. Continuation of support is thus questionable and will depend on whether additional financial support will be provided.

On the policy level, WWF has clearly incorporated the work and experiences in their own activities and will continue to do so. In general the follow up will concentrate on integrating the concept of ICZM in government plans. The GC-partners will continue working together with some NGOs that were supported under GC like FERAL and PBRC. Especially the Kerahaveli wetlands could be used as an example region for coastal zone problems and promising solutions.

Promising as well are the relations that WWF and WISA are now developing with some of the new development supported by for example the World Bank.

In conclusion, part of the GC work has been integrated in the activities of the organisations. As the southern region is apparently not part of the priority regions of the organisations we feel there is no value into looking for up-scaling. Some of the SG-projects are however good examples for government to see as 'models'. It is up to the Government to upscale these experiences.

One important issue has not yet been tackled but has been mentioned during interviews. The current government interventions are all focused on fixating the coastal ecosystem, either by building sea walls or by planting Casuarine trees on sand dunes. This will in the future limit the ability of the coastal ecosystem to respond to new events. Experiences in other countries - like the Netherlands - have shown that using the resilience of ecosystems (dunes, flood plains) is better and cheaper than trying to build higher and wider construction works. In the light of climate change adaptation it might also be beneficial to calculate whether the investments in such 'hard' construction works are economically viable and sustainable.

## **4 Sri Lanka Country Report**

### **4.1 Introduction**

The tsunami that struck Sri Lanka on the 26th of December 2004 had varying degrees of impacts to the coastline of the island. It resulted in more than 35,000 human deaths, and destroyed more than 100,000 houses, including large-scale damage to coastal infrastructure. Among the dead were 27,000 fishermen and their families. The coastline and associated land affected by the tsunami is about 1000 km. Of the 25 Districts in Sri Lanka, 12 districts have been severely affected and the disaster displaced 850,201 people. The worst hit was Eastern Sri Lanka, comprising the three districts of Ampara, Batticaloa, and Trincomalee. The impacts to the livelihoods of the communities living in the coastal zone were immense. The communities who are involved in fishing were severely affected by loss of family members, loss of houses, fishing vessels and fishing gear. Between 60-80% of the fishing boats in Sri Lanka were destroyed. Tourism sector was also badly affected due to the severe damage to hotels, cabanas and guest houses located near the coastline.

The project in Sri Lanka was implemented by the World Conservation Union (IUCN) Sri Lanka Country Office.

The evaluation team visited Sri Lanka between 7 and 10 April 2008 and discussed the project with the staff of IUCN and members of the National Reference Group. Subsequently, various small grant projects in the field were visited, especially in the East Coast. These projects were in Kalmunai (no 004), Kattankudy (052), Panama (13), Mahawela (010), and Akurala (071). Earlier the mid-term review had visited also some other projects in the West Coast.

### **4.2 Review of follow-up on the mid-term review**

The mid-term review had several observations concerning the implementation of Green Coast. Some needed follow-up. Others were reflection on the period before and needed no follow-up. The main findings of the mid-term review are:

- 1) Small Grant Projects prove to be a very effective means to reach out to affected communities. The bulk of the project money reaches these communities and supports them in restoring their livelihoods, and partially also undoing the damage caused by the post-tsunami relief work. The programme suffers from dispersion over a long coastline; steps to focus more on one coastal stretch are being taken. Presently this is seriously hampered by renewed political violence
- 2) Project implementation has suffered from pressure to produce visible result in a short period of time. This has gone at the costs of project coherence, as different project components started simultaneously, whereas a phased approach with assessments, small grants and policy work being started as a sequence of activities, would have been more appropriate. Yet, an impressive amount of relevant work has been done in a relatively short period of time.
- 3) Project coordination has been relatively easy in Sri Lanka, as the tasks were assigned to one partner, i.e. IUCN Sri Lanka. Initial coaching provided by GC team was in due course converted into well organised project procedures within IUCN Sri Lanka.
- 4) The lack of collaboration with other partners resulted in a loss of visibility of Green Coast as the project gets mixed up with other IUCN Sri Lanka tsunami response activities. The Green Coast name is not consistently used.

- 5) Assessments: the Sri Lanka team suffers from the lack of a clear vision on what it wants to reach with the Green Coast project. The way the project is implemented gives an impression of "business as usual". This has resulted in underperformance for the assessments, which did not follow the overall format provided by WI HQ. The social/gender issues have not been developed to the extent required. The reviewers, as well as the Sri Lanka team itself, do not have a clear picture of the usefulness of the documents.
- 6) Policy and communication work: the initial lack of vision, referred to above, was compensated by effective input from Green Coast partners, specifically during the February '06 Bangkok workshop. Since this event, a number of promising outputs have been created or are being created, with direct linkages to government agencies. The impact of this needs to be confirmed later. Opportunities to integrate lessons from small grants project should actively be sought.
- 7) Gender: in practise gender balance seems to be maintained, although there is a lack of objectively verifiable information - better monitoring could provide a better view on this.
- 8) For the final phase the emphasis should be on learning lessons from small grants projects, translate these into good and bad practises, and based on this develop a vision for the selected coastal stretch.
- 9) IUCN sees the future of the project as part of the IUCN International Mangroves for the Future project. If continued as a Green Coast project, a partnership with another organization could provide a means to loosen up from the 'business as usual' scenario.

### ***4.3 Outputs and outcomes of the Green Coast project Sri Lanka***

#### *4.3.1 The Assessments*

In the months following the Tsunami several organisations including UNEP assessed the damage to coastal communities and ecosystem. IUCN was to some extent involved in this work. The Green Coast project enabled IUCN to do its own assessments. At first two separate assessments were conducted related to biodiversity and socio-economic issues. Later the assessments were combined in one comprehensive report. This was done based upon some guidance provided by Wetlands International. On 25 January 2006 a letter was sent to IUCN highlighting some of the issues and providing some recommendations for improvement.

This resulted in the following outputs:

- 1) "Green Coast for Nature and People after the Tsunami: Sri Lanka Assessment", (October 2006). Field assessments were conducted between December 2005 and January 2006;
- 2) "Rapid Social and Economic Assessment" report (a summary). The report is undated.

The first report is the actual assessment. Six pre-identified coastal stretches (Region 1 - Hikkaduwa to Unawatuna, Region 2 - Rekawa to Godawaya, Region 3 - Pallemalala to Kirinda, Region 4 - Arugambay to Thirulkkovil, Region 5 - Akkaraipattu to Kalmunai' and Region 6 - Kalmunai to Batticaloa) were included. The impact of tsunami on the physical environment was determined by assessing the degree of erosion, debris, sedimentations and landform alteration. Impact to vegetation was determined by assessing the presence of dead or fallen plants, uprooted trees, and damaged tree trunks.

The mid-term review observed that the assessments are deficient in integrating the dependencies of local communities on the coastal ecosystems. Therefore these provide incomplete view on potential targets for Small Grants Facility. The assessments do not provide numbers of people dependent on damaged coastal resources in different stretches and

the relative impacts on their economic status and livelihood securities. According to IUCN, the socioeconomic surveys did not result in providing the complete assessment of situation because people were reluctant to respond to questionnaires designed for conducting surveys.



**Damaged Home Garden in Wanduruppa**



**Damaged scrublands in Ussangoda**

*source: Assessment report Sri Lanka*

Reviewing the Assessment we feel the observation of the mid-term is valid. Although the coastal stretches have been pre-selected the Assessment report does provide valuable detailed information and maps on ecosystem & livelihood including loss of houses and their ownership. The Sri Lankan team understood the value of the Assessment in guiding their work for identification of policy issues and small grants projects as presented in their report:

- Assessments of ecological damage and opportunities for rehabilitation, including local people's views, rights, capacity and needs;
- Policy support to guide reconstruction policies and implementing agencies towards sustainable recovery of coastal systems and associated livelihoods; and
- Ecosystem restoration activities/projects.

They did however not completely succeed on providing sufficient data and information, especially on gender to properly assess peoples views, capacity and needs. During the evaluation mission felt they could have improved the assessment and the way it guided the small grants. Especially, the time pressure was mentioned. In Sri Lanka it was clearly felt that defining a process to gather better and more socio-economic data during the process of implementation of the small-grants would have been beneficial. This is a lesson for all assessments. In conclusion, we feel the assessment is rather good when compared to for example India.

#### *4.3.2 The Small Grants Facility*

The Small-Grants Facility of Sri Lanka supported 29 projects implemented by a variety of (grassroot) NGOs and CBOs. Fourteen additional grants and extensions were given to this project bringing the total of grants to 43.

The Small-Grants Officer did a good job in administrating and recording the project data of each project and documentation was properly filed. The data base mostly focused however on the number of beneficiaries with a men/women distinction. IUCN Sri Lanka actually assumed the role of distant donor and regularly visit projects monitor progress. They did however not assess approaches or practices and/or provide advice to enhance implementation. This approach inevitably brought mixed results. Each NGO and project functioned on its own with

no linkages to the other NGO or projects within Green Coast or even other similar projects in the locality. If the organization in question was capable at community mobilization and possessed experience and technical skills in implementing eco projects, then the outcomes were good. Otherwise it turned in to be one of those failed experiments. Another missed opportunity in using this approach is that (a) IUCN itself does not learn from local successes and failures and (b) IUCN or another organisation cannot help other organisations in another region with that experience gained to avoid similar mistakes. Last but not least, we see the SGF as great opportunity for nature conservation organisations to build equitable relations with communities to stimulate support for their work and enhance the livelihood of people that depend on their natural surroundings.

But IUCN did produce some nice, easy to understand, practical technical guidelines on:

- Technical Guidelines for the Restoration of Mangroves (March 2007)
- Technical Guidelines for the Establishment of a Coastal Greenbelt (March 2007)
- Best practice guidelines for the Establishment of a Coastal Greenbelt (March 2007)
- Best practice guidelines on restoration of homegardens in Tsunami Affected Areas (March 2007)

Curiously enough they do mention some successes or failures of SG-projects.

It is not clear how the small-grants projects influenced policy work by IUCN (see par. 4.3.5). They did produce some nice fact sheets that do provide case information for coastal zone management discussions. The reasons given are the simultaneous implementation of both components (as already mentioned in the mid-term) as a result of time-pressure.

In total 29 Tsunami affected villages were involved in both the Eastern, Southern and Western coast of Sri Lanka benefiting 13,490 households directly and in total 29,934 households were beneficiary. Ninety-three hectares were planted with coastal forests. A complete overview of results is provided in the table in paragraph 7.1.1. Below some of the SG-projects are used to highlight certain aspects of the interventions.

#### ***Ecological restoration & Livelihood rehabilitation***

Most small grants projects included or were focused on restoring home gardens (kitchen gardens). In total 2,269 gardens were restored providing those households with food security, savings in purchases and often a surplus to be sold or bartered.

- *NSRC in Kalmunai (004)*: This was the largest SG-project in Sri Lanka. The project is situated on the East coast and is implemented by a local NGO that exists legally since 1992. NSRC was involved in before in a post-Tsunami rehabilitation project of a 1,000 drinking water wells (affected by debris, salinity and high levels of nitrates), the planting of 4 km of coastal forests and the formation of 36 community groups (who are beneficiaries of the drinking well project). The project planted trees around the wells to clean the water flowing to the well. NSRC claim to have scientific data to substantiate the cleaning functionality of trees but did not provide that information. Although we agree that roots can clean water from substances such as nitrates (from overusing fertiliser in agriculture) the claim of bioremediation should be carefully explained and documented (we fail to see the link with salinity that probably disappears over the years with heavy rainfall). Drinking water wells should for example always be tested on bacteria and worm diseases. Another part of the project was the re-planting of coastal forests species. They were seen in the field and are well-cared for in general. Nearby, a sad example of planting by another non-experienced recovery organisations could be seen. Almost all seedlings had died. NSRC does much better. However, the planting looks more like a nice garden scenery with a high diversity than a planting to restore an ecosystem in natural dynamic patterns. This is understandable as the planting in front of the village and in the way it is

planted can act as a wind buffer but it should not be claimed otherwise. The function as a safety buffer should also be substantiated by research and proper calculations (e.g. absorption capacity of energy). One problem mentioned is the motivation of the community to take care of this public forest and awareness-raising was seen as crucial. Here, the project touches upon a often encountered problem of the 'tragedy of the commons'. Solutions to this problem are context-specific but entail involving the municipality and/or defining innovative linkages between individuals and common interests (see the example of Panama in the box below).

**Box 4: Great benefits and linkages through a Micro-Revolving Fund**

NEUF, Panama (013): The project is implemented by the members of the 'South Panama Women's Friendship Society'. This is a Sinhalese women's group with 54 members in the village Panama.

Close by their houses sand dunes formed the coastal defence against the Tsunami. A part of the dunes where no native forest was present was breached by the wave. The group wanted to restore the forest in a coastal stretch of 5 hectare and support for the livelihood. There level of poverty is however such that it is for them difficult to commit time to attending to the trees. Every day is a struggle to put on the table and time is a scarce commodity to invest in indirect benefits. Thus the group - with the help of GC - defined 5 groups of 11 participants and divided the planting work. Participants were given a bag, compost and a plant seedling. The group later bought the mature seedlings from the participants for 7 Rp per plant. For the actual planting they were paid 2,000 Rp for two months (which is low but still a valuable contribution to their income. Other income opportunities are very scarce in this remote village).

To further support their livelihood the Group also received 600,000 Rp for a Revolving Fund. Each member can take loan (in turns) for a livelihood activity. The loan is between 5,000-10,000 Rp. The Fund charges 10,5% interest rate (a bank would charge 16%). But of course this money flows back into the Fund and thus the Group built their savings. In time the Fund will grow bigger and more members can take a loan at the same time or bigger loans can be provided.

The Group also decided that 1.5% interest rate is used to pay group members to attend to seedlings of the coastal forests. They thus pay the poor members for time invested and created a financially viable link between their livelihood work and ecological restoration. It seems the sustainability of the investment is guaranteed and both the individual members as well as the community and the ecosystem benefit.

*Source: documents and interviews during mission.*

- *DEIHERM in Mahawela (010)*: The organisation DEIHERM implemented the project titled "Improving Livelihoods of the Community Associating Contiguous Areas through Conservation of Mahawela Wetland". What they actually did was supporting a women's group in making a variety of handicrafts to be sold in a local shop. The raw material is collected from the nearby Mahawela wetland. Due to the Tsunami about 80% of the reed growth was destroyed and fish harvest also has gone drastically down. 123 Families depended on mat weaving. Along with sea water, there was a huge volume of debris lodged within the wetland.. Both problems were addressed by the SG-project; the wetland was restored so it could produce reed and fish again and the women's group was helped in picking up an income generating activity. A great side-effect was the fact that creative work in a group help the women with their post-Tsunami traumas. During the interview they started crying when describing their individual losses and they expressed they would sit also together and do something creative if they would not make any money with it. The group work helps them to cope with their fears.
- *ICGAT in Akurala (071)*: The project is implemented by ICGAT of the, University of Moratuwa, Katubedda. Along the South-western coast abandoned coral mine pits are found. These are excavated areas normally filled with water. The main problem is the health hazard of these abandoned sites, due to mosquito breeding and domestic waste



dumping. The project entails mainly awareness raising. Although sympathetic and probably valuable from a health perspective, we fail however to see the link with Tsunami-affected households.

#### 4.3.3 Local partner organisations (NGOs/CBOs)

For IUCN in Sri Lanka, Green Coast's SGF brought the "work at grass roots level" approach in a significant way. 29 projects of NGOs, CBOs and specialists groups were supported during this period. Supporting organizations' possessing capacities of varying aspects at differing levels, and implementing the same program in different contexts means the adoption of a monitoring and facilitating system to ensure similar outputs everywhere. IUCN's approach was that of ensuring quality during the project selection process and thereafter to monitor the each project's inputs, leaving the rest of the performance up to the partner organizations themselves.

Overall, of the projects visited, most had performed well in various aspects. The women's groups were maintaining their savings and revolving funds successfully. In the context of rising food prices, the women involved viewed their kitchen garden activities extremely positively. In some, the livelihood initiatives were strategically linked with cooperatives or other sales outlets to better their successes. In the most effective projects, they were able to connect livelihood issues with the mangrove plantations or that of organic farming.

#### **Box 5: The Kalmunai Women's Groups**

In Kalmunai, in the East coast of Sri Lanka, the women have seen long years of turmoil due to the civil war during the past 25 years. Then Tsunami hit their communities to create further havoc. After all the excitement died down, they were approached by NSRC, and supported to implement a livelihood project under the Green Coast. Some of them began to participate in a kitchen garden cultivation activity which trained them in organic farming. They learnt to use hay to replenish and prepare a largely sandy soil, and the use of natural pesticides many of which were provided for planting in their own gardens. They found that their kitchen needs were being replenished with next to no costs.

They, along with other women of the village, formed small groups of about 15 members and began to manage a group savings. After six months NSRC augmented each group's savings equalling the amount of their savings. With this seed fund the women began to provide micro credit for small income generation ventures such as poultry rearing, rice milling, and small trading activities. The most positive aspect of this activity was that the members themselves were able to decide how much to save and what to do with it. The lending of the group at 12% per annum doubled in another twelve months. Today they look forward to expanding their activities in a big way.

*Source: interview during mission.*

There were several drawbacks to the distant approach taken by IUCN as well. One group effort turned out to be one woman (a relative of one of the chief organizers) coordinating and managing a food business with hiring the other 'members' (?) as labour. A coastal planting of multi species was implemented with no participation or links with the communities there. In many, the livelihood issues were handled separately; the regular meeting forums of the groups which could have been utilised as opportunities for environment education, were frittered away to discuss about savings and credit issues. Moreover, considering that the Green Coast was a short-term project, the sustainability of newly formed savings groups failed to be considered. For, in Sri Lanka, forming small groups for savings and credit is the most common approach of NGOs in general, and which were fiercely owned by each organisation, to wither away after the completion of the project.

Identifying gaps and weaknesses in organizational strategy & capacity, linking appropriate resource organizations and persons to each organization according to its need, and facilitating

cross-fertilization of ideas and approaches amongst the Green Coast partners themselves, are required to offset the above-mentioned drawbacks. This prompts a clarification of the role IUCN decides to play in supporting their partner organizations especially in relation to the small grants facility. Whether it is going to be hands on or hands off.

#### 4.3.4 *Gender issues and women's empowerment*

A majority of the projects supported under the SGF were kitchen gardens targeting women. The members of the women's groups were provided with skills in organic farming and mangrove planting. In some, they were given new skills in handicraft production, and that too out of raw materials found in their environs. The experiences shared by the women were positive. They had gained confidence and derived immense satisfaction in being able to create beautiful artifacts on their own.

Yet, women's participation alone would not be sufficient to empower them. The process has to go beyond mere participation to women's control over decision-making structures, and their access to technical skills and high-income earning ventures. In Sri Lanka, men run many of the rural organizations, and they only are privy to the design of the program. Women still opt for house-based income generation ventures such as poultry and rice milling which do not bring substantial incomes. In general they are not considered as appropriate trainees for any technical skills. To cite one example, that if it is demonstration gardens which are bigger and need more technical inputs, then the men were managing them. If it were tiny kitchen gardens then women were totally responsible for them.

Therefore, unless a project is designed to offset these disadvantages it continues to merely reproduce the existing gender relations within.

#### **Box 6: Kattankudi Women's Predicament**

Kattankudi is a densely populated Muslim, urban area in the Eastern Coast of Sri Lanka. Under Green Coast, an organization called OPED mobilized men and women to initiate them in organic farming of home gardens. The first activity was training the participants in home gardening in which 25 women participated as against 15 men. When they came back to start home garden activity, the organisation gave yet another in site demonstration to the neighbourhood including the men in the families. Thereafter, the women stuck to weeding and collecting produce of the garden, while the men did the "technical" stuff such as preparation of ground, planting and preparation of pesticides. OPED explained that they included women in the original training held in a training center, in order to "promote women's participation".

While we appreciate the cultural context of a Muslim community we feel that careful consideration should be given to letting male-led dominated community organisations lead women's oriented activities.

*Source: Interview and visit during mission.*

#### 4.3.5 *Policy Work and Communication*

IUCN Sri Lanka is the sole implementer of the Green Coast project. The following outputs for policy work and communications were produced under the Green Coast project and presented:

- 1) A set of Best Practice Guidelines on restoration and rehabilitation. In total 14 have produced of which we saw 4 (see par. 4.3.2). The 4 papers presented look good and practical.
- 2) "Guidelines for coastal reservation green belts in Sri Lanka". These guidelines are actually produced by the Coast Conservation Department and not presented as a Green

Coast product. They have however been drafted with the (financial) support of IUCN under the Green Coast project.

IUCN reviewed the policy processes/documents/programs (including strategies/ guidelines/ and plans) that are being developed by various government organizations and other relevant institutes related to post-tsunami ecosystem and livelihood restorations and rehabilitations with the purpose to define opportunities to integrate Green Coast principles. The main programs under reviewed were:

- The process to the define the “Guidelines for coastal reservation green belts in Sri Lanka” by the Coast Conservation Department;
- “Strategy and program for reconstruction and development of the marine fisheries sector” by the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources;
- The Plan on “Green canopy for new settlements” by the Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit (THRU).

A special committee for Environment was set up within the Task Force For Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN) soon after the Tsunami. TAFREN is the government authority coordinating post-tsunami restoration work. Through the co -operation the Coast Conservation Department, IUCN could feed information and policy brief into the discussions.

In conclusion, we feel the GC-team is involved in the relevant processes. IUCN has succeeded to build a good relation with a government partner, the CCD. During the mission we however got the feeling that this department is not so strong in the government structure. This would suggest that relations are needed with other departments as well to influence the policy processes affecting the coast. Secondly, there seems to be a gap between the national policy processes and what it is decided on the ground. This suggests a link should be established with government entities on Provincial, District and municipality level. Of course, for such a development the intricacies of the current political structures and the conflict are the decisive factor.

#### **4.4 Budget, efficiency and effectiveness Sri Lanka**

##### **4.4.1 Budget and expenditures**

Below the original budget and the expenditures are presented based upon figures provided by IUCN Sri Lanka. This overall budget is presented in the table below The figures have been sub-divided differently from the formal financial report to show on what level money was spend and how much of the original budget went to direct support.

**Table 5: Budget and expenditures Sri Lanka**

	<b>Budget component</b>	<b>Original budget (Euros)</b>	<b>Expenditures (Euros)</b>	<b>% Exp. of total Exp.</b>
<b>1</b>	<b><i>National project implementation</i></b>			
<b>1a</b>	Assessment	34,355	33,795	4.0%
<b>1b</b>	Policy Work, Communications	91,293	82,851	9.9%
<b>2</b>	<b><i>Project costs</i></b>	<b>727,992</b>	<b>720,376</b>	<b>86.1%</b>
<b>2a</b>	Management costs IUCN SL	104,725	114,627	14.3%
<b>2b</b>	NGOs/CBOs	57,525	51,465	7.1%
<b>2c</b>	Direct “Ecosystem& Livelihood” support	565,742	565,610	78.6%
				100%
	<b>Total country budget</b>	<b>853,640</b>	<b>837,022</b>	<b>100%</b>

Of the overall budget 86.1% was allocated to the Small Grants facility. Of this amount 14.3% was used for project management by IUCN Sri Lanka (administration, monitoring, TA) and 85.7% was used to support local level management and capacity building and for direct support. The sub-division between direct support and costs for local NGO/CBOs (management, administration, TA) is a best calculated guess.

The financial officer of IUCN was also able to distinguish support provided to local grass root NGOs (84%) and CBOs. (16%). They did also do additional work in relation to the Assessments and on behalf of the small-grants facility,

#### 4.4.2 Efficiency and effectiveness

Presented below are some basis figures as recorded by IUCN Sri Lanka. Some of these results have been verified in the field.

**Table 6: Assessment of efficiency Sri Lanka**

	<b>Budget component</b>	<b>Means (Euros)</b>	<b>Output, Outcomes</b>	<b>Assessment</b>
<b>1</b>	<b><i>National project implementation</i></b>			
<b>1a</b>	Assessment	<b>33,795</b>	Good and useful information. Could have been better used.	+
<b>1b</b>	Policy Work, Communications	<b>82,851</b>	Relevant process. Good relation to government work. No outcomes yet.	0
<b>2</b>	<b><i>Project costs Small Grants</i></b>	<b>720,736</b>	29,934 beneficiaries = 23.5 Euro/beneficiary 13,490 households direct support = households more food security = surplus gardens sold +10% 93 ha planted = survival rate not monitored but varies considerably (mission)	++
	<b>Total country budget</b>	<b>837,022</b>		

'-' = not good: outputs have not been used or are not relevant enough

'0' = reasonable, need to be improved: outputs have been used and are relevant

'+' = good: outputs are high and relevant, outcomes are promising

'++' = very good: outputs are high, outcomes are good and significant to target group

Overall, the small grants facility has functioned well. The efficiency of the use of means for the assessments are also considered positive as the they were partly used for the SGF but mainly for the identification of policy issues. The quality is good but could be improved. The outcomes of the policy work are still limited but IUCN Sri Lanka has a good relation with the Coastal Zone department. One critical remark here that this Department is probably not the most powerful Department to influence decision-making affected the sustainability of the coastal zone.

The effectiveness (see annex C) can be defined as an assessment of the activities in reaching intended goals and outcomes. The country programs however never defined their own specific goals. We therefore consider it best to assess the effectiveness of the project components and activities on the level of the overall Green Coast project.

#### ***4.5 Sustainability, up-scaling and integration***

Most small-grants are finished and do not need further support. The supported households have picked up the rehabilitated livelihood activities, for example the home gardens, and they will continue the activity. We assessed - together with the SGO - that about 5-8 projects would benefit from some additional financial support to ensure continuation and/or sustainability. This support is especially related to ecological restoration activities e.g. the need to continue caring for planted seedlings, but also e.g. to continue an awareness raising activity or additional support for skills development (some form of vocational training).

The Green Coast project components are strongly appreciated by IUCN Sri Lanka and they currently work at full integration of the work into their own programs. Especially the small grants work, which gave them the opportunity to work with local communities is seen as positive. They have already received a small contribution by the Dutch embassy to continue the SGF.

Some of the SG-projects need some form of support to ensure sustainability in the future. They cannot stand alone yet. Whether these SG-projects fit under the IUCN strategic plan is not clear (in choice of area or theme). IUCN would benefit if they were able to define a strategic intervention regarding their priority areas and how they want to involve communities with "ecosystem&livelihood" projects. Especially if the small projects are defined in a participatory and equitable manner with the communities this could build lasting partnerships. Based upon this strategic plan IUCN could decide what is needed.

## 5 Malaysia case Report

### 5.1 Introduction

The waves of the Tsunami hit the Malayan coast from Perlis to Johor and along the beaches of the offshore islands. The extent of damage experienced at different locations depended on factors such as topography, obstruction by islands or man-made structures and coastal forests. Much of the media attention was focused on Penang Island, Kota Kuala Muda and Langkawi as these areas experienced the largest extent of damage. Many people were affected by the tsunami, especially in the northern states. 8,000 people in the states of Penang, Kedah, Perlis and Perak were made homeless or had their livelihoods disrupted. A total of 4,696 and 1,600 people were evacuated in Kedah and Penang respectively. Most of the people affected were fishermen and farmers and were of a lower socio-economic level. 7,721 fishermen reported a loss of RM 29.3 million<sup>8</sup> and 232 fish farmers suffered a loss totalling RM 23.9 million. Most of the 2000 inshore fishers in Kuala Perlis reported a decline in fish landings in the months after the tsunami (5kg/day post-tsunami compared to 10kg/day pre-tsunami).

The Green Coast project in Malaysia was small and at first limited to the components 'Assessment' (10,000 Euros) and the component 'Policy Work and Communications' (30,000 Euros). In 2006, one small-grants project with a budget 17,500 Euros was approved. Malaysia was not included in the mid-term review. The mid-term review concentrated on the three countries India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

WI Malaysia got an extension on the project to increase the impact of the GC-work. The budget for this phase was 25,000 Euros. The new project period focused on Integrated Coastal Zone Management Development (budget 11,813 Euros) and on Strategic Communications Development (budget 13,187 Euros). At the moment of the visit the final figures on expenditures were not ready yet but the financial officer expects that the budget will be spend.

The evaluation team visited Malaysia on 22 April 2008 and discussed the project with the staff of Wetlands International Malaysia (Sarala Aikanathan, Country Director and Gabriel Chong, Communications Officer). WI Malaysia was the main implementer of the GC-project. WWF Malaysia has contributed by conducting a policy analysis (see 6.2.3).

Like in the other countries staff has changed jobs since the project started and some of the institutional memory has gone. The interviewed persons were both rather new to the organisation but did their best to get all the information. A lot of information was properly filed.

### 5.2 Outputs and outcomes of the Green Coast project

#### 5.2.1 The Assessment(s)

Under the Green Coast project a concise assessment of the impact of Tsunami was conducted. The following outputs were produced under the Green Coast project and presented on the Internet:

- 1) Assessment Report Malaysia (March 2006). Conducted between August-December 2005;
- 2) "The Economic Impact of Tsunami on Penang". This is a publication in the Penang Economic Monthly (Volume 7, Issue 1, January, 2005).

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<sup>8</sup> 1 Euro = 4.5 RM

The report is mainly based on secondary data but also included interviewing local people in August 2005. Besides describing the impacts in a general manner the objective of the study was to "... look at why it is important to preserve the natural mangrove forests in Malaysia, and how government agencies, the local community and NGOs can work together to conserve and rehabilitate our mangroves under the Green Coast Recovery Project". Although this choice to focus on mangroves is understandable we wonder whether this has not excluded other viable 'Ecosystem & Livelihood' interventions. However, the assessment was meant to inform policy interventions and identify partnership opportunities and not directed at identifying small-grants projects. The study lacks a more specific description of the way coastal resources are used by various communities and is not gender-specific

At the end the document does provide useful recommendations, which has been followed up with policy interventions.

### *5.2.2 The Small Grants Project*

Malaysia also had one small grants project. The budget was 17,500 Euros and the expenditures 17,173 Euros.

Three sites and villages have been selected (Kuala Kurau, Perak; Taman Nilai, Merbok, Kedah; Kuala Tunjang, Kerpan, Kedah) for the establishment of the mangrove nurseries and for replanting of mangroves near these three villages. Why these three villages (and not others) have been selected is not clear (strategic value in region?, livelihood issue?).

The nursery and planting was organised with these fisheries communities by PIFWA (Penang Inshore Fishermen Welfare Association). This association was approached because they already had experience in establishing a nursery in another region and they already planted mangroves together with communities.

The project resulted in the collecting, raising and planting of 2,000 seedlings on 4 hectares of mangrove near the three villages. In the first round of planting the survival rate was lower than expected but subsequent planting was successful. Due to the distance (and the 1 day stay) the sites were not visited by the evaluation team. The current status could not be verified. The planting was mostly done by the women of the villages who were paid.

The experience led to various other outcomes or was intertwined with other ongoing developments and experiences by other organisations:

- 1) The SG-project –together with other mangrove planting activities - was instrumental in the development of a National Task Force on Replanting Mangroves and Coastal Species. WI Malaysia and WWF Malaysia have been invited to participate in this taskforce. For the first time in Malaysia a formal group has been formed between government and NGOs.
- 2) The government is now actively replanting mangroves. The goal is to plant 4,000 ha by 2010. About 282 ha have been planted in 2005 and 2006 with app. 1 million seedlings.

There are however some issues to be discussed in the taskforce. The government decided to involve the private sector in the planting. This has led to some problems regarding: the lack of involvement by communities; no proper monitoring of planting and the survival rates; and no proper spatial plan for which areas to target first and where to plant. The NGOs try to discuss these issues and for example get government buy the seedlings from community nurseries.

All in all, one can consider such an outcome as a great spin-off.

### *5.2.3 Local partner organisations (NGOs/CBOs)*

Green Coast in Malaysia had only one partner organization, the Penang Inland fishermen Welfare Association (PIFWA) based in the Province of Penang. They were formed by Friends of the Earth (FoE) back in 1997 with the aim of promoting natural resources associated with fishing. Since then PIFWA has been planting mangroves in their region.

PIFWA applied to the Green Coast to enable them to plant mangroves also in other Provinces, and build capacities so as to engage in advocacy with government agencies. The earlier communications with PIFWA and the friends of the Earth indicate that there was a concern about PIFWA not having the capacity to handle finances of the small grants scheme.

Green Coast, in addition to giving financial support to PIFWA to plant mangroves, has linked them well with the Federal Government. It has also begun to network with JARING, the National Association of Inland Fishermen. However, there was only one workshop conducted for the communities that PIFWA worked with under Green Coast, and that too on Mangroves. Considering that there was a need to institutionally strengthen PIFWA through establishing adequate financial and management systems, and advocacy skills had to be provided in terms of collation and documentation of information, and, communication and negotiation skills, there seems to be a gap in addressing the objectives stated in the proposal itself.

### *5.2.4 Gender issues and women's empowerment*

Gender concerns were not addressed in the project, as it is not considered as a problem in Malaysian society (not like other countries). Within the PIFWA for instance, women also attend meetings. As the fishermen were not always literate, they would bring their educated daughter along. Moreover, women were involved in all of the fish processing industries such as salted fish, shrimp paste and prawn crackers production. They were seen as the “mafia donnas” in this sector. The representative of PIFWA at the government tables was a woman.

Without visiting the communities it was difficult to comment upon these social processes. The assessment report also did not refer to the different ways in which post-Tsunami situation had affected women or the ways in which women used their environment. But one question was that if women were in fact involved in equally high income earning ventures and equally powerful as men, why did they not form a Fish Based Industries Workers Association for instance? The food processing industry within the fisheries sector is an entirely different component with its specific issues. Why was there only a fishermen association representing an occupation only pursued by men?

It is not constructive to compare women's and men's position with other countries. The gender relations are unique to each country, culture and even communities. They have to be assessed on their own merit and improved during the implementation of the project. Emphasis must be laid on gender disaggregated data in assessments and other policy documents. Only then they could be applied in the program design.

### *5.2.5 Policy Work and Communications*

The following outputs for policy work and communications were produced under the Green Coast project and presented:

- 1) 'Policy Analysis: Public participation in mangrove Forest Conservation and Management in Malaysia' (2006);
- 2) Newspaper article 'Natural disasters and green coastline' from the New Straits Time
- 3) Newspaper article 'Involve locals in rehabilitation' from the Malay Mail in August 2005.



- 4) Newspaper article 'RM 110M to restore mangroves' from the New Straits Times in August 2005.
- 5) Newspaper article 'PM: don't touch our mangroves' from the New Straits Times on 11 January 2005. - Mangrove brochure (pdf).

The policy analysis has a very suggestive title but actually does not cover this subject. The report presents information on legislation and the planning process in Malaysia. The report also includes country cases of community participation that have nothing to do with Malaysia or the post-Tsunami setting. The relevance for Green Coast is unclear and the report has no value. This is recognised by the new country director of WI and the report is not presented on the Internet.

The relevance of coastal forest and the GC-project seemed to have attracted some significant newspaper attention. This is reflected in the policy discussion ensuing in the post-Tsunami period. WI also produced some nice and easy to understand awareness material.

### **5.3 Other outcomes of the Green Coast project**

The Tsunami and subsequent research raised the awareness of the importance of the coastal forest for protection. Still a lot of work has to be done to get the same attention to conservation of biodiversity and importance for livelihood. This has yet not been recognised in coastal zone related policies.

The GC-project has led to an increased attention for the RAMSAR wetlands in the Southern tip of Peninsular Malaysia. This coastal wetland is seriously degraded and affected by erosion. If this would continue this would be the first wetland that would its Ramsar-status. In order for this not to happen the government of Johor now cooperates with WI Malaysia to stop further degradation.

### **5.4 Budget, efficiency and effectiveness Green Coast Malaysia**

#### **5.4.1 Budget and expenditures**

The project administration of this GC-project is rather straightforward as it includes very few organisations and activities. This seemed all in order.

**Table 7: Budget and expenditures Malaysia**

	<b>Budget component</b>	<b>Original budget (Euros)</b>	<b>Expenditures (Euros)</b>	<b>% Exp. of total Exp.</b>
<b>1</b>	<b><i>National project implementation</i></b>			
<b>1a</b>	Assessment	10,000	9,795	17.4%
<b>1b</b>	Policy Work, Communications	30,000	29,212	52%
	<b><i>Extension phase</i></b>	<b>25,000</b>	<b>25,000</b>	
<b>2</b>	<b><i>Project costs Small Grants</i></b>	<b>17,500</b>	<b>17,173</b>	<b>30,6%</b>
<b>2a</b>	Management costs WI	2,500	2,500	14%
<b>2b</b>	Local NGO/CBO	1,650	1,650	9%
<b>2c</b>	Direct "Ecosystem& Livelihood" support	13,350	13,023	76%
	<b>Total country budget</b>	<b>82,500</b>	<b>81,180</b>	<b>100%</b>

Malaysia was incorporated into the Green Coast project to work mostly on an assessment of the Tsunami and to work on policies. Later on in 2006 a small grants project was added. The budget breakdown shows that of the expenditures (17,500) of the small grants project about 76% went to community level direct support activities and 9% went to the community organisation PIFWA. This is good considering the fact that Malaysia was not part of the direct post-tsunami relief effort and the small grants project was merely supposed to show the case of mangroves restoration. The larger part of the budget was therefore spent on the other component (especially policy work).

#### 5.4.2 Efficiency and effectiveness

The efficiency (see annex C for definition) are the means used to achieve outputs and outcomes. The efficiency cannot be compared against a pre-determined standard, as this is very difficult for a project consisting of components like assessments and policy work. In Malaysia one SG-project was supported with the purpose to enhance the partner's influence. There is also not one standard to assess whether the 'efficiency' is sufficient or not. Thus the assessment by the evaluation team is mainly qualitative in nature.

In the main purpose of the work in Malaysia was to influence policy decision-making. Although the actual outcomes are still limited WI Malaysia has succeeded to become part of the policy process. Presented below are some basis figures as recorded by WI Malaysia and which have been discussed during the mission.

**Table 8: Assessment of efficiency Malaysia**

	<b>Budget component</b>	<b>Means (Euros)</b>	<b>Output, Outcomes</b>	<b>Assessment</b>
<b>1</b>	<b><i>National project management</i></b>			
<b>1a</b>	Assessment	<b>9,975</b>	Useful and relevant enough.	0
<b>1b</b>	Policy Work, Communications	<b>29,212</b>	Relevant process and increased participation. Policy Analysis useless. No outcomes yet.	0/+
<b>2</b>	<b><i>Project costs Small Grants</i></b>	<b>17,173</b>	3 villages direct support = <i>catch fishers expected to increase</i> 4 ha planted = <i>survival rate unknown</i> <i>Purpose was policy influence</i>	+
	<b>Total country budget</b>	<b>56,180</b>		

'-' = not good: outputs have not been used or are not relevant enough

'0' = reasonable, need to be improved: outputs have been used and are relevant

'+' = good: outputs are high and relevant, outcomes are promising

'++' = very good: outputs are high, outcomes are good and significant to target group

The efficiency of the use of means for the assessments is considered positive. The investment was small and the results are useful and relevant. The outcomes of the policy work are mixed. The Policy Analysis is not considered useful or relevant. However, WI is now involved in relevant policy processes amongst others as a result of the small grants project. This is of course very positive. There is also a spin-off in the planting by the government.

The effectiveness (see annex C) can be defined as an assessment of the activities in reaching intended goals and outcomes. The country programs however never defined their own specific goals. We therefore consider it best to assess the effectiveness of the project components and activities on the level of the overall Green Coast project.

### ***5.5 Sustainability, integration and up-scaling***

The project supported has finished. The project has not been visited so it is impossible for us to say whether the planted mangroves survived. According to the WI-team they do. The established nurseries provide seedlings to the government although this seems seriously hampered by the planting done by the private sector that source their seedlings elsewhere.

Malaysia has already fully integrated the experiences of the GC-project. It also continues its exchange with GC-partners in other countries (e.g. IUCN Sri Lanka). It has also defined a proposal to implement the BioRights Approach in Malaysia (based upon the positive experiences in Indonesia).

One of the issues mentioned in need for follow-up is climate change adaptation. The awareness on the role and importance of coastal forest ecosystems in the coastal zones has significantly been raised after the Tsunami. But still there is limited knowledge and awareness on the impact of climate change and the role 'soft' barriers (like forests) can have in limiting the impact of new climatic events. This is also an issue in the other coastal regions.

## 6 Thailand case Report

### 6.1 Introduction

The Tsunami of 26 December 2004 affected Thailand's Andaman coast in terms of lives lost and economic damages. Approximately 8,212 people lost their lives or were reported missing and a further 8,000 were injured. In addition, 12,815 households in 528<sup>9</sup> coastal villages in Thailand were directly affected and it has been estimated that the economic losses exceed 2 billion US dollars. In the fisheries sector, 3,714 small boats and 1,199 large boats were lost to the tsunami and 14,111 traps and 1,871 nets were also lost (ADPC, 2005). Losses to fishing vessels and gear have been estimated at 1,113 million and 427 million baht respectively (ADPC 2005). Furthermore, the damage to the aquaculture industry was estimated at approximately 1,000 million baht. Along the coast mangroves, coral reefs, beach forests and seagrass beds were damaged. The effects of the tsunami on the agricultural sector resulted in the loss of 1,652 ha of oil palm and coconut plantations, 75 ha of rice and 29 ha of other crops and total damages were estimated at 376 million baht (ADPC 2005). Livestock damage resulting from the tsunami was estimated at 17 million baht with the loss of 10,011 poultry, 2,100 pigs, 926 sheep and 448 cattle (ADPC, 2005). In terms of damages both to life and property, Phang Nga province suffered the most damage. However, in terms of economic losses, the impact of the tsunami had the greatest effect in Phuket province.

The Green Coast project in Thailand was implemented by Wetlands International Thailand (WI), WWF Thailand and IUCN Asia Regional Office in Thailand. WI was responsible for overall project coordination and management of the Small-Grants Facility. IUCN was responsible for the component Assessment and local implementation of 4 SG projects (together with local NGOs/CBOs) in Koh Phra Thong. WWF was responsible for the component Policy & Communications and implemented 10 SG projects in Tay Muang (in and around Had Tay Muang National Park).

Field visits by the evaluation team were conducted between 16 April and 18 April 2008. The team met the local team of WWF and IUCN and representatives of local NGOs and CBOs. In total 5 projects were visited. On Sunday 20<sup>th</sup>, a meeting was held with the Directors of WI and WWF in Bangkok. The Director of IUCN could not be present due to personal circumstances.

Thailand was not included in the mid-term review. The mid-term review concentrated on the three countries India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

### 6.2 Outputs and outcomes of the Green Coast project

The Green Coast Project in essence, was a continuation of previous work for both WWF in Tai Muang and IUCN in Ko Phra Thong. WWF worked the local National Park Authority, and directly with the communities that bordered the Tap La Mu bay area. In the other region, IUCN worked with local NGOs and communities of Ko Phra Thong island. Although it was claimed that the role of WI was to "collate information and conduct internal evaluation", there was no visible evidence of documentation regarding outcomes and processes or, the lessons learnt, for internal learning.

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<sup>9</sup> Recent estimates indicate that the number of affected villages amounted to 407 villages. Source: Tsunami Thailand. One year Later. National Response and Contribution of International Partners. UNDP 2006.

### 6.2.1 *The Assessment(s)*

Both IUCN and WWF worked in the area before the Tsunami and had experience in the region. Thus the assessment focused on this coastal stretch. IUCN Thailand was responsible for the assessment. The assessment for the Green Coast project was conducted between December 2005 and Early 2006 (pers. comm.).

The following outputs were produced under the Green Coast project and presented on the Internet:

- 1) "The Recovery of Coastal ecosystems to support Local Livelihoods", Assessment report Thailand (not dated, probably early 2006). This report guided the GC-project in Kho Phra Tong;
- 2) "Evaluating the Status of Marine and Coastal Resources in Had Tai Maung district, Phang Na province" (undated);

Earlier in January 2005 the IUCN Asia Regional Office already conducted a rapid assessment and published the results in the report "Post-Tsunami Ecosystems and Livelihoods Impact Assessment on Koh Phra Thong" (IUCN, January 2005). Based upon this work IUCN tried to give environmental guidance on relief and construction work.

According to GC staff, the assessment however missed a strong livelihood component identifying the need of the communities. Thus, the subsequent months were used for consultation of the targeted communities and organisation the GC-partners worked with before to define projects. One of the lessons learned was that it would have been better if under the assessment also a Rapid Rural Appraisal had been conducted.

#### *Observation:*

The IUCN assessment for Kho Phra Tong is of good quality and provides very useful information for focusing the Green Coast project and targeting affected communities. We found the assessment the best one of the Green Coast project by providing information about ecosystems and livelihoods and providing guidance to the small grants. The assessment should have included more information about other communities in the same region and not only those where the GC-partners worked before. It is however advisable to focus when only a small budget is available. We agree that more specific information about the needs of the communities itself is useful. However, this should be done in consultation with those communities and can thus be part of the facilitation process of the small-grants.

The report for Had Tai Muang provides useful information on the coastal ecosystem but no information on livelihoods and gender. It also provides an overview of the SG-projects. It is therefore not clear if and how this is an assessment to guide identification of target communities and livelihood needs.

### 6.2.2 *The Small Grants Facility*

As a result of the above-mentioned consultation process 30 proposals were submitted of which 14 were approved. The 20 projects that were rejected were focusing more on reconstruction work. The appraisals were conducted on 19-20 April 2006. The approved projects also included additional activities of projects that were ongoing. Therefore the starting dates of the projects vary as well as the date of completion.

The monitoring and administration by WI of the small grants projects is very limited in Thailand. There is no proper record of starting dates, completion dates, expected results, achieved results etc. We could not verify what has been done to monitor activities and outputs in the field by the small grants projects. No administration, documentation, database or record

has been provided to the evaluation team. Part of the problem is that some records like the project proposals are written in Thai (except one) and only three of those proposals have been translated into English.

Therefore we could not properly assess the timeline between submission of proposals, appraisal, approval, start and completion. To complicate the situation WWF staff members in Tay Muang have already left and the institutional memory on field level here is also limited. Thus only to a very limited extent outputs could be verified in the field – especially in Tay Muang - and could also not be compared to what was promised in the proposal. In the proposals that were provided the described expected outputs are mostly qualitative in nature.

In 2006 the small grants projects were approved. The smallest project approved was 92.000 baht (1,957 Euros) and the largest was 578.000 Baht (12,295 Euros). The expenditures for the 14 Small Grants Projects totalled a grant budget of 3,757,595 Baht (79,526 Euros), which is significantly less than the foreseen budget (100,400 Euros). The Tay Muang area received 2,082,095 Baht and the Koh Phra Thong area 1,656,500 Baht.

It should be noted that the post-Tsunami setting and the general economic situation of Thailand is different from the other countries. Communities in Thailand are not so poor as in for example Sri Lanka and were also less affected. Secondly, the GC-organisations already worked in part of the coastal region that was hit by the Tsunami. Thus there is a marked difference between the focus of the SG-projects and their way of implementation. For example, local people were not paid to do the planting of mangroves.

The Small Grants Facility (SGF) helped for example WWF to focus more on livelihoods than it had done before. Many projects focused on elements like awareness raising, action research, and environmental education. A substantial amount of mangrove restoration has been done as well.

In Koh Phra Thong, the community group of Ban Thung Nang Dam implemented a project to establish a Sea Grass Conservation Zone (to enhance fisheries nearby by their fishermen). The project was successfully implemented and buoys mark the area.

In both regions a mangrove restoration site was visited. The first one was a small one planted by the villagers of Ban Thung Nang Dam (the project actually focuses on establishing a community sea grass conservation zone). The site looked all right and survival rate seemed high (>80%).

In Tay Muang an area of mangrove restoration of 5 hectares was visited (although another area planted by the Government was first shown). How much was promised in the proposal is unknown. A worn out sign of Green Coast was put up in the planted area (owned by the military). The planted area looked fine and survival rate of the mangroves is high (>80%)

The replanting was done in mangrove areas directly destroyed by the tsunami and there are still mangrove trees left. The areas were thus very suitable. On the long term natural re-growth would have occurred. However, by planting the mangroves the areas will be restored more quickly and thus provide protection sooner and create more habitat for fish and crabs on the short term (one fisherman claimed that crab fishing in the mangroves was 'good'). The planting by communities and their awareness is a strong base for future support for conservation and sustainability.

In general it seems that support by communities was not difficult to obtain as they have experienced first hand the protection they provide (the interviewees stated that in the southern community of Koh Phra Thong island the wave stopped close to the village and they now support the restoration of a large area of mangrove between their village and the sea). Due to the distance this area was not visited.

In Tay Muang fishermen put 100 artificial reefs (concrete blocks) into the water. The fishermen made the blocks themselves (no information on if and how they were trained in

this). According to WWF they checked the number of blocks on shore and on the boat (of course we could not verify whether 100 blocks were actually under water). According to the fishermen (interviewed) their catch of fish (from the reefs) and crabs (from the mangroves) is rising again. They also catch some fish species they did not catch before. The 100 artificial reefs also provided a direct impulse to the livelihood of fishermen. The habitat provided to fish directly increases their catches. In the whole area about 100 local fishermen put nets (box of 1 m<sup>2</sup> by 0.4 mt). The total number is around 3,000. They say their livelihood and income is more or less stable. They could however not tell what this means in terms of monthly income. Firstly, because there are good and bad months and secondly because the fish price per kg has stayed the same but the price of petrol has gone up.

Some awareness activities have been conducted related to species (e.g. on turtles in Tay Muang) and because communities also want to attract (eco-)tourists to their communities, they know that - in order to do so - they have to have unspoiled natural scenery and something interesting to see (e.g. sea turtles, dugong).

In Koh Phra Thong region the organisation Naucrates (Italian) conducted research on 'The Relation between Sea Turtles and Artisanal Fisheries'. The study looked at the impact of the increase in fishing boats and gear as a result of the post-Tsunami relief effort (more boats have been handed out than there were before). The focus was mainly on artisanal fisheries but also included some observations on the big trawler boats (fishing with nets on fish and with squid traps) as well. The report contributes to the ongoing turtle conservation project. The report also describes the tension between forbidden trade and consumption of turtles and eggs and the probably to some extent ongoing use of turtles by the coastal communities. This is an issue to be addressed.

The team also visited a supported fish aquaculture project. The project was implemented by a group of 4 households. But in reality it was done by the adjacent households' husband and wife (more on this in 7.3.2). The household seemed capable to continue. However, the more strategic importance of this activity for GC was not clear at first. Later on it was learnt that it had to become a model of ecofriendly fishculture. However, then the question arises of how good the model is and how many other fishcultures have to be converted. Information on this was not clear.

In conclusion, there is a mixed portfolio of activities and thus the impressions of the evaluation team. Some small grants project are great stand-alone projects, others are not. More importantly, the strategic value of the combined small-grants project for "ecosystems & livelihood" have not yet been discussed among the GC-partners. IUCN has at the moment a better understanding on this subject in its own region and is working on bringing more communities together. WWF – together with Park management – have yet to develop a strategic vision on how to address 'livelihood & ecosystem' linkages to improve local livelihoods and conserve natural resources.

### *6.2.3 Local partner organisations (NGOs/CBOs)*

The focus of discussions vis-à-vis the local partner NGOs and CBOs mostly revolved around outputs. In fact, at no time was there any cognizance of the need to identify partner organizations' capacities and needs except in raising awareness on a particular issue or providing some technical skill in carrying out tasks related to conservation of ecosystems. During the evaluation visits also meetings were arranged only with one, or at best, two representatives of each beneficiary group. This was perhaps due to the language constraint and local group culture, but it made it all the more difficult to ascertain the dynamics amongst the various groups. Despite this lack of focused attention, and the constraints faced in the

arrangement of field visits, it was possible to meet with representatives of some communities and local NGOs which were carrying out inspiring work.

The evaluation team met with a women's group of the village of Thung Nang Dam involved in the promotion of ecotourism. Even though the core group consisted of only seven members, with their foresight and strategic interventions they had managed to mobilize their whole community. Their 'needs identification' was clear, and they actively engaged with outside agencies such as the Department of Fisheries, the Universities and the Center for Biological Studies in order to access resources, skills and the knowledge to implement solutions. Since they could clearly articulate the link between their livelihoods and ecosystems, they were involved in a multiple range of activities from declaring a protection zone for sea grass and marine life from fishing trawlers, and protecting swamp forests (to prevent land grabbing by palm oil companies). They were also keen in raising awareness by organizing youth camps and intended to work closely with local schools in raising awareness of their children on environmental issues. The community group seemed very capable to further their cause (financial resources, political support etc. See box below).

**Box 7: The Women's Thung Nang Dam Environmental Conservation Group**

Pimsanit Suksa-ard comes from a coastal village where women produce fish cages, collect and sell cashew nuts, along with their usual household chores and child rearing responsibilities. She used to take a leading part in the activities of her village. When the Tsunami struck her village, it brought another turning point in her life. She observed that the Thai government forgot her village when it drew up a master plan. Realizing the need for a larger voice for her community, she brought a core group together. Although she did not intend it to be a women's group, the active members turned out to be women, as "men were always engaged in fishing and did not have the time to involve in group activities". In addition to putting their village on the map of the government, this group geared itself to do a lot more.

In the wake of reduced fishing activities after the Tsunami, they decided that one alternative source of livelihood is ecotourism. They contacted the officials of the department of fisheries, and the researchers and experts from the University in Bangkok and the Center for Biological Studies to obtain help in order to establish such a venture. As a result of these collaborations they were introduced to the methodologies of studying their own environment and understanding the linkages between ecosystems and livelihoods. As the user community, they observed and gathered information about plant and marine life in their area. When we showed a Green Coast publication of IUCN in Thai language on the ecosystems of the area and asked her about her opinion and understanding, she proudly claimed that it was her community which provided all that information required for the publication.

Under the Green Coast project, this women's group has declared an unofficial protected coastal zone in their section of the bay area to prevent fishing trawlers from over-harvesting fish and also from destroying the sea grass. Although there is still no legislation in Thailand for the protection of destroyed ecosystems, they have managed to ensure support from the local police, which will strictly warn offenders handed over to them by the community. The trawler owners had gone to court over this issue, which was allayed by the community with the support of a Minister in the government. With a mischievous smile, Pimsanit recounted her group's attempt at diplomacy in visiting the Minister and expressing their support to him. "Our local authority leader is ineffective and is scared of taking controversial decisions. We want to change him in the coming elections" she said decisively. Green Coast has also assisted this group in planting mangroves and raising awareness (by organizing a youth camp). With support of CARE a tourist lodge is being build they have demarcated the place for an information center for ecotourists.

That is not all. This group has now lot more activities planned for the future, and they seemed to be very capable to handle them all. They meet once a month in their village which meeting most of the villagers attend, just for the wealth of information that is offered during their proceedings. Since some of the members are also involved in programs implemented by other government and non-government agencies, they are able to share information and plan their activities to harness these resources. For instance, Sakinah, the treasurer of this group is also one of the leaders of the village development



committee established by the government. Pimsanit herself is engaged in a fish culture project implemented by another local NGO. These opportunities have prodded her to explore the potential for shrimp paste production and marketing for which she visited the North-east area to talk to traders about the market. She also dreams about starting an education program in local schools on the natural resources and their links to livelihoods of the people.

We asked her if she had the opportunity to plan the Green Coast project again, what aspects would she want changed. “ As we need all the communities to conserve an ecosystem, I would include all the communities along our bay, rather than just one community as it was done now.” was her prompt reply. Well!

*Source: interview with Pimsanit Suksa-ard*

The subsequent discussion with IUCN staff in Koh Phra Thong somewhat explained the achievements of the women’s group in Thung Nang Dam. IUCN had built an equitable collaboration with two small local NGOs (which work closely with the communities) and the mentioned community group (referring to them as ‘my colleagues’ and really meaning it). Even before the commencement of Green Coast they have been engaging in building capacities of local communities in participatory research through which awareness of the ecosystems and their linkages were raised. Sea grass planting and other activities had been commenced as part of an action research program. Other activities such as turtle protection, home gardens, mangrove planting were also pursued with total community participation. Patrolling the beaches for saving turtle nests, collecting of seeds, planting in nurseries and replanting were all done by the women, men and the children of the Thai communities and the Mokkan peoples (also called ‘sea gypsies’ or ‘new Thai’). A Green Coast publication on sea grass by one of the NGOs ‘Thailand Reserve Fund’ targeted at both children and adults, was attractive and extremely simple in the directions provided for nurturing sea grass. IUCN has also engaged in advocacy related to the Forestry Bill under preparation with building capacities of forestry committees in the localities.

The same observations could not be made of the projects supported by WWF in the Tay Muang region. A meeting with one member of a group, which was involved in aquaculture was disappointing. He and his wife, an enthusiastic and hard working couple, reported that other group members do not contribute to any of the work carried out in the venture. While he did the maintenance, his wife helped in with feeding the fish. As there were still some funds left in the project, the members had not started contributing financially as yet. The couple hoped to tap on the doors of the other members once the current funds dried up. Although they claimed that they will share the profits equally, this appears to us as being grossly unfair. This group needed building of capacities in group functioning and sharing management tasks. However, in another project the benefits of linking with local authority (what Thais term as sub-district) leaders were seen in the mangroves planting project. The local project leader was able to mobilize the whole community to participate in the establishment of the nursery and the planting of the mangroves.

In the turtle conservation project under the National Park, WWF had supported the printing of posters and leaflets to raise awareness of the need to save turtles, as well as to imprint the turtle as a symbol of the local communities. The management of the National Park had formed what it calls the Community Forums in the localities consisting on an average about 30 members. This forum met once a month where government officials attended to explain about government procedures and new projects for implementation. This forum also was utilized by the officials to raise awareness on turtles. WWF supported the fuel expenses of the beach patrolling staff as well as for the rewards for the community members who brought in turtle eggs. Under Green Coast, one youth camp was also organized as part of awareness raising activities. The role of WWF in building in sustainability the relation with the communities remained unclear.

#### 6.2.4 *Gender issues and women's empowerment*

Although the assessment report of the IUCN mentions the “need for gender sensitive measures in assistance” during post Tsunami programs, it contains no gender disaggregated data on many important issues. It states that in the KPT area “conditions of land tenure is a key factor in all future activities” but gives no idea as to the land ownership patterns between men and women. Similarly there are no gender disaggregated data on livelihoods, access to relief and rehabilitation programs, and responses to common environmental concerns. These lacunae in the assessment report seemed to continue in to the program design.

The impressions quoted during the discussions with all three organizations, WI, WWF and IUCN, indicated that from the Assessment stage gender issues have not been mainstreamed in program design. If it had been, there would have been capacity building first for the staff of the implementing agencies, and then their partner organizations on the gendered nature of development processes. Instead, stereotype perceptions were heard from the staff of the project offices.

WWF staff tended to explain that women do not participate in mangrove planting because they “do house based work”. But all visual evidence in their project areas indicated otherwise. The women collect nearly 500 kg of cashew nuts and then take it to the mainland to sell to middlemen. At the discussion at the IUCN office – which included the local NGOs - opinions such as women participate in the group meetings as men are “busy and have no time” were shared. When asked whether they had an overview of what men and women do during a day they stated they had none. In a joint timeline analysis it transpired that women get up at 3.00 am in the morning to start cooking for husbands going to the sea (they get up at the same time to prepare their boats and gear and drag the boats to sea). After seeing the men off, women are busy with mending fish traps, collecting shells, and collecting nuts and other produce from the adjacent forest in the midst of looking after their children (Statement: they stay close to the village and work in groups so they can chat. Translation: thus they can communicate about group work). And, when the husbands come home at 3.00pm they are ready with their lunch. It must be realized that women do little bits of work the whole day that contributes to their livelihood and income but is not generally considered as real work (even by themselves when asked). Women are more willing to participate in group activities because they through their experience of helping each other in caring for children and managing households, and know the benefits of collective activity.

It would have been beneficial to conduct a proper Time Line exercise (based upon the methodology of a Participatory Rural Appraisal) as part of the Assessment. Focus group discussions with small groups of women from the same community would have indicated in detail how women spent their time, and from that, what natural resources they were depending upon. This documentation would have provided many options in strengthening their livelihoods activities. For example, all focus of livelihood initiatives under Green Coast in this project area were on fishing, while women were obviously engaged in an important income earning cashew nut venture. And, in some areas the cashew trees had been affected during the first year after Tsunami due to high salinity of the water in the area.

In the process of implementation also, there seemed no attempt to target women as a group. There was no indication that one of the indicators for monitoring was the specific participation of women. “Community” was the common reference term in the discussions with both WWF and IUCN. One had to delve into this at length to decipher how men and women benefited from or participated in, a particular activity. The women's leadership of Tung Nang Dam was not by design, but because of the capacity of the person involved. IUCN staff made the observation that in their project area, amongst the two communities, the Thai community was a patriarchal structure, while the Moklen peoples community was based on a somewhat matrilineal structure. There seemed to be no strategy in place to strengthen the

women's position within the Moklen community while constructively changing it within the Thai community.

If we consider the fact that patriarchal culture took hold mainly due to the access men had to the surplus wealth of the community, then projects that strengthen male earning capacities tend to exacerbate this inequality. The data related to livelihoods in the assessment report itself should have alerted programmers in this respect; the first ten high income earning ventures were all men's activities. When programs are not sharpened in taking into account gender issues, then they cannot inform any policy initiatives. Thus the Green Coast project in Thailand did not take up any issues concerning women at the policy level.

#### *6.2.5 Policy Work and Communications*

The two implementing organisations IUCN and WWF work separately from each other and in different regions. Also on the policy component they work in different policy contexts. There were no specific policy-oriented documents produced. Only a progress report was put on the intranet.

##### *WWF in Tay Muang:*

The project was implemented in close collaboration with the Park Authority of Had Tay Muang National Park. A significant problem is the sand mining – with a strong business interest - in the coastal zone. A community leader working on this issue in a GC-project was killed. Although the reason is unknown and there are no suspects the focus of the GC-project shifted more towards livelihood. The Park Authority also established a Community Consultative Forum to discuss various issues (like sand mining) bringing the community, businessmen and organisations together. It is too premature to predict the outcome of this difficult consultation process.



*Sea wall construction at Had Tay Muang (courtesy WI Thailand)*

Another important issue was the fact that the Provincial government received a serious amount of relief funds to spend on construction. They decided to spend this on building a sea wall on the high tide line. WWF and Park Authority only learned about this activity when construction had already begun. The wall is a serious barrier for the sea turtles that come to lay their eggs on this coastal stretch (the four most threatened species can be found here). Even worse is the fact that the sea wall probably does not provide proper protection. The wall is about 1 meter above sand level and will provide only some protection against smaller waves. It will probably provide no protection against waves above 3 meters high with a high energy impact (the tsunami was around 5 meters). It would also have been possible to construct the wall more inland near the road and use beach forest as additional wave protection. The GC-partners find the communities and the Marine and Coastal Department on their side on this issue. The GC-project team tries to undo the damage and has also provided

guidelines on Environmental Impact Assessment to the sub-district government for future construction work.

The team also produced a Master plan for Sea Turtle Conservation (and worked together with local communities on this). The sea turtle is considered not only important for conservation but also to attract tourists and create revenues for local communities. The Plan will for example introduce zoning and prohibit monocultures in the coastal zone. It will also prohibit to use of chemicals and will support organic farming (tried out under the GC-project).

The GC-partners also want to expand the boundaries of the National Park to include also a marine protected area. They are currently lobbying for this (although it might be difficult as the navy uses the area).

#### *IUCN in Koh Phra Thong:*

The local office of IUCN is small and works closely with grassroot NGOs and CBOs. The main focus of the GC-policy work is on the conservation of sea grass and mangroves on behalf of the local fishing communities. These communities catch for example fish nearby and collect crabs in the mangroves. They know about the importance of these areas and work closely with environmental groups to protect the areas against degradation and commercial fishing trawlers. An ecosystem map has been produced and has been distributed to communities and local government to raise awareness and inform them.

Under the GC-project a Sea Grass Conservation Zone has been established and marked by buoys. Community fishermen respect these boundaries and do a citizen-arrest if others trespass. They can however only warn trespassers and these can not taken to court (if need be). At the moment the law does not recognize community-based management of areas. The CG-partners promote such community-based management.

Another outcome of the GC-work is that a Coastal Community Network of user/community groups is under development. The purpose of the network is to disseminate information, discuss common issues and expand the impact of work by collaboration.

#### *Observation(s):*

The first noticeable fact is that the organisations work in different policy processes and measurable outcomes are yet limited. There is a lack of cooperation between the partners to influence coastal zone management policies on higher policy levels and linking the two regions and their issues. It seems IUCN, WWF and WI do not work together on coastal zone management related policy issues. This has been noted by the Country Directors and there is currently a dialogue to see what can be done together.

In the general Policy Analysis of March 2006 it was mentioned that Thailand wanted to work more on the Provincial and National Wetland Committee. The Green Coast project and the identified policy issues have not been discussed in the National Wetlands Committee or other such fora. The plan was also to strengthen the role of the Phang-Nga Provincial Wetland Committee in local development planning (in particular ensuring effective high quality input to the 5 year plans). This was not mentioned during the interviews and it is not clear if this work was done.

### **6.3 Other outcomes of the Green Coast project**

#### *6.3.1 Other outcomes related to Ecosystems & Livelihoods*

In Tay Muang some relevant work has been done to restore mangroves and improve the fish population. A clear overview of the larger coastal ecosystem and the livelihoods of the

communities it supports is not available. This gives the impression that here is no overall strategy. For the smaller area of the Kad Tay Muang National Park this is clearer. The support provided to communities and users groups could be improved in order to create benefits to both. At the moment it is fragmented but the gained experience under the GC-project will be very helpful. The main challenge is the conservation of the beach front for turtles and to attract tourist that are willing to pay. It will be very important that such revenues are equally shared with the communities.

Especially in the Koh Phra Thong area there is a good link between local livelihood work and the bigger picture of ecosystem conservation. The process seems very promising to develop community support in a larger region and conserve sea grass areas and mangroves.

### 6.3.2 *Influencing national policies related to the coastal zone*

As far as can be distinguished the GC-partner organisations are as yet only focusing on those policies and decisions that directly affect their work on the local and sub-district level. There seems not attempt yet to influence policies or legislation that could help or hamper their work through for example colleagues at headquarters in Bangkok. For example, the issue of community based management of marine areas. It was stated that there are conflicting policies between the forestry department and fisheries department.

Another important issue for local success for turtle conservation is the commercial trawlers fishing for the coast with nets. The trawlers are the main reason for turtles to die. It seems that so far no activities have been conducted to improve the situation by for example: trying to create fishing zones where only line fishing is allowed (a complete ban is probably not feasible); a seasonal ban when the young turtles go to sea; or awareness raising and getting fishermen to set free turtles.

## 6.4 *Budget, efficiency and effectiveness Green Coast Thailand*

### 6.4.1 *Budget and expenditures*

The budget allocated to Thailand can be subdivided in 25,000 Euros for the Assessment; 60,000 Euros for Policy Work and Communications; and 100,000 Euros for the Small Grants Facility. In addition funds were allocated for workshops, audits, etc. The total expenditures were 192,419 Euros. A complete overview is provided in the Financial Report.

**Table 9: Budget and expenditures Thailand**

	<b>Budget component</b>	<b>Original budget (Euros)</b>	<b>Expenditures (Euros)</b>	<b>% Exp. of total Exp.</b>
<b>1</b>	<b><i>National project management</i></b>			
<b>1a</b>	Assessment	<b>25,000</b>	<b>23,899</b>	<b>12.4%</b>
<b>1b</b>	Policy Work, Communications	<b>60,000</b>	<b>69,240</b>	<b>36.0%</b>
<b>2</b>	<b><i>Project costs</i></b>	<b>100,000</b>	<b>99,280</b>	<b>51.6%</b>
<b>2a</b>	Management costs WI	20,000	20,000	20.1%
<b>2b</b>	Community based management	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
<b>2c</b>	Direct "Ecosystem& Livelihood" support	80,000	77,280	79.9%
	<b>Total country budget</b>	<b>185,000</b>	<b>192,419</b>	<b>100%</b>

Of the total funds (192,419 Euros), 40.2% (77,280 Euros) was spend on direct 'Ecosystems & Livelihood activities and thus reached community level.

#### 6.4.2 Efficiency and effectiveness

The efficiency (see annex C for definition) are the means used to achieve outputs and outcomes. The efficiency cannot be compared against a pre-determined standard, as this is very difficult for a project consisting of components like assessments and policy work. In Thailand two different regions were supported with two different SG-organisations. The resulting implemented activities and outcomes are diverse. There is also not one standard to assess whether the 'efficiency' is sufficient or not. Thus the assessment by the evaluation team is mainly qualitative in nature.

**Table 10: Assessment of efficiency Thailand**

	<b>Budget component</b>	<b>Means (Euros)</b>	<b>Output, Outcomes</b>	<b>Assessment</b>
<b>1</b>	<b><i>National project management</i></b>			
<b>1a</b>	Assessment	<b>23,899</b>	In Koh Phra Tong useful and relevant. In Had Tai Muang not relevant for SGF.	0/-
<b>1b</b>	Policy Work, Communications	<b>69,240</b>	In Koh Phra Tong good and relevant process on local level. Increased participation in Coastal Network. In Had Tai Muang knowledge about process but less strategic (respond to problem rather than anticipate). No clear outcomes yet.	0/0
<b>2</b>	<b><i>Project costs Small Grants</i></b>	<b>99,280</b>	No. beneficiaries unknown. = <i>outcome not monitored</i> ha planted between 5-11 = <i>survival rate &gt;80%</i> <i>In Koh Phra Tong the development of the Community network is a valuable outcome.</i>	+/-
	<b>Total country budget</b>	<b>56,180</b>		

'-' = not good: outputs have not been used or are not relevant enough

'0' = reasonable, need to be improved: outputs have been used and are relevant

'+' = good: outputs are high and relevant, outcomes are promising

'++' = very good: outputs are high, outcomes are good and significant to target group

Overall, we have to conclude that the results regarding Koh Phra Tong are positive. In Had Tay Muang the GC-partners are less advanced and work less strategic. Because the monitoring of project outcomes on all levels is limited, we feel that the GC-project has not been implemented well and cannot be qualified as 'efficient'.

#### 6.5 Sustainability, integration and up-scaling

The activities under the GC-project have been part of ongoing work and therefore lessons and experiences can be integrated easily. Up-scaling can also be build upon this work. If so willing the GC-partners could also work together on several common issues.

##### *IUCN in Koh Phra Thong region:*

The small-grants work in Koh Phra Tong seem very sustainable and will be taken forward by IUCN Thailand. As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, there is a clear potential to upscale the work of the IUCN office on coastal conservation. They are already working on

establishing Coastal Community Network. If IUCN is able its ecosystem conservation work with the livelihood priorities they can get great community support. There is now experience and evidence how “ecosystem & livelihoods” can be combined. However, some tensions and conflicts will remain with the fisheries communities. This is shown clearly by the study on sea turtles and artisanal fisheries. The fishermen at the moment do not really trust conservation NGOs on the issue of sea turtles. Community representatives are needed to build bridges and the Coastal Community Network could facilitate this and also establish more community conservation and sustainable use zones.

*WWF in Tay Muang region:*

Not all supported projects seems very sustainable and would need further assistance, especially in the form of skills to learn to become independent. The local office of WWF and Park Management can learn a lot of the work done under the GC-project. First they however need to define a “national park and livelihoods” strategy bringing all issues together in a comprehensive and holistic manner. The Forum they have created should not only be used to discuss the agenda of visiting officials but also to discuss the introduction of alternative livelihood activities and discuss the needs of the communities (e.g. organic farming). There is probably an opportunity to work together with communities to develop a common ecotourism strategy with elements like homestay, turtle viewing, and developing tourist attraction like the turtle nursery and community livelihood activities.

*WI on national level*

The role of Wetlands International has been rather limited in the implementation of the GC-project. As a member of the National Wetlands Committee they could influence policies on a national level and promote Integrated Coastal Zone Management. There is also a need by the other GC-partners to link research with policies. Both IUCN and WWF facilitate action-oriented and participatory research. Compiling this information for policy work on Provincial and State level (as far as could be distinguished) has not been done yet. There several other outstanding issues like the economic value of mangroves to Thailand (not only financial but also community use, wave protection etc.) as well as other coastal wetland systems.

*Common issues:*

There are some issues on which the GC-partners could work together as a Green Coast follow up. For example:

- 1) Community involvement in conservation zones.
- 2) Integrating community-based management in coastal conservation legislation.
- 3) Developing a campaign for turtle-friendly fisheries policies and practices, which could include: introducing line-fisheries and banning net fishing in certain zones from November till March (when turtles come to the beach to lay their eggs); help artisanal fishermen to become turtle-friendly and promote such artisanal fisheries as a good alternative; arrange tourist sightseeing trips with fishermen etc.
- 4) Develop community-based ecotourism together with coastal communities in order for them to really appreciate the value of nature to attract tourists (including for example brochures and other material on behalf of the coastal communities).
- 5) Promote Integrated Coastal Zone Management on Provincial and State level (including proper planning of construction, zoning etc).

## 7 General findings concerning the Green Coast Project

### 7.1 Budget and expenditures

In the table below an overview of the original budget and the expenditures of the Green Coast project are presented. More detailed information can be found in the financial reports. More specific information how the budgets were spent in the countries is provided in the previous chapters.

*Table 11: Budget and expenditures Green Coast project*

	Budget component	Original budget	Expenditures	% Exp. of total Exp.
<b>A</b>	<b>Assessments</b>	<b>431,200</b>	<b>388,067</b>	<b>9.7%</b>
	Country budgets	417,450	374,317	9.3%
	Overall incl. guidance by WI HQ	13,750	13,750	0.3%
<b>B</b>	<b>Policy support &amp; Communication</b>	<b>473,450</b>	<b>472,505</b>	<b>11.8%</b>
	Country budgets	370,700	355,754	8.8%
	Overall incl. website, production of GC materials & guidance on communications	102,750	116,751	2.9%
<b>C</b>	<b>Grants projects</b>	<b>2,607,170</b>	<b>2,634,569</b>	<b>65.5%</b>
	Country budgets	2,642,950	2,477,570	61.6%
	Overall incl. guidance by IUCN NL	144,220	156,998	3.9%
<b>D</b>	<b>Project management (incl travel &amp; other costs)</b>	<b>167,175</b>	<b>168,574</b>	<b>4.2%</b>
<b>E</b>	<b>Audits and project evaluation</b>	<b>50,000</b>	<b>25,186</b>	<b>0.6%</b>
<b>F</b>	<b>Workshops</b>	<b>116,000</b>	<b>105,360</b>	<b>2.6%</b>
	National	96,000	70,922	1.8%
	Regional (incl. study tour)	20,000	34,438	0.9%
<b>G</b>	<b>AKV (5%)</b>	<b>201,500</b>	<b>225,559</b>	<b>5.6%</b>
	<b>Total</b>	<b>4,046,495</b>	<b>4,019,820</b>	<b>100%</b>
	<b>External evaluations</b>	<b>50,000</b>	<b>26,664</b>	
	<b>Total project budget</b>	<b>4,096,495</b>	<b>4,046,483</b>	

The country budgets formed 81.5% of the total project expenditures of 4,019,820 Euros.

The micro-grants projects entail 65.5% of the overall budget expenditures.

Management costs and other (regional and institutional) costs are related to the budget lines 'overall costs', 'project leader', 'AKV' and total 17.8% of the overall expenditures.


*Table 12: Budget and expenditures Country budgets.*

Country	India	Indonesia	Sri Lanka	Thailand	Malaysia
<b>Component</b>					
1. Assessment	88,497	119,413	33,795	23,899	9,795
2. SGF	634,659	942,814	720,376	99,280	17,173
3. Policy Work	69,285	97,311	82,851	69,240	29,212
<b>Total</b>	<b>814,797</b>	<b>1,159,538</b>	<b>837,022</b>	<b>192,419</b>	<b>56,180</b>



The total SGF for the countries total 2,436,658 Euros. This differs from table 10 total amount of 40,912 Euros and is explained by some other costs that have been subdivided over the various country budgets and as such presented in the final financial report.

**Figures 13: Budget and expenditures Country budgets.**



### 7.1.1 Efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability

In the original project proposal a table was presented describing the main expected outputs and outcomes. This table is used for assessing the general effectiveness.

The overall outcomes of the Small Grants project under the Green Coast project are presented in the following table. For Thailand and Malaysia is data is not complete. Overall, the expenditures 2,420,160 of the 163 small-grants reached 97,728 households (direct and indirect support). Of the beneficiaries about 66.3% were women. In total 686 hectares were planted with tropical dry forest species and mangroves. The strategic importance of these plantings and the value they have for livelihood income can yet not be measured. During the field visit some fishermen expressed they noticed an increase in catch of crabs and fish. Without proper research this is at best circumstantial evidence.

**Table 14: Outputs and outcomes of Green Coast.**

	Country	India	Indonesia	Malaysia	Sri Lanka	Thailand	TOTAL
	<b>Unit</b>						
<b>No SG-projects</b>		60	59	1	29	14	163
<b>Expenditures (Euro)</b>		657,015	942,814	17,173	720,376	99,280	2,436,658
<b>Ecosystem restoration</b>	hectare	59.5	529	4	93	?	686
	seedlings	136,750	1,191,600	2,000	106,000		1,436,350
	nurseries	14	29	3	6		52
<b>Livelihood support</b>	eco-enterprises	168	111			?	279
	homegardens	7,021	138		2,269		9,428
	agriculture + fisheries (no)		523		300	?	823
	agriculture (ha)	521	220				741
	micro revolving funds		16		154		170
	community infrastructure	120	12		1		133
<b>Beneficiaries</b>	households (direct support)	8,513	3,449	?	13,490	?	25,452
	men (farmers/fishermen)	10%	46%		45.0%		33.7%
	women	90%	54%		55.0%		66.3%

	Total household beneficiaries	24,157	43,637	?	29,934	?	97,728
<b>Awareness + Training</b>	number of events	590	400				990
	participants	93,813	12,000		12,000		117,813

The *effectiveness* of the Green Coast cannot be compared against a neutral external standard. Thus, the project is compared vis-à-vis its own expected outputs and outcomes (see table below). Our conclusion in general that the activities under the three project components have led to significant outcomes as promised by the original proposal. We have also the feeling that the project could also improve its performance by applying a more rigid and directive organisation in a post-disaster setting (see 7.3 and 7.4).

**Table 15: Performance of the Green Coast project**

Projected Outputs and Performance Indicators	Outputs and Outcomes	Observations
<b>Component 1: Assessments</b>		
<b>1.1 Accessible database</b> - Database - High priority area list - Maps of country strategic assessment and coastal stretch assessment	Not one comprehensive database. Some countries have good database. Good interactive map on internet. Maps in Assessments vary.	One comprehensive data recording in database is crucial. In future use of Google Earth would give more flexibility.
<b>1.2 Mapping assessment activities</b> - Record of areas and actions approved through participatory process	Most areas and actions recorded. SGFs discussed on local level. In two countries 'Policy Road Shows'	Participation seemed high.
<b>1.3 Policy recommendations</b> - Policy guidance papers for coastal rehabilitation	- Green Reconstruction Guidelines - Mangrove Planting Guidelines	- Too elaborate - More outreach to local communities needed
<b>Component 2: Policy support and communication</b>		
<b>2.1 More sustainable livelihoods</b> - Influence reconstruction policies for at least 20% of the investment arena's and coastline - Within the 20% coastline at least 100 village groups will benefit	SG-partners are involved in process. Many coastal communities received support and their livelihood has been improved. For example: 9,428 home gardens through women's groups.	Influence is not yet enough. In each country there is a reconstruction effort that has not been improved! The fault is with Gov. + donor.
<b>2.2 Integrating Green Coast recovery principles.</b> - Minimal 5 policy and implementing agencies per country (not Malaysia)	Guidelines picked up in: Indonesia, Sri Lanka Involvement in: India, Malaysia In Thailand esp. local level Gov.	Developments are positive but outcomes still uncertain on the really big reconstruction issues.
<b>Component 3: Grants for Rehabilitation projects.</b>		
<b>3.1 Rehabilitated livelihoods</b> - 150 SGF <10,000 Euro - 30SGF >10,000 Euros - Total 48,000 beneficiaries	163 SG projects in total. Total: 25,452 direct support and 97,728 household beneficiaries	Positive
<b>3.2 Rehabilitated Coastal Ecosystems</b> - xx projects implemented - xx hectares coastal ecosystems	Many combination projects so difficult to quantify. 593 ha replanted, survival rate between 58-68% mangroves and 73%-89% for coastal dry forests	Positive. Some notable failures due to inexperience with planting and grazing (fencing!).
<b>3.3 Enhanced Institutional Capacity</b> - Capacities 48,000 people	Many people - i.e. NGOs, CBOs -	Positive. Skills training

- Partners, NGOs trained in SGF - NGOs/CBOs coordinate themselves	participated in events to enhance skills, awareness and were trained. Total: 117,813 participants	seems most efficient, use of Appropriate Technology!

An important aspect in the discussion on cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness is the fact that a project has to define its outcomes in very specific terms at the start in order to make a comparison possible in the end. Green Coast did not do that. An assessment of cost-effectiveness should take the benefits arising from the activities of the project as a given and ask whether these could have been produced at a lower cost compared with alternatives.

On sub-project level, several projects in India supported households in developing home gardens to increase their income. The increase in income and savings for food purchases was around 20-30% of the monthly household income. The investment made was about 2-5 Euros per household. More or less the same effect can be seen with Micro-Revolving Funds.

Investments in agriculture on Sustainable Rice Agriculture required a much larger investment per household (76.5 Euro) benefiting directly 176 farmers. But their yield per ha tripled in the last year leading to a significant increase in income. With 794 farmers copying these SRI practices without further investments the project-investment per farmer is around 13.9 Euro.

On this level alternatives might be defined but the examples mentioned seems very cost-effective. Those that failed of course did not. Investments in ecological restoration can improve significantly in their cost-effectiveness if these investments could define their importance to the ecosystem, i.e. what does 1 ha planted mean for the larger area (merely an increase ha?, resilience/, safety buffer zone?, increase in yield and catch?, how much water?).

Although we cannot produce hard figures, we have the feeling that the Small-Grants Facility has about 10-20% SG-projects could improve significantly in their outcomes and sustainability, and that about 10% of the SG-projects will fail for a variety of reasons. The failure rate of the Micro-Revolving Funds with women's groups seems extremely low (not one is mentioned as a failure, yet).

On the level of the GC-project it becomes more difficult to make such claims. If the purpose of the GC-project had been to only focus on how to restore a livelihood and raise a household income the best way would have been to only invest in small-grants projects. Thus leaving out the other project components. However, the component 'Assessment' was incorporated to focus the SGF and identify policy issues. This has not been very successful (because they often failed to produce guidance to the SGF) bringing the cost-effectiveness down. The policy component had been incorporated with the rationale that long-term sustainability had to be ensured as well. Thus making the investment of the SGF more sustainable. The policy interventions in most countries are not specific enough to make this claim. But in most countries the GC-teams are involved in the relevant processes. The outcomes are yet limited. In a future project with similar components, the inter-linkages could be stronger and better defined preferably also with measurable outcomes. This would enhance the project's efficiency and effectiveness and also make it better measurable.

## 7.2 Findings and observations

### 7.2.1 General findings of the mid-term review

The following findings - also related to activities in the Netherlands - were presented in the mid-term review (please note the findings are shifted to fit under the various headings):

#### *Project design and steering mechanism:*

- 10) Project partners as well as external informants expressed that the design of the Green Coast Project was well conceived and innovative. The small grants components and its

communities perspective was considered novel and ‘absolutely unique’ in the context of relief work. The project furthermore is unique in creating an internationally collaborative effort for adopting a bottom up approach for restoration of ecosystems and livelihoods.

- 11) The backside of this bottom up approach is the unfamiliarity with the approach with a number of implementing partners, resulting in some delay in implementation in several countries. The Netherlands-based team has provided relevant inputs and back-up, but were seriously constrained by limited budgets for the Netherlands-based activities. It is observed that during implementation significant improvements have been made in the performance of all programmes.
- 12) The strong conceptual design of the project should be maintained, where (i) the assessments component should be converted into science-based monitoring, learning and exchange, (ii) the small grants component should pay specific attention to sustainability and self reliance (aimed at phasing out of external assistance), and (iii) the policy work should be aimed at introducing an ecosystem approach. The concept of Integrated Coastal Zone Management merits special attention to enhance a further development of linkages between sea, coast and inland areas on a watershed basis.
- 13) Project management at Wetland International HQ has done a remarkable job and is praised by all respondents in the visited countries. The general feeling was that without the continuous support from HQ the project would never have been where it stands now.
- 14) There is a continued need for a regional project team to (i) maintain consistency in the approach of the programme, (ii) facilitate the exchange of experiences and enhance the learning at international level, and (iii) to liaise with international initiatives and the international communities at large.

*Project preparation and implementation:*

- 15) The Green Coast project has, in a relatively short period of time, produced an impressive output of visible results contributing to the restoration of livelihoods of people hit by the tsunami, combined with an innovative approach to restore coastal ecosystems and landscapes in a sustainable manner.
- 16) The better response of the Green Coast project refers in particular to the items 6, 7 and 8 of the Red Cross/Red Crescent code of conduct (see Box 3) on the use of local capacities, the participation of local beneficiaries in project management, and the reduction of vulnerability to future disasters.
- 17) The steering committee has advised to limit the project to selected coastal stretches. Even though the need for more focus is acknowledged, it is recommended to provide a more solid conceptual and factual foundation for the selected stretches. In India some respondents questioned the feasibility of such an approach.

*'Ecosystems & Livelihoods' Assessments:*

- 18) The project was seriously affected by unrealistic timelines due to the fact that emergency relief has to be spent within two years (leaving one and a half year for this project). The pressure on the project to provide visible result in a short period of time was the single greatest problem encountered by all. To address this need to produce results, the Steering Group of project partners decided to commence simultaneously with all three components. This has led to coordination problems. Assessment results were needed to select interventions areas for small grants projects; outputs of small grants projects as well as assessment would be needed for policy and communication work. Now that the projects are well underway it becomes clear that opportunities for integration have been missed. On the other hand, however, the country teams are increasingly working towards an effective and integrated use of all outputs. In this respect the first year of

implementation has been a learning experience, under great pressure, but with increasingly visible results.

- 19) Restoration of ecosystems and livelihoods linked to such ecosystems cannot be realistically achieved in a two-years period, taking into account that a programme first has to be established and baseline information needs to be collected. Collecting such ecological as well as social-economic baseline information is time consuming, but is an absolute necessity if one does not want projects to wither from faulty design. (The number of abandoned tree-planting projects – not linked to Green Coast - encountered during our visits is bewildering). The programme should not be simply abandoned after this phase. It is clear that tangible outputs for the environment and livelihoods have been obtained but long-term benefits will only be achieved if follow up activities are possible. A number of activities can continue without further support, but for the bulk of the activities continued monitoring and support is needed as these simply have not had time to produce sustainable results yet (in terms of livelihood opportunities for local communities).
- 20) Many staff members express having trouble in effectively integrating gender aspects in their work. The assessment documents are deficient in providing concrete gender based information on livelihood dependencies. In the policy component the gender aspects are largely absent. On the other hand it is observed that small grants projects reach women and men in equal numbers. In some instances women groups expressed their appreciation for the project as they were able to make some money for themselves for the first time ever. Differences between countries are visible; gender inequalities within small grants project have been observed in Indonesia.

*Small Grants Facility:*

- 21) The approach followed by the Green Coast project to distribute funds through a small grants facility is a very effective means to reach out to local communities hit by the tsunami and to have these communities actively participate in, and benefit from rehabilitation activities.
- 22) In this respect the Green Coast project performs impressively better than many of the other post-tsunami activities which were subject to an internal evaluation by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition. This confirms information from other sources, such as the evaluation of the GEF Small Grants Fund, that small grants have big impacts (even when taking into account the relatively high overhead costs associated to small grants administration).

*Policy and communication work:*

- 23) The Green Coast project makes a strong case of restoring the environmental damage done by tsunami as well as post-tsunami relief work and pre-tsunami unsustainable developments. Item 8 of the Red Cross code of conduct makes specific reference to environmental concerns. The Green Coast project goes even further than many other activities in reducing the vulnerability of the coast by the re-greening, where other relief and rehabilitation activities have done significant harm to the environment of coastal areas. Scientific evidence for the effectiveness of these measures is contradictory, making the science-based approach of the Green Coast project all the more relevant, to distinguish stories from facts.
- 24) For the final period of the present project phase we recommend to pay serious attention to the learning of lessons appearing from the small grants programme and translating these either into questions for further research, or in policy outputs aiming to spread the lessons to a larger audience.

On communications it was also noted that communication outputs from all project components are available and branded as 'Green Coast' and/or as a collaborative effort by the four international NGOs. The website provides a wealth of information and is praised by a number of respondents for its transparency and efficiency in use.

### 7.2.2 *General findings regarding the Green Coast' project components*

The main general findings are presented under the various chapters per country. Below the main issue per project components derived from those findings is presented.

#### ***The Rapid Assessments***

At the start of the GC project a Guidance document was sent to all countries. The Guidance document for the Assessment states that the purpose of the assessments is: "...includes but is not limited to Small Grants targeting; assessment serves the policy component through its contribution towards an inventory of restoration priorities, impediments, and policy needs...". Various countries have not really used the assessments for this purpose. The main reason provided was time pressure, which forced the various components to start simultaneously. The assessments that were produced were however also not really used in later stages.

*Recommendation: The assessments and their use can be improved significantly. In a future Rapid response Green Coast project a rigid control is needed that first one comprehensive assessment report is produced that includes nature, resources, livelihoods and gender aspects. The last chapter of this report should contain a proposal for focusing on one or two coastal regions and their communities. The chapter should also provide criteria based upon which small-grants can be facilitated and selected (e.g. state that agriculture support is preferred above fisheries). In the consultation with the communities of course other type of livelihoods projects might be proposed. This can be allowed but the result of the consultation should be noted. The assessment team needs to be aware of "The Need for Speed". They should act as advisers to SG-process and not wait on formal reporting.*

#### ***The Small-Grants Facility***

Much has already been said in previous chapters about the small-grants facility. Many project contributed to ecosystem and livelihood restoration. Some projects are great examples of linked interventions. Good experiences have been noted with appointing 'village facilitators' whom are paid by Green Coast but support local implementers. However, a disaster would also bring GC-organisations to regions which normally do not belong to their priority regions.

*Observation: An important assumption of the GC project and one of the main principles of the Ecosystem Approach is that resource management decisions are to be taken at the lowest possible level or closest to where they will have their effect. Experience shows that communities whom control their local natural resources under conditions whereby there is a basic degree of equitability, this favours sustainable resource management. The Small Grants Facility is an instrument that aims to support local people to design their own management and use strategies. The SGF, as well as the BioRights Approach, under GC-project has some very good examples but not all projects have been defined with this point of view. If the above observation remains the driving force the SGF could become even more effective.*

#### ***Women's empowerment and gender issues***

[shanti]

Because of the focus on in-country implementation the attention for the Green Coast project and its approach was limited within the internal organisations (with the exception of Wetlands International). Although the rationale is very clear this has also led to limited attention for this project within society and government in the Netherlands.

*Observation: The project also intended to raise awareness, in the region and in the Netherlands, about the special role and responsibilities of women in coastal resource management, the way their lives were affected by the tsunami and how the project contributes to the empowerment of women, and concrete improvements in their rights and economic position (source project proposal). This information and related lessons have only to a limited extent been gathered and as yet not communicated.*

### **Local NGOs/CBOs**

[shanti]

### **Policy work and communication**

Most work done under the GC-project regarding policies is valuable. However, the partners in all countries all were input and output-oriented. Various GC-partners had a thorough understanding of the policy processes they wanted to influence. In general, they tend to approach their natural partners for advocacy, i.e. a department responsible for environmental or coastal resources. Depending on the context of the country this can be the best approach. But in some cases a department responsible for economic decisions regarding investments (infrastructure, fisheries) has more (negative) impact.

*Observation: The effectiveness of policy work would improve if the policy interventions would be outcome-oriented. Or in other words, define first what the intended outcome of the policy work is and work backwards in: defining what to do when; which policy process should be influenced; on what level; and which government actors should and could be approached, identify partners etc.*

The *communication strategy* and development of an effective and transparent communication process was a high priority of the project. The main objectives of the communication strategy were to a) enhance support from various audiences (e.g. local communities, Governments, donor community, general public) for the Project's concept and approach, and b) provide clear information how the public charity funds were spent and what we achieved (accountability). The strategy needs to assure one common message from the joint partners to the public and media.

An important instrument in the communication was the creation of website. This website contains a wealth of information for both the general public and project partners (an intranet site which is password protected). This website is highly appreciated by local partners.

Other communication material included fact sheets, special reports, video material, etc.

*Observation: Information is power. As also observed by the general tsunami evaluation report access to high quality information enables affected people to define and demand accountability, based on their own expectations and standards. It also allows them to plan their own recovery. Under the GC-project some good and practical field oriented guidelines have been produced that can be used in other settings as well. The Internet website could be improved as the wealth of information is actually a bit too much and varies considerably in quality. Not all information gathered for this end-evaluation could be found on the Internet website. In general, the attention given to communication was good. There is however still a demand by local NGOs and research institutes to also have access to raw data collected under the Green Coast project. How and to what extent such data can be made available should be considered.*

### 7.3 Efficiency and effectiveness in a post-disaster setting

A striking element of the Green Coast project was its post-disaster setting. However, the Green Coast project is not designed as a humanitarian emergency relief activity (as implemented by organisations like the Red Cross). The *GC project is a rehabilitation project* after the first needs of the affected people are addressed. This character distinction is very important when assessing the results of the project. For humanitarian relief the 'Sphere Handbook', which sets standards for such aid, identifies four major components: (1) Water supply, Sanitation and Hygiene promotion; (2) Food Security, Nutrition and Food Aid; (3) Shelter, settlement and non-food items; (4) Health services. The Green Coast project can be described as an 'Ecosystem & Livelihoods' project that may assist in the longer term sustainability of some relief activities (i.e. water supply, sanitation, agriculture/fisheries for food security, settlements). The rationale behind such projects is that a healthy and functioning ecosystem is needed in order to be used by people as a resource base (for both goods and services).

The budget raised in international aid is estimated at 12 billion USD<sup>10</sup>. In the Netherlands the co-operating aid organisations (SHO) received a record contribution of the Dutch people of 200 million Euros<sup>11</sup>. Relief activities focused first on food, water, health and shelter. Later also rehabilitation and reconstruction activities were funded. The Green Coast project is one of those projects and relatively modest in budget size.

General constraints mentioned for the post-disaster work, which are also applicable for the Green Coast project:

- Destruction of infrastructure making areas difficult to access;
- Pre-disaster weaknesses in national and local capacities were a major constraint;
- Loss of numerous capable people resulting in an absence of social and institutional structures especially on a local level;
- Co-ordination of the numerous aid organisations was difficult. All wanted to work with the limited number of local NGOs and CBOs;
- The pre-tsunami conflict situations in Indonesia and Sri Lanka hampered aid (and recently the situation in Sri Lanka worsened making certain areas impossible to work in. This will also affect sustainability).

*In many disasters there is a gap between relief and recovery. In the post-tsunami this was not the case. The GC project can be seen as one of the projects that closed this gap and worked with affected communities on recovery and rehabilitation.* The general conclusion of the report regarding the recovery work was: "Overall, international relief personnel were less successful in their recovery and risk reduction activities than they were in the relief phase. More sustainable, context-specific approaches, through and with local and national capacities, are required". Other important observations are that "Recovery is context- and location-specific rather than time-bound", "... Re-building communities and livelihoods is more complex and takes longer than building houses or distributing goods. The concentration on distribution of assets, especially boats, demonstrated a failure to understand and support diversified and sustainable livelihoods and communities".

One dominating aspect of project implementation was the time pressure. All activities had to be implemented and finished within a 2-year time frame. This is very short for a rehabilitation activity and it will be difficult to assess results and sustainability (which typically need a longer time horizon).

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<sup>10</sup> Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (2006): Synthesis report.

<sup>11</sup> SHO action report (2008): 'Niet voor niets: drie jaar na de tsunami'.



Thus, the main questions regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of the GC project in a post-disaster setting are:

- 1) Did the GC-project indeed fill the gap between relief and recovery?
- 2) Was the timing of the GC-project correct and could it deal with the time pressure?
- 3) Is the GC-project context- and location specific and building on local capacities?
- 4) Does the 'Ecosystem & Livelihoods approach' not hamper relief activities and does it positively contribute to the sustainability of relief work?

*Our conclusions are:*

Ad. 1: Especially the way the Small-Grants Facility has been implemented in a participatory manner fills this gap between relief and recovery. The SGF had a meaningful contribution e.g. the home gardens, restoration of agricultural lands, planting of mangroves, artificial reefs to restore livelihoods both on the short-term as well as on the long-term.

Ad. 2: The timing of GC-project could be better. We feel the project could be implemented in (re-) established communities more or less 3 months after the relief work (maybe 3-6 months after the event). The time pressure was difficult to the regular staff and often mentioned as a constraint. We feel this cannot be used as an excuse in a post-disaster setting or not to link work. The staff should rather change its mentality towards a rather 'quick & dirty' response, accept failures and mistakes and define a process for adaptation in the first months.

Ad. 3: The SGF is a great instrument to make investments context and location specific. Especially experiences regarding the micro-revolving funds are suitable. Local capacities are often used and groups empowered. One problem however is that many relief activities take the form of hand-out's which spoil the recipient's mentality. Other relief work entail 'cash-for-work'. Green Coast staff was regularly confronted with this mentality and had often convince communities that their support work was different and required community participation. We believe that this works better in the end to empower people and enhance sustainability. In our opinion the GC-project mostly built on local capacities and quite often strengthened women's groups.

Ad. 4: The Green Coast project did not hamper any relief activity. The implementation of GC was actually almost one year after the event. If implemented sooner it would also not hamper such activity if GC stays focused on re-habilitated and established communities. In addition, we feel *GC-advisers should hamper reconstruction work*. Too often, re-construction work has been ill-planned: sea walls that could shift 50 mt inland. bridges that close off hinterland lagoons, housing without proper space for home gardens, plantation trees that are planted in the wrong place etc. etc. Such efforts could greatly benefit from the experience and knowledge of people that know more about the local ecosystem and how local communities use their resources.

The experiences of the GC-project - success and failures - should be shared with emergency relief organisation like: IFRC (Red Cross and Red Crescent, [www.ifrc.org](http://www.ifrc.org)), MSF (Artsen zonder Grenzen), World Food Programme; UNHCR, IOM and especially with organisations that also do some recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation work like CARE, the UN system ([www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int)); UNDP and World Bank.

#### **7.4 Project management and organisation**

The project is a co-operation effort in the Netherlands by 4 international operating Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs): BothENDS, IUCN NL (National Committee in the Netherlands of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature network),

Wereldnatuurfonds (WNF, part of the World-Wide Fund for Nature network), and Wetlands International. The latter is signatory to the contract with Oxfam-NOVIB, leading the project and providing the project manager.

The project management structure in general consisted of:

- 1) Steering Committee in the Netherlands
- 2) Project manager
- 3) National Coordination Teams (in India, Indonesia, and Thailand)
- 4) National Reference Group (in India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand)

Project management was assigned by mutual agreement to one of the smaller organisations (WI) in the consortium. All organisations were involved in appointing the project manager. According to the organisations this created a feeling of ownership and commitment.

A *Steering Committee* was formed between the Green Coast partners with the purpose to:

- 1) Supervise management and implementation; which includes:
  - (a) approval work plans;
  - (b) approval progress reports;
  - (c) approval and monitoring budgets.
- 2) Programme development;
- 3) Guidance to national coordinating offices and national project steering committees;
- 4) Joint overall responsibility for organising adequate accountability and reporting on the way funds are allocated and for quality of implementation.

The first meeting was held in May 2005 and subsequently meetings were held every month. The first minutes of the meetings that were made available to all partners through the website are dated December 12<sup>th</sup>, 2005. This transparency was much appreciated.

During project implementation the national project teams were informed that all small grant projects above 15,000 Euros (category C projects) had to be submitted to the Steering Committee for approval. A letter describing the reasoning was sent to partners on January 26<sup>th</sup>, 2006. The main reason given was the media attention in The Netherlands to spending of public money in the post-tsunami period (which was criticised). The SC wanted to assure proper accountability. At first this worked very well. Later on the response time of the SC became longer, leading to delays (observation mid-term review). The Steering mechanism worked well in general.

The focus of the project was on implementing the project in the five participating countries. Support by the organisations was mainly given to the national NGOs (e.g. on small-grants by IUCN, on gender by BothENDS). Therefore, the co-operation in the Netherlands was limited, but can be considered supportive and meaningful vis-à-vis the goals of the project.

As stated in the mid-term review, project management at Wetland International HQ has done a remarkable job and is praised by all respondents in the visited countries. The general feeling was that without the continuous support from HQ the project would never have been where it stands now. This has not changed. The project manager acted in a neutral manner but was also committed to implementation. The appointed project manager was not content-driven but rather communication and management oriented. This proved to be very positive.

In the implementation countries a project management structure was formed consisting of a *National Coordination Team* (NCT), a *National Reference Group* (NRF) and a *Project Team*.

On paper the project it is well structured and the rationale behind the structure is sound. The division between project classes (A<5,0000 Euros; B 5,000-15,000 Euros; and C above 15,000 Euros) as well as the linked decision-making is good. In general, the overall structure worked quite well but also quite a few problems have arisen: a project manager that could not work together with the NCT; an NCT that is very directive but distant; GC-partners that work separate from each other; project team members that work in isolation; staff hired new on the job (in a disaster situation this takes too long and they have often less experience). Conflicts seem unavoidable in any institutional setting, but we feel the best way to solve future problems is by:

- 1) Forming a locally-based Project Team consisting of regular staff members of the participating organisations for the first 3-6 months. At first the team could entail a project manager, a financial officer, the small-grants officer and the members of the Assessment team (3 months). Later responsibilities can be transferred to others whereby the previous staff is still present within the own organisation for consultation.
- 2) The National Coordination Team should focus on the strategic orientation of the response effort and define the focus based upon the Assessment. They should not get involved in day-to-day management and leave decision regarding small-grants to the project manager and the National Reference Group. In the case the PM and NRG differ in opinion the NCT should decide. The NCT should regularly do ex-ante monitoring on the orientation of the SGF.
- 3) The National Reference Group should consist of experts whose organisations may not apply for small-grants. The NRG advises on medium and larger projects.
- 4) The Assessments define the focus of the post-disaster work and should provide strategic guidance. Therefore, the Steering Group should decide upon the Assessments. For each disaster setting one comprehensive report should be submitted. The report should provide strategic guidance to the SGF and potential policy issues regarding reconstruction work.

## **7.5 Monitoring**

The monitoring from the Netherlands of the country teams was mainly done by the project manager and the financial officer. Especially for the small-grants work the specialist on the Small Grants Facility from IUCN Netherlands provided guidance and monitoring of this work. In general, the guidance documents and other material provided to the country teams are clear.

Regarding the assessments specific guidance was provided by an expert of Wetlands International (following the guidance document provided in an earlier stage). Letters were sent to India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Sri Lanka. It seems that – with the exception of Indonesia – not much was done with observations and remarks.

In conclusion, we feel that a substantial effort was made on an international level to monitor the implementation and progress of the Green Coast project. The in-country follow-up could however improve significantly. If a country team decides to deviate and does not agree this should be properly communicated to higher levels and documented.

From the start the whole project would have benefited if one database structure was made mandatory to all country teams to monitor progress, outputs and outcomes. They now deviate very much from each other and differ considerably in quality. The database should link component activities and small-grants projects to budgets, expenditures, intended outputs, achieved outputs and outcomes.

In general, the policy work is input and output oriented. The investment of means and focus of activities would benefit strongly if outcomes would be defined related policy decisions.

This would also make it possible to monitor progress and enable decisions to re-focus efforts if the team feels the process is not leading to the outcome. Within GC-project the outcomes of policy work have not been defined by indicators or monitored.

The financial monitoring by most organisations and their audits seems in line with the requirements. For Thailand some confusing exists as three organisations are involved and information seems not to have been shared. There is not one comprehensive database.

***In-country monitoring India:***

The Small-Grants Officer and his assistant led the monitoring in India. Field level monitoring was partly done by a local NGO. The overall monitoring by the SGO looks good and he recorded performance and output in a comprehensive database. Less attention was paid to the capacities of local SG-recipients. They were mostly assisted through the personal support by the SGO. The role and contribution by the hired local NGO seems limited and not very convincing. It focused more checking as an outside reviewer than helping to improve performance.

***In-country monitoring Indonesia:***

Due to the enormous influx of relief funds and international organisations a strong competition for local partners developed. This led to high percentage of inexperienced partners under the small-grants facility. But the GC-team responded to this by employing four regional field staff for monitoring work. As a result they developed the most comprehensive monitoring framework of the GC-countries and were the only ones to pay specific attention to the capacities of local partners organisations. This led to a comprehensive assessment and scoring of their partners on their performance on (i) ecosystem restoration; (ii) livelihood rehabilitation; (iii) gender; (iv) performance. The result is a strong and convincing performance by the Indonesian GC-team.

***In-country monitoring Sri-Lanka:***

Monitoring in Sri Lanka was rather good but not so formalised and at a distance. There was a proper administration and a sound budget-monitoring. The GC-implementing organisation, IUCN Sri Lanka, took the position of a donor. They regularly visited projects and assessed progress. Actual implementation constraints by recipients related to their capacities, gender etc. could therefore not directly be addressed. A lesson learned for Sri Lanka is that monitoring was good but a closer contact as an 'Adviser' would help local partners and probably improve implementation.

***In-country monitoring Thailand:***

The monitoring in Thailand was not formalised and seemed very limited. The funds were divided over three organisations: WI, WWF, IUCN and it seems no effort was made to conduct a comprehensive monitoring based upon one framework and the same indicators. Monitoring was left to the individual organisations. As a result, the coordinator has no overview, implementation varies and it is now difficult to assess actual outputs, outcomes and performance by local partners.

***In-country monitoring Malaysia:***

The monitoring in Malaysia was limited and not institutionalised. There was also no need because only one SG-project was supported. The recipient could have used some additional support in relation to some capacity issues.

## ***7.6 The Green Coast Project Design in a crises situation***

In general the design of the project was considered by the implementing organisations as good (meaning the necessary components were there). The phasing of the original proposal

was also sound. However, due to the time-pressure they were implemented simultaneously. Only very late during project implementation the synergy improved. The relevance of for example the assessments for the small grants projects was thereby lost.

The evaluation team agrees that the initial design of the project contained good elements and was innovative. The implementing organisations had to learn a lot about implementing such a project in a post-disaster setting. Almost everybody – all normally work in regular development and conservation projects – complain about the time pressure and the time horizon of two years.

However, the evaluation team feels that the project design and phasing can be improved. For example, many grass-root organisations and community groups could benefit from capacity building. The small-grants officers and financial officers now did this implicitly on for example administration. Identification of how women use their environmental resources could also be improved as well as how (and when and why) to define a micro revolving fund might improve the overall impact and sustainability. Therefore, a new program should explicitly build in a component to build capacity and address gender issues. The project components would thus be:

1. Rapid Assessment of Impact on “Ecosystem & Livelihoods”
2. Policy Work and Communications
3. Small Grants Facility
4. Capacity building NGOs/CBOs and gender issues
5. Learning and exchange

The phasing of the GC-project could be:

Month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
<i>Disaster event</i>												
<b>Response</b>												
<i>Project formulation</i>												
<i>Rapid Assessment</i>												
<i>Advisory role team</i>												
<i>SG-projects ident.</i>								1st	2nd	3rd		
<i>Policy issues ident.</i>												
<i>The project can be finalised after the project period granted by the donor, e.g. 18 months</i>												

### 7.7 Research questions on "ecosystems & livelihoods"

The rationale for the project was that most coastal communities were heavily depending on their coastal natural resources (e.g. fisheries, small-scale eco-tourism). Many coastal communities also used semi-natural resources like home gardens, bamboo and coconut groves. Poor fishing communities have been most severely hit by the Tsunami in many locations. A large part of the fishing fleet has been lost. Damage to coral reefs, mangroves, sea grass beds, peat lands and estuaries will reduce their ability to provide nursery habitat for local fisheries, and the region’s marine food chain will suffer for years. The event also caused loss of tourism enterprises (Sri Lanka, Thailand) and shrimp ponds (Indonesia and Malaysia), Coral reefs have been damaged in various locations, diminishing the tourism potential in those areas (besides the fact that many small beach front tourist lodges were destroyed).

Therefore, the project specifically focused on ecosystem based livelihood reconstruction. The long-term objective (> 5 years) of the project is to rehabilitate local livelihoods through restoration of coastal ecosystems. The short-term objective was to make rapid assessments of

damage and impacts on both ecosystems and livelihoods, to guide rehabilitation policies, and to support small-scale rehabilitation projects in hotspot areas (2 years).

The expected project impact/outcome was that the project would ultimately contribute to more secure livelihoods of the beneficiaries through, among others (source project proposal): i) a healthier/ more intact natural resource base; ii) better security from damaging storm and flood events; iii) increased potential for economic development; and iv) stronger ownership by local communities of the natural resource base.

In relation to this rationale several research questions can be defined.

***Research questions regarding coastal livelihoods and poverty reduction***

- What is the direct and indirect value of the natural resources to the income of a household? what distinction can be made between the asset poor and other and what instruments are most suitable to improve the situation?
- How do women use their coastal natural resources and what is the contribution to the household income and food security?
- To what extent can a recovery project facilitate the recognition of tenure and user rights in a recovery situation? what are tools available to avoid land grabbing?
- What is their resilience against new climatic events and how adaptable are they to climate change?

***Research questions regarding healthy coastal as a safety buffer***

Field experience shows that coral reefs, mangroves and other coastal forests reduce the impacts of tidal waves and hurricane in coastal areas. They also did when the tsunami struck according to eye witnesses. According to available information, human and economic losses were most severe along shorelines lacking natural vegetation and with constructions close to the sea. Coastal communities that were situated more inland were better protected. To safeguard future human security and protection – also in view of frequent cyclones and floods in the region – it is essential to rehabilitate those natural buffers. Or in other words: to restore so-called *green coasts*. But, various scientists doubt whether coastal forests could have a significant meaning against tidal waves and hurricanes.

- To what extent provide coastal forests protection against tidal waves and other climatic events?
- What are design features of a 'soft' barrier vis-à-vis the risk scenarios of climatic events?, i.e. how wide the forest has to be, how far inland, which species, how widespread planted, what is the energy absorption capacity etc.
- To what extent is the coastal ecosystem resilient enough to withstand climate change and natural climatic events?, i.e. the climate change adaptation.

## 8 Integration, up-scaling and follow-up

### 8.1 Sustainability, integration and up-scaling

#### *Sustainability*

The sustainability of the small-grants work varies. We have the impression that most investments in individual households (e.g. home gardens) have been very successful and are sustainable. The Micro-Revolving Funds too have become sustainable. The Funds we reviewed continue to grow in savings and the groups that administer the Funds look strong and capable. Some ecological restoration projects are very successful and no further attention is needed. However, some look very unsustainable. Either because the survival rate so far has been low, or the community does not attend to the seedlings. Without further support to attend to the seedlings they will wither away. Per project one should assess for how long further support would be needed and what the investment would entail. Based upon this information a decision should be taken whether this support is feasible to achieve sustainability within a reasonable time frame.

In general however, to ensure sustainability of ecological restoration a small-grants project should be 3-5 years. This is often the time needed for a seedling to reach water with its roots and to become strong enough to withstand, grazing, droughts and other climatic events.

#### *Integration, mainstreaming*

There are various strategies possible for bringing the work done by the 'Green Coast project forward:

1. Integration/mainstreaming of the experiences and lessons into the work of the participating organisations to improve (ongoing) programmes;
2. Up-scaling of the green coastal rehabilitation work by either providing more budget to project activities and/or mainstreaming in the coastal zone management strategies of the five countries;
3. Integration of the experiences into the work of humanitarian relief organisations;
4. Institutionalise disaster response activities in coastal zones.

Some of the SG-projects in the various countries (India, Sri Lanka and Thailand) need some additional support to continue their work and ensure sustainability. If additional financial resources would be made available this would be possible. However, we do not consider this 'project-driven' intervention as we feel it is more important that the intervention areas or themes become an integrated part of the GC-organisations (or not).

#### *Integration in the four organisations*

Some very important lessons have been learned and experiences gained (as presented and discussed in various workshops. Most of this work is or will be incorporated in the ongoing work of the four organisations in the various countries (see the country chapters). Especially, the approaches and instruments are integrated. The work on gender still needs some significant improvement.

#### *Up-scaling: integration into government policies*

During project implementation a major new program was initiated (likely from earlier pre-Green Coast discussions by other parties): IUCN International has launched the '*Mangroves for the Future*' initiative aimed at promoting investment in ecosystem conservation for coastal development. It is based on the existing opportunity to look beyond immediate post-tsunami reconstruction processes, towards long-term sustainable coastal zone management in the future. The Green Coast project is mentioned and GC-organisations will be involved. This

initiative can be seen as an up-scaling of work implemented under Green Coast. However, in some countries like India other priority regions are chosen suggesting there is no real intention to up-scale the work of Green Coast on field level. The 'Green Coast Approach', i.e. the various instruments are used.

Our observation is that there is a need for incorporating the 'Green Coast Approach' - and especially the work with the coastal communities - into the overall coastal zone management of the five countries. This would have been an up-scaling opportunity for the four organisations under the 'Green Coast' umbrella. However, this is exactly what the IUCN 'Mangroves for the Future' aims for. The initiative targets the coastal zones of the Indian Ocean countries and incorporates a large number of organisations. Thus, the GC-partners should work together to integrate the GC-approach in the initiative.

*Integration of "Nature & Poverty" concerns into relief organisations.*

Many relief organisations have become aware of the 'environment' as an issue. At first this had mainly to do with the impact of refugees and refugee camps on the surrounding environment (see box below). This is a crises different situation but might be interesting for an "ecosystem approach" as well. Later, the awareness of the interrelations between the natural resource base and rural livelihoods rose. In this latter context the "ecosystem approach" plays an important role and is often misunderstood by non-experts.

Just after tsunami the US Red Cross initiated a partnership with WWF US<sup>12</sup>. This partnership builds on previous discussions between the two organisations. In essence, WWF will advice on rehabilitation policies and to include ecological and environmental aspects in their restoration work. It mentions the focal themes of humanitarian aid: (i) livelihoods; (ii) construction; (iii) water and sanitation; and (iv) disaster preparedness. WNF is not directly involved in this work. It is however strange to see that WWF US presents Green Reconstruction Guidelines for Aceh Province in Indonesia (January 2006) and these do not mention either the Green Coast Project or WWF Indonesia's partner Wetland International. Nor does the website provide a link to the Green Coast work. Although it is not necessary that the 'Green Coast Project' survives as a stand-alone project, it would surely be good to present the experience gained as a 'Green Coast Approach' because it has valuable experiences and lessons.

**Box 8: Another connection: Wildlife, Refugees and Relief Agencies.**

Poverty-conservation discussions mostly focus on the roles and responsibilities of conservation organisations and development assistance agencies. A new report by TRAFFIC sheds light on an often overlooked sector in this debate – humanitarian relief agencies: the NGOs, UN agencies and government bodies that work on the ground with refugees, victims of natural disasters and so on. The report explores what happens when insufficient attention is paid to wildlife management and conservation in areas that have been designated for refugee camps, drawing on experience from Tanzania which, since 1993, has been host to one of the largest concentrations of refugees in the world.

For over a decade, relief agencies have recognised the need to address environmental management issues in and around refugee camps, recognising the dependence of refugee livelihoods on natural resources such as fuel wood, wood poles and local water sources. However, TRAFFIC finds that the contribution of wild meat towards refugee food security and well-being, and the impact of refugee camp management policies on the wildlife sector, are not fully recognized. Particular concerns include the location of refugee camps (in Tanzania, more than 20 major camps have been located close to game reserves and other protected areas), the inadequate provision of essential protein supplies in refugee rations (despite the best efforts of the World Food Programme, rations are often in short supply and do not include meat), and a government policy that discourages "self-reliance" in refugee camps (meaning that income-earning opportunities are few and far between). As a result, illegal hunting, trading and

<sup>12</sup> <http://www.worldwildlife.org/humanitarian/arc/index.cfm>



consumption of wild meat (referred to locally as “night time spinach” because of the covert, after-dark nature of the trade) have flourished.

The sheer number of refugees has led to extensive habitat degradation, while the hunting and trade of wild animals for meat has had a major negative impact on local wildlife populations. One outcome of this has been a decrease in income to local authorities as the refugee situation has undermined commercial hunting and tourism operations. Another has been decreasing availability of important livelihood resources to the resident local community as wildlife populations have dwindled. Despite this, TRAFFIC do not advocate a wholesale clamp-down on the refugees’ activities – though the report highlights that law enforcement will be essential to protect some endangered species such as chimpanzees and elephants. Of more concern is the fact that the trade is symptomatic of a failure by the international community to meet the refugees’ basic needs. Humanitarian relief agencies need to address inadequate food provision policies and sustainable wildlife use may be one option to consider more seriously – both as a source of protein for refugees and as a source of income for local communities.

In conclusion: relief agencies have to become part of the conservation-poverty debate.

*Source: Jambiya, G., Milledge, S.A.H. and Mtango, N. (2007). ‘Night Time Spinach’: Conservation and livelihood implications of wild meat use in refugee situation sin north-western Tanzania. TRAFFIC East/Southern Africa, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.*

*The report is available to download from: <http://www.traffic.org/home/2008/1/22/lack-of-meat-for-refugees-causing-large-scale-poaching.html>*

## **8.2 Follow-up: Resilient Coasts Program**

Based upon some of the findings and discussions during the evaluation there is an opportunity to work with the same countries on climate change adaptation towards the development of resilient coasts and resilient communities. Some of questions that need to answered have been presented in paragraphs 7.7. A project could:

### **Focus on:**

- Resilient coastal ecosystems and resilient communities;
- Identify policy issues from local ‘ecosystem & livelihood’ discussions.

### **Issues:**

- Climate change adaptation & ICZM;
- Coastal forests as safety buffer;
- Integrate ‘Ecosystem & Livelihoods’.

### **A need for a Regional project?:**

- One reason might be the economy of scale and the higher absorption capacity of a consortium of organisations and countries;
- The region-wide adaptation needs should become clearer;
- There is always a need for learning and exchange between organisations in the region;
- But: a regional project should built in a real need for regional co-operation!, for example by addressing conflicting cross-border policies hampering ‘Resilient Coasts’.

## **8.3 Be prepared for future disaster relief: Green Rapid Response Team**

Based upon the contribution made by the Green Coast in the recovery period after the Tsunami (see outcomes) and how the ‘Green Coast Approach’ could fill the gap between relief

and recovery (see 7.3), we propose that the four organisations together with some recovery-oriented organisations (like the SHO, CARE, UNDP) look into the possibility of creating a "Green Rapid Response Team".

All findings and observations discussed in the previous chapters can be used for this discussion and set-up of such a response team. In addition, the set-up could entail:

- Developing and maintaining a database of staff that has certain expertise, are knowledgeable about certain regions and learned their lessons;
- Developing and maintaining database of experts for Rapid Ecosystem & Livelihood Assessments;
- Develop on Handbook on Recovery of Ecosystems & Livelihoods with Green Coast experiences, lessons, the manuals for on-the-ground implementation etc.
- Developing contacts with UN system, IFRC, CARE and linking to the 'reliefweb' Internet site.
- Developing a project proposal format in order to be able to define and submit a proposal as quick as possible.

A rapid assessment should be deployed when coastal ecosystems are hit by cyclones, tsunamis and when appropriate maybe also in large flooding situations. Expertise is needed on: (1) the specific ecosystem, (2) livelihoods, (3) gender.

## **8.4 Conclusion**

### ***Outputs and outcomes:***

- Green Coast countries and organisations show a diverse performance in achieving outputs and outcomes
- In general this performance is positive: many people were reached, and large number of ha were restored

### ***Efficiency (means -> outputs, outcomes):***

- Positive; small money with often big impact  
SG goal: 48,000 livelihoods -> 25,452 directly supported, 97,728 beneficiaries  
SG goal: 48,000 people aware/trained -> 117,813 people
- Overhead of small grants 'management' must remain low and clear (GC-partner%, local NGO/CBO%): Capacity building of SG-partners should be a separate component. When defining SGF thought should be given to economy of scale!

### ***Effectiveness (activities -> goals, outcomes, effects):***


- Positive but Assessments must improve in guiding SGF and policy issues  
Especially: home gardens, micro revolving fund, and the specific case of SRI
- Policy work should also become outcome oriented to have more effect.

### ***Sustainability:***

- In general positive but a small number of SG-projects need attention.
- Livelihood rehabilitation can feasibly achieved in 2 years.
- A time horizon for ecological restoration projects of 3-5 years is needed.


**Annex A: Map of the tsunami region and Green Coast project areas.**

*Map 16: Region hit by the tsunami.*



*(The yellow stars have no specific meaning in this context)*

*Map 17: Green Coast project areas.*



[\(click here](#) for internet link).

## **Annex B: Terms of Reference End Term Evaluation**

### **Green Coast; for nature and people after the tsunami**

*(final draft, March 10<sup>th</sup> 2008, MJV)*

#### **Background and context of the evaluation**

Green Coast, an initiative of four organizations, Wetlands International, Both ENDS, Wereld Natuur Fonds and IUCN NL, is developed in response to the 2004 Asian tsunami. With financial support of 4,4 million Euro from Oxfam NOVIB (through funds from SHO, Dutch public charity), Green Coast is implemented in the period June 2005 – March 2008 with the overall objective to recover coastal ecosystems in support to local livelihoods of tsunami affected people.

Green Coast focuses on three tsunami-affected countries: Indonesia, Sri Lanka and India, with limited support for policy work and model examples in Thailand and Malaysia. The partnership of the four organisations is based on a common vision and complementarities in terms of expertise, skills and regional networks of the four organizations and their partners. The project has three main components – assessment of the potential for ecological restoration to contribute to livelihood recovery; science-based policy and communications; plus a small grants facility to demonstrate the win-win solutions. These three components are inextricably linked and they will overlap in the timing of implementation. Although an emergency response project, Green Coast is designed as a long term endeavour to build resilient communities and ecosystems in vulnerable coastal regions in Asia.

Wetlands International HQ in the Netherlands has been in charge of the project management and coordination of all technical, organisational and financial aspects of Green Coast. A Steering Committee, consisting of the directors/representatives of the four Green Coast partners (IUCN NL, WNF, Both ENDS and WI) is overall responsible in guiding and steering the project.

The implementation of Green Coast is delegated to and coordinated within the respective countries (Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand & Malaysia). National offices of each of the partners have taken a central coordinating and managerial role, and (representatives) formed a National Coordination Team (NCT). In each of the countries, a National Reference Group (NRG) is established, with representatives of government, donor coordination bodies, relief agencies, development NGOs and scientists, to advise on the overall implementation of Green Coast, specifically on the community-based ecosystem and livelihood restoration projects.

A Midterm Evaluation was held in October/November 2006 with focus on three main countries: Indonesia, Sri Lanka and India. Main objectives: check progress, review project design and steering mechanism of the project, advice on how to improve implementation and on recommend on the development of Green Coast Phase 2. In its report (Nov. 2006), the midterm review team concluded a.o. the following:

- “Green Coast produced an impressive output of visible results contributing to the restoration of livelihoods of people hit by the tsunami, combined with an innovative approach to restore coastal ecosystems and landscapes in a sustainable manner”.
- “The distribution of funds through a Small Grants Facility is a very effective means to reach out to local communities hit by the tsunami and to have them actively participate in, and benefit from rehabilitation activities”.
- “Green Coast performs better than many of the other post-tsunami activities, in particular in the use of local capacities, participation of local beneficiaries and reduction of vulnerability to future disasters”.
- “Green Coast makes a strong case of restoring the environmental damage done by tsunami as well as post-tsunami relief work and pre-tsunami unsustainable developments. Green Coast goes even further in reducing the vulnerability of the coast by re-establishing coastal greenbelts, where other relief and rehabilitation activities have done significant harm to the environment of coastal areas”.
- “Green Coast is well conceived and innovative. The small grants components and its communities perspective are novel and unique in the context of relief work and Green Coast creates an

internationally collaborative effort to adopt a bottom up approach for restoration of ecosystems and livelihoods”.

- “Collecting ecological as well as social-economic baseline information is time consuming, but is an absolute necessity if one does not want projects to wither from faulty design”.
- “Restoration of ecosystems and livelihoods linked to such ecosystems cannot be realistically achieved in a 2,5 years period. The programme should not be simply abandoned after this phase. (.....) It is clear that tangible outputs for the environment and livelihoods have been obtained but long-term benefits will only be achieved if follow up activities are possible”.

After acceptance of the final report by the Steering Committee, Green Coast partners and the National Coordination teams, implemented and took into account most of the recommendations and advice from this Midterm Review.

### **Objectives and key questions of the evaluation**

Green Coast Phase 1, originally scheduled till March 2007, was granted a time extension till March 2008, with the aim to replicate some successful restoration projects, monitor & assess longer term impacts on ecosystems and livelihoods and to collect and communicate lessons learnt to key stakeholders.

It is expected that, by the end of March 2008, Green Coast partners in India, Sri Lanka and Thailand will have completed the extension phase with lessons learned documents and final impact assessment reports.

In Aceh & Nias, Green Coast Phase 1 was already completed in March 2007 and a second, follow up phase of Green Coast is currently being implemented till December 2008 with additional financial support (1 million euro) from Oxfam NOVIB (through DEC in the UK).

The Green Coast Steering Committee wishes to issue a final evaluation to assess results and outcomes, cost-efficiency and –effectiveness, to identify main lessons learned and advise and recommend on how to upscale effective intervention strategies in follow up projects and initiatives.

It is proposed to focus this final evaluation on Green Coast in Sri Lanka, India and Thailand with a quick review of GC activities in Malaysia and Indonesia.

For Green Coast in Indonesia, it is proposed to schedule a separate, final evaluation for Green Coast Phase 1 & 2 in Aceh & Nias in November/December 2008.

Key questions of the evaluation<sup>13</sup>:

1. What outcomes<sup>14</sup> (intended and unintended) have been achieved by Green Coast Phase 1?
2. Have these outcomes been achieved in a cost-efficient and cost-effective way? and are they sustainable?
3. What contributions have been made to women’s empowerment and furthering gender equality?
4. Have changes in policies and practices occurred to which Green Coast activities have contributed?
5. What lessons can be learned about the effectiveness of Green Coast as an approach (intervention strategy) to achieve outcomes?
6. Furthermore, the evaluation should make recommendations on how the Green Coast approach best be replicated and scaled up, in order to ensure sustainability of results. The evaluators should also look into possibilities to what extent Oxfam NOVIB and the Green Coast partners will integrate Green Coast approach in their regular work (what lessons can

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<sup>13</sup> Questions are formulated conform the Oxfam NOVIB 60124 guidelines “Central Research Questions to be integrated in Terms of Reference for Humanitarian Project Evaluations”

<sup>14</sup> See definition of ‘outcome’ in above mentioned guidelines

be learned from Green Coast and what can it ‘teach’ the involved partners?)

The evaluation will be **result oriented** and the final report will be used by Green Coast partners (incl. Oxfam NOVIB) in their dialogues with the humanitarian relief sector to promote the “ecosystem approach” in disaster relief work.

**Main stakeholders** of this evaluation are:

- Members of the Netherlands based Steering Committee
- Oxfam NOVIB as donor of Green Coast Phase 1
- Green Coast partners in the five countries

**Ad 1. What outcomes (intended and unintended) have been achieved by Green Coast Phase 1?**

Main questions:

- Are the intended outcomes, as formulated in the log frame, been achieved?
  - What are the outcomes in terms of rehabilitated livelihoods and how many people in total have benefitted?
  - What are the outcomes in terms of ecosystem restoration? (improved ecosystem services & functions, increased biodiversity)
  - Is there a link (and if yes, what kind of link) between the rehabilitated livelihoods and the restored ecosystems? For example in the context of disaster preparedness or long term livelihood benefits of restored ecosystems?
  - What are the outcomes related to the components ‘assessments’ and ‘policy and communications’ in the log frame?
- What are unintended outcomes of Green Coast such as number of people trained in technical capacities re coastal rehabilitation, number of people made aware and educated on coastal ecosystems, and other?
- Are the outcomes appropriate to the local situation and context?
- Have the outcomes been reached for people most in need with support that is priority to them? (<sup>15</sup>non-discrimination, needs based assessment, priority setting based on needs)
- Are the outcomes sustainable? (re participation, community ‘ownership’, building on local capacities, reduction of future vulnerabilities, restored ecosystems & livelihoods, etc.)

**Ad 2. Have these outcomes been achieved in a cost-efficient and cost-effective way?**

Main questions:

- What is the cost-benefit ratio: was it good value for money?:
  - Percentage of total project budget that ‘hit the ground’? (spent on restoration projects benefitting tsunami affected communities)
  - Percentage of total project budget spent on other activities:
    - Scientific assessments, monitoring & evaluation
    - Policy guidance & communications
    - Administration, project management
    - Capacity building, technical exchange & guidance (workshops, study-tours, intranet, etc)
  - Cost-benefit in relation to ‘replicability’ of the Green Coast model/approach. Replication of Green Coast model is also a ‘return on investment’.
- Have steering mechanism & management process been effective and efficient and did it

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<sup>15</sup> For explanation of issues mentioned after each question between “( )” : See box 3 in “Central Research Questions to be integrated in Terms of Reference for Humanitarian Project Evaluations”

nurture the partnership?

- Were monitoring & evaluation mechanisms adequate and effective?

***Ad 3 What contributions have been made to women's empowerment and furthering gender equality?***

- To what extent were the interventions 'gender sensitive', i.e. were specific roles, needs and risks for women satisfactorily been taken into account during implementation of the different components of Green Coast?
- Has this led to targeted number of women participating and benefiting from Green Coast?
- Were the roles and needs of other vulnerable groups (tribals, Dalit (India), Tamil (Sri Lanka)) taken into account and were these groups involved?

***Ad 4 Have changes in policies and practices occurred to which Green Coast has contributed?***

- Are these policy and practice changes appropriate to the local situation and context?
- Have the policy and practices changed for people most in need with support that is priority to them? (with respect to non-discrimination, needs based assessments and priority setting based on needs alone)
- Are the policy and practice changes sustainable? (with respect to participation, building on local capacities, accountability to beneficiaries, reduction of future vulnerabilities & co-ordination)

***Ad 5 What lessons can be learned about the effectiveness of Green Coast as intervention strategy to achieve outcomes?***

Here, the relation between the explanatory factors, the most important results and the quality of the

Results will be considered. What are good, bad and innovative practices? Were there any missed opportunities?

What lessons can be learned, both positive and negative, from the design and different aspects of implementation of Green Coast:

- Partnership approach: what has been the added value of the Green Coast partnership (both on international and national levels)? What were key success (and failure if any) factors and tools to make this partnership work?
- Added value of and linkage between the three different components: what lessons can be learned from this 3 pronged approach?
- Technical aspects of implementation: the (need for) technical capacity building of different stakeholders
- What are the key success factors and tools in the implementation of the Small Grants Facilities? What lessons can be learned from using small grants and/or financial tools for community-led coastal rehabilitation?
- Green Coast approach versus other tsunami relief projects focussing on restoration of livelihoods: what was the added value of the 'ecosystem approach'?
- Is there any lesson to be learned from the participatory and beneficiary role of communities? Were they sufficiently involved in the assessments, consultations, planning, implementation and maintenance of the restoration projects?
- What conclusions can be drawn on the coordination of Green Coast national

partners with other NGOs, CBOs, local government and other stakeholders? Any overlap or missed opportunities?

*Ad 6. What recommendations can be made on Green Coast follow up projects and initiatives?*

Main questions:

- What is needed to convince governments in these countries to use the Green Coast approach for their coastal development work?
- What are major opportunities to upscale and replicate Green Coast in other coastal areas and to mainstream Green Coast approach in other coastal ecosystem & livelihood initiatives?
- What opportunities are there to link follow up projects to climate change adaptation & mitigation initiatives?
- What possibilities exist for Oxfam NOVIB and the Green Coast partners to integrate Green Coast approach in their regular work (what lessons can be learned from Green Coast and what can it 'teach' the involved partners?)

### **3. Main activities of the evaluation team:**

#### **Additional information gathering**

A Midterm Review on Green Coast was executed in October/November 2006, by a team of 3 consultants: one team leader from NL and two consultants respectively from India and Indonesia. On the basis of a desk-study and interviews with key resources persons in the Netherlands, the team leader drafted a framework with key questions and priorities as guidance for the team during the review. The review team visited the three Green Coast focal countries Sri Lanka, India (both visited by 2 consultants) and Indonesia (1 consultant). Due to limited budget and time, no visits were made to Thailand and Malaysia and only key documents of green Coast in these countries were studied.

As the Midterm Review team already did much work in the form of a desk-study, interviews & meetings with key persons in the focal countries and visited a total number of 23 field projects, it is proposed not to replicate the same but do additional work in the final evaluation. Therefore, Midterm Review report should be used as a basis and starting point for the final evaluation and only additional documents, field visits and interviews should be studied and executed.

During the extension phase, from March 2007 – March 2008, a number of well performing NGOs in India, Sri Lanka and Thailand were invited to replicate their projects in other coastal areas and received additional funds. As it is interesting to check the replication potential of the restoration projects, the evaluation team is advised to visit some of these project sites. Furthermore, it is proposed to visit both Green Coast project areas in Thailand to study the model examples GC partners established in these two sites.

Concerning Green Coast in Malaysia: as there was only one community-based restoration project executed, relatively far away from KL, it does not seem to be efficient for the evaluation team to visit this field project. It is therefore advised that the team meets with Green Coast partner (WI-Malaysia) and other GC stakeholders in Kuala Lumpur and checks the outcomes of the field project through a desk-study.

Green Coast in Indonesia: as an evaluation of both Green Coast Phase 1 & 2 in Aceh & Nias



is scheduled for end 2008, it is advised that, for this evaluation, only a desk-study on Green Coast Phase 1 in Indonesia will be executed.

To summarize, the Green Coast Phase 1 final evaluation will focus on India, Sri Lanka, Thailand and, to a lesser extent Malaysia. Green Coast Phase 1 in Indonesia will be full part of this evaluation, however, only on the basis of a desk-study.

### **Main activities**

Main tasks for the evaluation team will be the following:

- Desk-study to review key documents (see Annex A)
- Internet scan to identify main coastal ecosystem & livelihood initiatives & key partners
- Interview key resource persons in the Netherlands: members of the NL Steering Committee, project manager & CEO at WI-HQ, guidance officers at IUCN NL & Both ENDS and key contacts within Oxfam NOVIB.
- Travel to Thailand, Sri Lanka, India & Malaysia to:
  - Do additional interviews with the following persons/representatives:
    - Members of the National Coordination Teams and key Green Coast staff within the national offices such as Small Grants, policy & communication officers
    - Members of the National Reference Group and representatives of Oxfam NOVIB
    - Representatives of donor/aid agencies and other relevant organisations (Red Cross, CARE, MDTF, Mangroves for the Future/IUCN Regional office) in Colombo, Chennai & Bangkok
    - Representatives of key government ministries/departments and policy makers in each country.
  - Visit additional Green Coast projects (preferably 'replication projects') in the prioritised coastal regions in each country, check results and outcomes and interview local implementing CBOs & NGOs and community participant and beneficiary groups
  - Spend some time at Green Coast project office in each country and study relevant in-country documents from SGF (Small Grants Facility) such as original reports from project grantees, progress reports, reports of monitoring visits & impact assessment documents
- Write (draft) evaluation report, incl. summary of findings and conclusions
- Present main findings and conclusions to NL based Green Coast Steering Committee and collect feedback and comments
- Produce final evaluation report (report should have 35 pages as maximum incl. 5 pages (max) for summary)

### **4. The evaluation team**

The evaluation will be executed by a team of 2 - 3 consultants (at least one woman), preferably one based in the Netherlands (to do desk-research and interviews in NL) and one or two consultants from the region.

Together, the evaluation team should have the following expertise:

- Working experience in the region (South- and Southeast Asia), preferably speaking one of the local languages (Sinhala, Tamil, Thai)
- Track record in leading and/or executing project evaluations

- Knowledge of 'ecosystem approach' and expertise in wetlands and/or coastal ecosystems
- Gender expertise
- Experience in community-based approaches and working with NGOs/CBOs
- Preferably experience with SGF: small grants as a tool for community-based work
- Preferably experience with working in a disaster relief/humanitarian aid context

The team should be available for a total of app. 20 days per person, preferably in the period of March 30 – April 30th 2008.

Draft report should be submitted by May 2nd and final report before May 16<sup>th</sup> 2008.

## **5. Proposed schedule & budget Mid Term Evaluation**

Start: week 14 (Starting March 31st)

Draft report ready: week 19 (May 8th)

### **1. Preparatory work and desk study by NL consultant:**

- 1,5 day desk-study in NL: Midterm Review, project-proposal, quarterly reports to Oxfam NOVIB, Lessons Learned workshop report, etc.
- 1 day desk-study specifically for Green Coast Phase 1 Indonesia documents and reports
- 1,5 day interviews in NL: Oxfam NOVIB, Steering Committee project manager, finance officer, Capacity Building officer SGF

*Total: 4 days NL based consultant*

### **2. Meetings & visits in the region**

Visit to the countries:

Sri Lanka: 4 days (app. 8 consultant days)

- 1 day interviews Colombo: Green Coast staff at IUCN SL, Members of NAC (Ministry of Environment, Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, etc.), Coast Conservation Department
- 0,5 day desk study (technical and financial dossiers small grant projects and other Green Coast documentation) in IUCN-Sri Lanka office Colombo
- 2,5 day field trip to visit additional small grant restoration projects (category A, B & C) in Southwest Sri Lanka

India: 4 days (app. 8 consultant days)

- 1 day interviews in Chennai: Green Coast staff from WISA, WWF, Both ENDS/PHCC, Members of NRG, Oxfam, State Ministry of Forests/Environment Tamil Nadu, FERAL/CAG, donors
- 0,5 day desk study (dossiers small grant projects & other GC project documentation) at Green Coast Chennai office
- 2,5 days field trip to visit additional small grant restoration projects (category A, B & C) in South Tamil Nadu

Malaysia: 1 day (2 consultant days)

- Meeting with WI-Malaysia and other key stakeholders of Green Coast in Malaysia & study relevant documents

Thailand: 4 days (app. 8 consultant days)

- 1 day meetings/interviews in Bangkok with Green Coast staff of IUCN-Thailand, WI-Thailand & WWF-Thailand, Mangroves for the Future key staff, etc. (2 consultants)
- 0,5 day desk study (dossiers small grant projects & other GC project documentation) at Green Coast project offices (WWF & IUCN office in Bangkok; WI-office)
- 2,5 days field trip to Koh Phra Tong & Had Thai Muang National Park (1 consultant)

Time needed to travel to and from these countries:

- NL based consultant: 3 days
  - Regional based consultant: 2 days
- Total time needed to travel to and from countries: 5 consultant days*

*Total 1 and 2: app 36 consultant days*

### **3. Report writing**

- Wrapping up, analysis & writing draft report: 6 days (4 days team leader, 3 days consultant)
- Presentation & feedback to project manager & Steering Committee: 1 day (team leader)
- Final report: 2 days (1 day team leader, 1 day consultant)

*Total report writing: 10 days*

Total number of days for evaluation: 46 consultant days

### **Annex 1: List of key documents for desk-study**

- Midterm Review final report plus annexes (Nov. 2006)
- Project proposal, log frames, budget and (sub)contracts
- Quarterly progress reports (technical and financial) of 2007 from WI-HQ to Oxfam NOVIB
- Minutes & resource papers Steering Committee 2007
- Final impact assessment documents from Indonesia, Sri Lanka and India
- News items, project descriptions & other information at Green Coast website: [www.greencoasts.org](http://www.greencoasts.org)
- Green Coast outputs per country:
  - assessment reports
  - policy reports
  - brochures, technical policy guidelines,
  - educational leaflets/flyers
  - report of Lessons Learned workshop Pondicherry Febr. 2007
  - reports Lessons Learned Workshops GC partners in India & Sri Lanka (summary translation LL workshop Thailand)
- Quarterly and final reports + Annexes from WI-IP and WWF on Green Coast Phase 1 in Aceh & Nias

## **Annex C-1: Explanation of terminology (e.g. effectiveness, efficiency)**

The various terms used for measuring project performance are described below. There is not one encompassing model to measure organisational efficiency and effectiveness, and the same terminology is used in a slightly different manner by different organisations. The terminology used is based upon the guidance note by OXFAM-Novib for Tsunami Evaluations and the note 'Handreiking Meten van Doelmatigheid' (measuring efficiency) aimed at the Dutch government and non-governmental organisations in the Netherlands:

*Output* = achievements by operations: quantitative and qualitative results.

*Outcome* = a result of the organisation's activities (output) that represents a potential contribution to the achievement of changes in existing policies and practices. Usually, outcomes coincide with a counterpart's one, two or three year objectives.

*Sustainability* = continuation results after the program.

*Efficiency* (doelmatigheid) = assessment of the use of means and the internal organisational processes in relations to achieving the direct project results (the outputs).

*Effectiveness* (effectiviteit, doeltreffendheid) = assessment of the activities in relations to achieving the goals and intended end results, outcomes and effects.

## Annex C-2: Performance Indonesia

*Table 18: Performance in Indonesia: targets and achievements*

	Indonesia	Target	Achieved	%
<b>Ecosystem restoration</b>				
<i>Mangrove regeneration</i>				
Area	ha	638	529	82.9%
Saplings	nos.	1,191,600	811,263	68.1%
Nurseries	units	29	29	100.0%
Survival Rate	%	1	1	68.0%
<i>TDEF plantation</i>				
Area	ha			
Saplings	nos.	119,350	107,350	89.9%
Nurseries	units	19	19	100.0%
Survival Rate	%		1	
Coral reef protection				
Community based protected area	ha	30	20	66.7%
Mooring buoy	ha	8	8	100.0%
<b>Livelihoods</b>				
<i>Eco-enterprises</i>				
Units	nos	-	209	?
Members	nos	-	305	?
Women direct beneficiaries	%			100.0%
<i>Sustainable agriculture</i>				
Area	ha	220	220	100.0%
Farmers	nos	1,856	1,856	100.0%
Increase in yeild over base	%		20-30%	
small scale fishery	nos	115	105	91.3%
Increase in yeild over base	%		50 - 100%	
Cattle (goat)	nos	600	523	87.2%
Increase in yeild over base	%		20-30%	
<i>Household production systems</i>				
<i>Vermicomposting units</i>				
Vermicomposting - Units	nos	2	2	100.0%
Vermicomposting - Members	Households	20	20	100.0%
<i>Community Infrastructure</i>				
Mooring buoys/devices - Units	nos	8	8	
Mooring buoys/devices - Users	Households	100	100	
Meeting huts - Units	nos	3	3	
Meeting huts - Users	Households	300	300	
Generator Fisher hamlet - Units	nos	4	4	
Generator Fisher hamlet - Users	Households	200	200	
<b>Awareness Generation</b>				
Traning / awareness programmes		400	400	100.0%
Cultural programmes / public metings		-	4	?
Skill Workshops		4	4	100.0%
Exposure visits		177	177	100.0%
Production of IEC material		1,000	8,000	800.0%
Total participants		12,000	12,000	100.0%

## Annex C-3: Performance India

*Table 19: Performance in India: targets and achievements*

	India	Target	Achieved	%
<b>Ecosystem restoration</b>				
<i>Mangrove regeneration</i>				
Area	ha	53	43	81.9%
Saplings	nos.	127,000	1,229,627	968.2%
Nurseries	units	13	13	100.0%
Survival Rate	%			58.0%
<i>TDEF plantation</i>				
Area	ha	7	7	92.9%
Saplings	nos.	48,000	62,473	130.2%
Nurseries	units	11	11	100.0%
Survival Rate	%			73.0%
<i>EIPs and other plantations</i>				
Seedlings	nos	329,201	344,336	104.6%
Homesteads	nos	4,610	4,750	103.0%
<b>Livelihoods</b>				
<i>Eco-enterprises</i>				
Units	nos	153	141	92.2%
Members	nos	844	626	74.2%
Women direct beneficiaries	%			37.0%
<i>Sustainable agriculture</i>				
Area	ha	521	521	100.0%
Farmers	nos	463	463	100.0%
Increase in yield over base	%			31.0%
<i>Household production systems</i>				
Vermicomposting units	nos	45	10	22.2%
Vermicomposting Members	Households	55	2	22.2%
Kitchen gardens - Members	Households	2,310	2,193	94.9%
Herbal gardens - Units	nos	104	102	98.1%
Herbal gardens - Members	Households	180	178	98.9%
<b>Community Infrastructure</b>				
<i>Safe drinking water</i>				
Units	nos	118	103	87.3%
Users	Households	216	201	93.1%
<i>Solid waste management</i>				
Units	nos	2	1	50.0%
Users	Households	101	100	99.0%
<b>Awareness Generation</b>				
Traning / awareness programmes		489	392	80.2%
Cultural programmes / public metings		102	73	71.6%
Skill Workshops		24	19	79.2%
Exposure visits		25	28	112.0%
Production of IEC material		43	29	67.4%
Total participants		66,939	86,186	128.8%
Female	%			32.0%
Children	%			56.0%

## Annex D: Methodology for calculating expenditures

The GC project used a standard for its budgets. Based upon this standard the budget lines have been grouped to indicate expenditures related to national level project implementation (1) by the GC-partners and expenditures related to local level implementation (2). The latter has been subdivided in: Management by the GC-partner (2a); Management by a grassroots NGO or community based organisation which includes administration, Technical Assistance and other capacity building work; and the funds for the small grants in direct support for “Ecosystem& Livelihoods” (2c).

*Example Table: Budget and expenditures*

	<b>Budget component</b>	<b>Original budget (Euros)</b>	<b>Expenditures (Euros)</b>	<b>% Exp. of total Exp.</b>
<b>1</b>	<b><i>National project management</i></b>			
<b>1a</b>	Assessment	xx	xx	xx%
<b>1b</b>	Policy Work, Communications	xx	xx	xx%
<b>2</b>	<b><i>Project costs Small Grants</i></b>	xx	xx	xx%
<b>2a</b>	Management costs GC partner	xx	xx	xx%
<b>2b</b>	Management NGOs/CBOs	xx	xx	xx%
<b>2c</b>	Direct “Ecosystem& Livelihood” support	xx	xx	xx%
				100%
	<b>Total country budget</b>	xx	xx	<b>100%</b>